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Yom Kippur War

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Military History and War

   Yom Kippur War

      Date     October 6 – October 26, 1973
    Location   Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and surrounding regions of the
               Middle East
     Result    UNSC Res. 338: cease-fire leading to Geneva Conference
   Casus belli Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel
               on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur.
   Combatants
   Israel Egypt
   Syria
   Jordan
   Iraq
   Commanders
   Moshe Dayan
   David Elazar
   Ariel Sharon
   Shmuel Gonen
   Benjamin Peled
   Israel Tal
   Rehavam Zeevi
   Aharon Yariv
   Yitzhak Hofi
   Rafael Eitan
   Abraham Adan
   Yanush Ben Gal Saad El Shazly
   Ahmad Ismail Ali
   Hosni Mubarak
   Mohammed Aly Fahmy
   Anwar Sadat
   Abdel Ghani el-Gammasy
   Abdul Munim Wassel
   Abd-Al-Minaam Khaleel
   Abu Zikry
   Mustafa Tlass ,
   Strength
   415,000 troops; 1,500 tanks, 3,000 armored carriers; 945 artillery
   units; 561 airplanes, 84 helicopters; 38 warships. Egypt: 800,000
   troops (300,000 deployed); 2,400 tanks, 2,400 armored carriers; 1,120
   artillery units; 690 airplanes, 161 helicopters; 104 warships
   Syria: 150,000 troops (60,000 deployed); 1,400 tanks, 800-900 armored
   carriers; 600 artillery units; 350 airplanes, 36 helicopters; 21
   warships
   Iraq: 60,000 troops; 700 tanks; 500 armored carriers; 200 artillery
   units; 73 airplanes
   see also Other participants
   Casualties
   2,656 killed
   7,250 wounded
   400 tanks destroyed
   600 damaged/returned to service
   102 planes shot down 8,528 killed
   19,540 wounded
   (Western analysis)
   15,000 dead
   35,000 wounded
   (Israeli analysis)
   2,250 tanks destroyed or captured
   432 planes destroyed
           Yom Kippur War
   Hizayon - Abiray-Lev - Latakia

   Related U.S. Operations
   Nickel Grass
                             Arab-Israeli conflict
   1920 riots · Jaffa riots · 1929 Palestine riots · 1936-1939 Arab revolt
   · 1948 Arab-Israeli War · Suez Crisis · Six-Day War · War of Attrition
   · Yom Kippur War · 1978 South Lebanon conflict · 1982 Lebanon War ·
   1982-2000 South Lebanon conflict · First Intifada · Gulf War · al-Aqsa
   Intifada · 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict

   The Yom Kippur War, Ramadan War or October War (Hebrew: מלחמת יום
   הכיפורים; transliterated: Milkhemet Yom HaKipurim or מלחמת יום כיפור,
   Milkhemet Yom Kipur; Arabic: حرب أكتوبر‎; transliterated: ħarb October
   or حرب تشرين, ħarb Tishrin), also known as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War
   and the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to October
   26, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab nations led by Egypt
   and Syria. The war began on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur with a
   surprise joint attack by Egypt and Syria crossing the cease-fire lines
   in the Sinai and Golan Heights, respectively, which had been captured
   by Israel in 1967 during the Six-Day War.

   The Egyptians and Syrians advanced during the first 24–48 hours, after
   which momentum began to swing in Israel's favour. By the second week of
   the war, the Syrians had been pushed entirely out of the Golan Heights.
   In the Sinai to the south, the Israelis struck at the "seam" between
   two invading Egyptian armies, crossed the Suez Canal (where the old
   ceasefire line had been), and cut off an entire Egyptian army just as a
   United Nations cease-fire came into effect.

   The war had far-reaching implications for many nations. The Arab world,
   which had been humiliated by the lopsided defeat of the
   Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian alliance during the Six-Day War, felt
   psychologically vindicated by its string of victories early in the
   conflict. This vindication paved the way for the peace process that
   followed, as well as liberalizations such as Egypt's infitah policy.
   The Camp David Accords, which came soon after, led to normalized
   relations between Egypt and Israel—the first time any Arab country had
   recognized the Israeli state. Egypt, which had already been drifting
   away from the Soviet Union, then left the Soviet sphere of influence
   almost entirely.

Background

Casus belli

   This war was part of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a conflict which has
   included many battles and wars since 1948. During the Six-Day War six
   years earlier, the Israelis had captured the Sinai clear to the Suez
   Canal, which had become the cease-fire line. The Israelis had also
   captured roughly half of the Golan Heights from Syria.

   In the years following that war, Israel erected lines of fortification
   in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights. In 1971 Israel spent $500
   million fortifying its positions on the Suez Canal, a chain of
   fortifications and gigantic earthworks known as the Bar Lev Line, named
   after Israeli General Chaim Bar-Lev.

   Nonetheless, according to Chaim Herzog,

          On June 19, 1967, the National Unity Government [of Israel]
          voted unanimously to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan
          Heights to Syria in return for peace agreements. The Golans
          would have to be demilitarized and special arrangement would be
          negotiated for the Straits of Tiran. The government also
          resolved to open negotiations with King Hussein of Jordan
          regarding the Eastern border.

   The Israeli decision was to be conveyed to the Arab nations by the
   United States. The US was informed of the decision, but not that it was
   to transmit it. There is no evidence of receipt from Egypt or Syria,
   who thus apparently never received the offer. The decision was kept a
   closely-guarded secret within Israeli government circles and the offer
   was withdrawn in October, 1967.

   Egypt and Syria both desired a return of the land lost in the Six-Day
   War. However, the Khartoum Arab Summit issued the "three nos,"
   resolving that there would be "no peace, no recognition and no
   negotiation with Israel."

   President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt died in September 1970. He was
   succeeded by Anwar Sadat, who resolved to fight Israel and win back the
   territory lost in the Six-Day War. In 1971, Sadat, in response to an
   initiative by UN intermediary Gunnar Jarring, declared that if Israel
   committed itself to "withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the
   Gaza Strip" and to implementation of other provisions of UN Security
   Council Resolution 242 as requested by Jarring, Egypt would then "be
   ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel." Israel responded
   that it would not withdraw to the pre- June 5, 1967 lines.

   Sadat hoped that by inflicting even a limited defeat on the Israelis,
   the status quo could be altered. Hafiz al-Assad, the head of Syria, had
   a different view. He had little interest in negotiation and felt the
   retaking of the Golan Heights would be a purely military option. Since
   the Six-Day War, Assad had launched a massive military build up and
   hoped to make Syria the dominant military power of the Arab states.
   With the aid of Egypt, Assad felt that his new army could win
   convincingly against the Israeli army and thus secure Syria's role in
   the region. Assad only saw negotiations beginning once the Golan
   Heights had been retaken by force, which would induce Israel to give up
   the West Bank and Gaza, and make other concessions.

   Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three
   years since Sadat had taken office… were the most demoralized in
   Egyptian history… A desiccated economy added to the nation's
   despondency. War was a desperate option." In his biography of Sadat,
   Raphael Israeli argued that Sadat felt the root of the problem was in
   the great shame over the Six-Day War, and before any reforms could be
   introduced he felt that shame had to be overcome. Egypt's economy was
   in shambles, but Sadat knew that the deep reforms that he felt were
   needed would be deeply unpopular among parts of the population. A
   military victory would give him the popularity he needed to make
   changes. A portion of the Egyptian population, most prominently
   university students who launched wide protests, strongly desired a war
   to reclaim the Sinai and was highly upset that Sadat had not launched
   one in his first three years in office.

   The other Arab states showed much more reluctance to fully commit to a
   new war. King Hussein of Jordan feared another major loss of territory
   as had occurred in the Six-Day War, during which Jordan was halved in
   population. Sadat was also backing the claim of the PLO to the
   territories (West Bank and Gaza) and in the event of a victory promised
   Yasser Arafat that he would be given control of them. Hussein still saw
   the West Bank as part of Jordan and wanted it restored to his kingdom.
   Moreover, during the Black September crisis of 1970 a near civil war
   had broken out between the PLO and the Jordanian government. In that
   war Syria had intervened militarily on the side of the PLO, leaving
   Assad and Hussein estranged.

   Iraq and Syria also had strained relations, and the Iraqis refused to
   join the initial offensive. Lebanon, which shared a border with Israel,
   was not expected to join the Arab war effort due to its small army and
   already evident instability. The months before the war saw Sadat engage
   in a diplomatic offensive to try to win support for the war. By the
   fall of 1973 he claimed the backing of more than a hundred states.
   These were most of the countries of the Arab League, Non-Aligned
   Movement, and Organization of African Unity. Sadat had also worked to
   curry favour in Europe and had some success before the war. Britain and
   France had for the first time sided with the Arab powers against Israel
   on the United Nations Security Council.

Events leading up to the war

   Anwar Sadat in 1972 publicly stated that Egypt was committed to going
   to war with Israel, and that they were prepared to "sacrifice one
   million Egyptian soldiers." From the end of 1972, Egypt began a
   concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-21s, SA-2,
   SA-3, SA-4, (Returned to the Soviet Union prior to the war), SA-6 and
   SA-7 Surface-to-air missiles (SAM), RPG-7s, T-55 and T-62 Tanks, and
   especially the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet
   Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet doctrines.
   Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout
   in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.

   The role of the great powers, too, was a major factor in the outcome of
   the two wars. The policy of the Soviet Union was one of the causes of
   Egypt's military weakness. President Nasser was only able to obtain the
   material for an anti-aircraft missile defense wall after visiting
   Moscow and pleading with the Kremlin leaders. He claimed that if
   supplies were not given, he would have to return to Egypt and tell the
   Egyptian people Moscow had abandoned them, and then relinquish power to
   one of his peers who would be able to deal with the Americans. The
   Americans would then have the upper hand in the region, which Moscow
   could not permit.

   One of Egypt's undeclared objectives of the War of Attrition was to
   force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced arms and war
   materiel. Egypt felt the only way to convince the Soviet leaders of the
   deficiencies of most of the aircraft and air defense weaponry supplied
   to Egypt following 1967 was to put the Soviet weapons to the test
   against the advanced weaponry the United States supplied to Israel.

   Nasser's policy following the 1967 defeat conflicted with that of the
   Soviet Union. The Soviets sought to avoid a new conflagration between
   the Arabs and Israelis so as not to be drawn into a confrontation with
   the United States. The reality of the situation became apparent when
   the superpowers met in Oslo and agreed to maintain the status quo. This
   was unacceptable to Egyptian leaders, and when it was discovered that
   the Egyptian preparations for crossing the canal were being leaked, it
   became imperative to expel the Russians from Egypt. In July 1972 Sadat
   expelled almost all of the 20,000 Soviet military advisors in the
   country and reoriented the country's foreign policy to be more
   favorable to the United States.

   The Soviets thought little of Sadat's chances in any war. They warned
   that any attempt to cross the heavily fortified Suez would incur
   massive losses. The Soviets, who were then pursuing détente, had no
   interest in seeing the Middle East destabilized. In a June 1973 meeting
   with U.S. President Richard Nixon, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had
   proposed Israel pull back to its 1967 border. Brezhnev said that if
   Israel did not, "we will have difficulty keeping the military situation
   from flaring up"—an indication that the Soviet Union had been unable to
   restrain Sadat's plans.

   In an interview published in Newsweek ( April 9, 1973), President Sadat
   again threatened war with Israel. Several times during 1973, Arab
   forces conducted large-scale exercises that put the Israeli military on
   the highest level of alert, only to be recalled a few days later. The
   Israeli leadership already believed that if an attack took place, the
   Israeli Air Force would be able to repel it.

   Almost a full year before the war, in an October 24, 1972, meeting with
   his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention
   to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support. Planning
   was done in absolute secrecy—even the upper-echelon commanders were not
   told of war plans until less than a week prior to the attack, and the
   soldiers were not told until a few hours beforehand. The plan to attack
   Israel in concert with Syria was code-named Operation Badr (the Arabic
   word for "full moon"), after the Battle of Badr, in which Muslims under
   Muhammad defeated the Quraish tribe of Mecca.

Lead up to the surprise attack

   The IDF's Directorate of Military Intelligence's (abbreviated as
   "Aman") Research Department was responsible for formulating the
   nation's intelligence estimate. Their assessments on the likelihood of
   war were based on several assumptions. First, it was assumed correctly
   that Syria would not go to war with Israel unless Egypt went to war as
   well. Second, they learned from a high-ranking Egyptian informant (who
   remains confidential to this day, known only as "The Source") that
   Egypt wanted to regain all of the Sinai, but would not go to war until
   the Soviets had supplied Egypt with fighter-bombers to neutralize the
   Israeli Air Force, and Scud missiles to be used against Israeli cities
   as a deterrent against Israeli attacks on Egyptian infrastructure.
   Since the Soviets had not yet supplied the fighter bombers, and the
   Scud missiles had only arrived in Egypt in late August, and in addition
   it would take four months to train the Egyptian ground crews, Aman
   predicted war with Egypt was not imminent. This assumption about
   Egypt's strategic plans, known as "the concept," strongly prejudiced
   their thinking and led them to dismiss other war warnings.

   The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis
   and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military
   observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army.
   The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false
   information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate
   the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated misleading
   reports about lack of spare parts that also made their way to the
   Israelis. Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship, that his frequent
   war threats were being ignored by the world. In May and August 1973 the
   Egyptian army had engaged in exercises by the border and mobilizing in
   response both times had cost the Israeli army some $10 million.

   For the week leading up to Yom Kippur, the Egyptians staged a week-long
   training exercise adjacent to the Suez Canal. Israeli intelligence,
   detecting large troop movements towards the canal, dismissed these
   movements as more training exercises. Movements of Syrian troops
   towards the border were puzzling, but not a threat because, Aman
   believed, they would not attack without Egypt and Egypt would not
   attack until the Soviet weaponry arrived.

   The obvious reason for choosing the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur for
   staging a surprise attack on Israel was that on this specific day
   (unlike any other holiday) the country comes to a complete standstill.
   On Yom Kippur, the holiest day for Jews, not only observant, but most
   secular Jews fast, abstain from any use of fire, electricity, engines,
   communications, etc., and all road traffic comes to a standstill. Many
   soldiers leave military facilities for home during the holiday and
   Israel is most vulnerable, especially with much of its army
   demobilized. The war also coincided with the Muslim holiday of Ramadan,
   meaning that many of the Muslim soldiers were also fasting. Many others
   believe that the attack on Yom Kippur surprisingly helped Israel to
   easily recruit reserves from their homes and synagogues.

   Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with
   Sadat and [Syrian President] Assad in Alexandria two weeks before.
   Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was
   unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was
   probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against
   Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan
   joining in." On the night of September 25, Hussein secretly flew to Tel
   Aviv to warn Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir of an impending Syrian
   attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir.
   The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would
   cooperate'". Surprisingly, this warning fell on deaf ears. Aman
   concluded that the king had not told it anything it did not already
   know. "Eleven warnings of war were received by Israel during September
   from well placed sources. But [ Mossad chief] Zvi Zamir continued to
   insist that war was not an Arab option. Not even Hussein's warnings
   succeeded in stirring his doubts" (Rabinovich, 56). He would later
   remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of War]"

   Finally, Zvi Zamir personally went to Europe to meet with the Source
   (the high-ranking Egyptian official), at midnight on October 5th/6th.
   At that meeting, The Source informed him that a joint Syrian-Egyptian
   attack on Israel was imminent. It was this warning in particular,
   combined with the large number of other warnings, that finally goaded
   the Israeli high command into action. Just hours before the attack
   began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.
   Ironically, calling up the reserves proved to be easier than usual, as
   almost all of the troops were at synagogue or at home for the holiday.

Lack of an Israeli pre-emptive attack

   Upon learning of the impending attack, Prime Minister of Israel Golda
   Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive
   strike.
   Enlarge
   Upon learning of the impending attack, Prime Minister of Israel Golda
   Meir made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive
   strike.

   The Israeli strategy was, for the most part, based on the precept that
   if war was imminent, Israel would launch a pre-emptive strike. It was
   assumed that Israel's intelligence services would give, at the worst
   case, about 48 hours notice prior to an Arab attack.

   Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, and Israeli general David Elazar met at 8:05
   a.m. the morning of Yom Kippur, 6 hours before the war was to begin.
   Dayan began the meeting by arguing that war was not a certainty. Elazar
   then presented his argument, in favour of a pre-emptive attack against
   Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00 p.m., and Syrian
   ground forces at 5:00 p.m. "When the presentations were done, the prime
   minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear
   decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing
   American assistance soon and it was imperative that it not be blamed
   for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from
   anybody', she said." European nations, under threat of an Arab oil
   embargo and trade boycott, had stopped supplying Israel with munitions.
   As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States to
   resupply its army, and was particularly sensitive to anything that
   might endanger that relationship.

   Some claim that in restrospect the decision not to strike first was
   actually a sound one. While Operation Nickel Grass, the American
   airlift of supplies during the war which began October 13, did not
   immediately replace Israel's losses in equipment, it did allow Israel
   to expend what it did have more freely. Had they struck first,
   according to Henry Kissinger, they would not have received "so much as
   a nail".
   Operation Nickel Grass was the American airlift of supplies to Israel.
   Shown here, an American C-5 Galaxy unloads an M-60 Patton Tank at Ben
   Gurion International Airport.
   Enlarge
   Operation Nickel Grass was the American airlift of supplies to Israel.
   Shown here, an American C-5 Galaxy unloads an M-60 Patton Tank at Ben
   Gurion International Airport.

Combat operations

In the Sinai

   The Egyptian units would not advance beyond a shallow strip for fear of
   losing protection of their SAM missile batteries. In the Six-Day War,
   the Israeli Air Force had pummelled the defenseless Arab armies. Egypt
   (and Syria) had heavily fortified their side of the cease-fire lines
   with SAM batteries, against which the Israeli Air Force had no
   effective countermeasures. Israel, which had invested much of its
   defense budget building the region's strongest air force, would see its
   air force rendered almost useless by the presence of the SAM batteries.

   Anticipating a swift Israeli armored counterattack, the Egyptians had
   armed their first wave with unprecedented numbers of man-portable
   anti-tank weapons— Rocket propelled grenades and the more devastating
   Sagger missiles. One in every three Egyptian soldiers had an anti-tank
   weapon. "Never before had such intensive anti-tank fire been brought to
   bear on the battlefield." In addition, the ramp on the Egyptian side of
   the canal had been increased to twice the height of the Israeli ramp,
   giving them an excellent vantage point from which to fire down on the
   Israelis, as well as any approaching tanks.
   The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 6-15.
   Enlarge
   The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 6-15.

   The Egyptian army surprised many by breaching the Israeli defenses
   (which were undermanned due to Yom Kippur). The large barricades were
   built primarily from sand, and the Egyptian forces used water-cannons
   loaded with water from the Suez Canal. These water-cannons effectively
   blasted away the Israeli barricades. Troops then crossed the Suez Canal
   in small personnel-carrier boats and inflatable rafts, in what became
   known as The Crossing, capturing or destroying all but one of the
   Bar-Lev forts. In a meticulously rehearsed operation, the Egyptian
   forces advanced approximately 15 km into the Sinai desert with the
   combined forces of two army corps. The Israeli battalion garrisoning
   the Bar-Lev forts was vastly outnumbered, and was overwhelmed. Only one
   fortification, code named Budapest (the northernmost Bar-Lev fort),
   would remain in Israeli control through the end of the war.

   The Egyptian forces consolidated their initial positions. On October 8,
   Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern front—who had only
   taken the position 3 months before at the retirement of Ariel
   Sharon—ordered a counterattack by Gabi Amir's brigade against
   entrenched Egyptian forces at Hizayon, where approaching tanks could be
   easily destroyed by Saggers fired from the Egyptian ramp. Despite
   Amir's reluctance, the attack proceeded, and the result was a disaster
   for the Israelis. Towards nightfall, a counterattack by the Egyptians
   was stopped by Ariel Sharon's 143rd Armoured Division—Sharon had been
   reinstated as a division commander at the outset of the war. The
   fighting subsided, with neither side wanting to mount a large attack
   against the other.

   Following the disastrous Israeli attack on the 8th, both sides adopted
   defensive postures and hoped for the other side to attack. Elazar
   replaced Gonen, who had proven to be out of his depth, with Chaim
   Bar-Lev, brought out of retirement. Because it was considered dangerous
   to morale to replace the front commander during the middle of a battle,
   rather than being sacked, Gonen was made chief of staff to the newly
   appointed Bar-Lev.

   After several days of waiting, Sadat, wanting to ease pressure on the
   Syrians, ordered his chief generals ( Saad El Shazly and Ahmad Ismail
   Ali chief among them) to attack. The Egyptian forces brought across
   their reserves and began their counterattack on 14 October. "The
   attack, the most massive since the initial Egyptian assault on Yom
   Kippur, was a total failure, the first major Egyptian reversal of the
   war. Instead of concentrating forces of maneuvering, except for the
   wadi thrust, they had expended them in head-on attack against the
   waiting Israeli brigades. Egyptian losses for the day were estimated at
   between 150 and 250 tanks."
   The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 15-24.
   Enlarge
   The 1973 War in the Sinai, October 15-24.

   The following day, October 15, the Israelis launched Operation
   Abiray-Lev ("Valiant" or "Stouthearted Men")—the counterattack against
   the Egyptians and crossing of the Suez Canal. The attack was a
   tremendous change of tactics for the Israelis, who had previously
   relied on air and tank support—support that had been decimated by the
   well-prepared Egyptian forces. Instead, the Israelis used infantry to
   infiltrate the positions of the Egyptian SAM and anti-tank batteries,
   which were unable to cope as well with forces on foot.

   A division led by Major General Ariel Sharon attacked the Egyptian line
   just north of Bitter Lake, in the vicinity of Ismailiya. The Israelis
   struck at a weak point in the Egyptian line, the "seam" between the
   Egyptian Second Army in the north and the Egyptian Third Army in the
   south. In some of the most brutal fighting of the war in and around the
   Chinese Farm (an irrigation project east of the canal and north of the
   crossing point), the Israelis opened a hole in the Egyptian line and
   reached the Suez Canal. A small force crossed the canal and created a
   bridgehead on the other side. For over 24 hours, troops were ferried
   across the canal in light inflatable boats, with no armor support of
   their own. They were well supplied with American-made M72 LAW rockets,
   negating the threat of Egyptian armor. Once the anti-aircraft and
   anti-tank defences of the Egyptians had been neutralized, the infantry
   once again was able to rely on overwhelming tank and air support.

   Prior to the war, fearing an Israeli crossing of the canal, no Western
   nation would supply the Israelis with bridging equipment. They were
   able to purchase and refurbish obsolete modular pontoon bridging
   equipment from a French WWII scrap lot. The Israelis also constructed a
   rather sophisticated indigenous "roller bridge" but logistical delays
   involving heavy congestion on the roads leading to the crossing point
   delayed its arrival to the canal for several days. Deploying the
   pontoon bridge on the night of October 16/17, Avraham "Bren" Adan's
   division crossed and raced south, intent on cutting off the Egyptian
   third Army before it could retreat west back into Egypt. At the same
   time, it sent out raiding forces to destroy Egyptian SAM missile
   batteries east of the canal. By October 19 the Israelis managed to
   construct four separate bridges just north of the Great Bitter Lake
   under heavy Egyptian bombardment. By the end of the war the Israelis
   were well within Egypt, reaching a point 101 kilometers from its
   capital, Cairo.

On the Golan Heights

   In the Golan Heights, the Syrians attacked the Israeli defenses of two
   brigades and eleven artillery batteries with five divisions and 188
   batteries. At the onset of the battle, 188 Israeli tanks faced off
   against approximately 2,000 Syrian tanks. Every Israeli tank deployed
   on the Golan Heights was engaged during the initial attacks. Syrian
   commandos dropped by helicopter also took the most important Israeli
   stronghold at Jabal al Shaikh ( Mount Hermon), which had a variety of
   surveillance equipment.
   Golan heights campaign
   Enlarge
   Golan heights campaign

   Fighting in the Golan Heights was given priority by the Israeli High
   Command. The fighting in the Sinai was sufficiently far away that
   Israel was not immediately threatened; should the Golan Heights fall,
   the Syrians could easily advance into Israel proper. Reservists were
   directed to the Golan as quickly as possible. They were assigned to
   tanks and sent to the front as soon as they arrived at army depots,
   without waiting for the crews they trained with to arrive, without
   waiting for machine guns to be installed on their tanks, and without
   taking the time to calibrate their tank guns (a time-consuming process
   known as bore-sighting).

   As the Egyptians had in the Sinai, the Syrians on the Golan Heights
   took care to stay under cover of their SAM missile batteries. Also as
   in the Sinai, the Syrians made use of Soviet anti-tank weapons (which,
   because of the uneven terrain, were not as effective as in the flat
   Sinai desert).

   The Syrians had expected it would take at least 24 hours for Israeli
   reserves to reach the front lines; in fact, Israeli reserve units began
   reaching the battle lines only fifteen hours after the war began.

   By the end of the first day of battle, the Syrians (who at the start
   outnumbered the Israelis in the Golan 9 to 1) had achieved moderate
   success. Towards the end of the day, "A Syrian tank brigade passing
   through the Rafid Gap turned northwest up a little-used route known as
   the Tapline Road, which cut diagonally across the Golan. This roadway
   would prove one of the main strategic hinges of the battle. It led
   straight from the main Syrian breakthrough points to Nafah, which was
   not only the location of Israeli divisional headquarters but the most
   important crossroads on the Heights." During the night, Lieutenant
   Zvika Greengold, who had just arrived to the battle unattached to any
   unit, fought them off with his single tank until help arrived. "For the
   next 20 hours, Zvika Force, as he came to be known on the radio net,
   fought running battles with Syrian tanks—sometimes alone, sometimes as
   part of a larger unit, changing tanks half a dozen times as they were
   knocked out. He was wounded and burned but stayed in action and
   repeatedly showed up at critical moments from an unexpected direction
   to change the course of a skirmish." For his actions, Zvika became a
   national hero in Israel.

   During over four days of fighting, the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade in
   the north (commanded by Yanush Ben Gal) managed to hold the rocky hill
   line defending the northern flank of their headquarters in Nafah. For
   some as-yet-unexplained reason, the Syrians were close to conquering
   Nafah, yet they stopped the advance on Nafah's fences, letting Israel
   assemble a defensive line. The most reasonable explanation for this is
   that the Syrians had calculated estimated advances, and the commanders
   in the field didn't want to digress from the plan. To the south,
   however, the Barak Armored Brigade, bereft of any natural defenses,
   began to take heavy casualties. Brigade Commander Colonel Shoham was
   killed during the second day of fighting, along with his second in
   command and their Operations Officer (each in a separate tank), as the
   Syrians desperately tried to advance towards the Sea of Galilee and
   Nafah. At this point, the Brigade stopped functioning as a cohesive
   force, although the surviving tanks and crewmen continued fighting
   independently.

   The tide in the Golan began to turn as the arriving Israeli reserve
   forces were able to contain and, starting on 8 October, push back the
   Syrian offensive. The tiny Golan Heights were too small to act as an
   effective territorial buffer, unlike the Sinai Peninsula in the south,
   but it proved to be a strategic geographical stronghold and was a
   crucial key in preventing the Syrian army from bombing the cities
   below. By Wednesday, October 10, the last Syrian unit in the Central
   sector had been pushed back across the Purple Line, that is, the
   pre-war border (Rabinovich, 302).

   A decision now had to be made—whether to stop at the 1967 border, or to
   continue into Syrian territory. Israeli High Command spent the entire
   October 10 debating this well into the night. Some favored
   disengagement, which would allow soldiers to be redeployed to the Sinai
   (Shmuel Gonen's defeat at Hizayon in the Sinai had happened two days
   earlier). Others favored continuing the attack into Syria, towards
   Damascus, which would knock Syria out of the war; it would also restore
   Israel's image as the supreme military power in the Middle East and
   would give them a valuable bargaining chip once the war ended. Others
   countered that Syria had strong defenses—antitank ditches, minefields,
   and strongpoints—and that it would be better to fight from defensive
   positions in the Golan Heights (rather than the flat terrain of Syria)
   in the event of another war with Syria. However, Prime Minister Meir
   realized the most crucial point of the whole debate—"It would take four
   days to shift a division to the Sinai. If the war ended during this
   period, the war would end with a territorial loss for Israel in the
   Sinai and no gain in the north—an unmitigated defeat. This was a
   political matter and her decision was unmitigating—to cross the purple
   line… The attack would be launched tomorrow, Thursday, October 11"
   (Rabinovich, 304).

   From 11 October to 14 October, the Israeli forces pushed into Syria,
   conquering a further twenty-square-mile box of territory in the Bashan.
   From there they were able to shell the outskirts of Damascus, only
   40 km away, using heavy artillery.

   "As Arab position on the battlefields deteriorated, pressure mounted on
   King Hussein to send his Army into action. He found a way to meet these
   demands without opening his kingdom to Israeli air attack. Instead of
   attacking Israel from their common border, he sent an expeditionary
   force into Syria. He let Israel know of his intentions, through US
   intermediaries, in the hope that it [Israel] would accept that this was
   not a casus belli justifying an attack into Jordan… Dayan declined to
   offer any such assurance, but Israel had no intention of opening
   another front" (Rabinovich, 433).

   Iraq also sent an expeditionary force to the Golan, consisting of some
   30,000 men, 500 tanks, and 700 APCs (Rabinovich, 314). The Iraqi
   divisions were actually a strategic surprise for the IDF, which
   expected a 24-hour-plus advance intelligence of such moves. This turned
   into an operational surprise, as the Iraqis attacked the exposed
   southern flank of the advancing Israeli armor, forcing its advance
   units to retreat a few kilometers, in order to prevent encirclement.

   Combined Syrian, Iraqi and Jordanian counterattacks prevented any
   further Israeli gains. However, they were also unable to push the
   Israelis back from the Bashan salient.

   On 22 October, the Golani Brigade and Sayeret Matkal commandos
   recaptured the outpost on Mount Hermon, after sustaining very heavy
   casualties from entrenched Syrian snipers strategically positioned on
   the mountain. An attack two weeks before had cost 25 dead and 67
   wounded, while this second attack cost an additional 55 dead and 79
   wounded (Rabinovich, 450). An Israeli D9 bulldozer with Israeli
   infantry breached a way to the peak, preventing the peak from falling
   into Syrian hands after the war. A paratrooper brigade took the
   corresponding Syrian outposts on the mountain.

At sea

   Diagram of the Battle of Latakia
   Enlarge
   Diagram of the Battle of Latakia

   The Battle of Latakia, a revolutionary naval battle between the Syrians
   and the Israelis, took place on October 7, the second day of the war,
   resulting in a resounding Israeli victory that proved the potency of
   small, fast missile boats equipped with advanced ECM packages. This
   battle was the world's first battle between missile boats equipped with
   surface-to-surface missiles. The battle also established the Israeli
   Navy, long derided as the " black sheep" of the Israeli services, as a
   formidable and effective force in its own right. Following this and
   other smaller naval battles, the Syrian and Egyptian navies stayed at
   their Mediterranean Sea ports throughout most of the war, enabling the
   Mediterranean sea lanes to Israel to remain open. This enabled
   uninterrupted resupply of the IDF by American ships (96% of all
   resupply tonnage was shipborne, not airlifted, contrary to public
   perception).

   However, the Israeli navy was less successful in breaking the Egyptian
   Navy's blockade of the Red Sea for Israeli or Israel-bound shipping,
   thus hampering Israel's oil resupply via the port of Eilat. Israel did
   not possess enough missile boats in Red Sea ports to enable breaking
   the blockade, a fact it regretted in hindsight.

   Several other times during the war, the Israeli navy mounted small
   assault raids on Egyptian ports. Both Fast Attack Craft and Shayetet 13
   naval commandos were active in these assaults. Their purpose was to
   destroy boats that were to be used by the Egyptians to ferry their own
   commandos behind Israeli lines. The overall effect of these raids on
   the war was relatively minor.

Participation by other states

   Besides Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, several other Arab nations were
   involved in this war, providing additional weapons and financing. The
   amount of support is uncertain.

   Saudi Arabia and Kuwait gave financial aid and sent some token forces
   to join in the battle. Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines;
   the Palestinians sent troops as well (Rabinovich, 464). Pakistan sent
   sixteen pilots.

   From 1971 to 1973, Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya sent Mirage fighters and
   gave Egypt around $1 billion to arm for war. Algeria sent squadrons of
   fighters and bombers, armored brigades, and dozens of tanks. Tunisia
   sent over 1,000 soldiers, who worked with Egyptian forces in the Nile
   delta, and Sudan sent 3,500 soldiers.

   Uganda radio reported that Idi Amin sent Ugandan soldiers to fight
   against Israel. Cuba also sent approximately 1,500 troops including
   tank and helicopter crews who reportedly also engaged in combat
   operations against the IDF.

Weapons

   The Arab armies were equipped with predominantly Soviet-made weapons
   while Israel's armaments were mostly Western-made. The Arab armies'
   T-62s were equipped with night vision equipment, which the Israeli
   tanks lacked, giving them an added advantage on the battlefield during
   the fighting that took part at night. The older IS-3 'Stalin' tank,
   mounting a powerful 122 mm main gun, still proved its use on the
   battlefield, giving long-range anti-tank support to the Egyptian Army's
   T55/T62 tanks.
   Type Arab armies IDF
   Tanks T-34/85, IS-3, T-10, T-54, T-55, T-62, and PT-76, as well as
   100's of SU-100/ 122 (WWII vintage) Self propelled antitank guns. Super
   Sherman, M48, M60, Centurion, AMX 13, also about 200 of T-54, T-55
   captured during the Six-Day War, and later upgraded with British 105 mm
   L7 gun.
   APC's/IFV's BTR-40, BTR-152, BTR-50, BTR-60 APC's & BMP 1 IFV's M2 /M3
   Half-track, M113
   Artillery 2A18, M1937 Howitzer, BM-21 M101 howitzer, M114 howitzer,
   M109, M110
   Aircraft MiG-21, MiG-19, MiG-17, Su-7B, Tu-16, Il-28, Il-18, Il-14,
   An-12 A-4 Skyhawk, F-4 Phantom II, Dassault Mirage III, Dassault
   Mystère IV, IAI Nesher, Sud Aviation Vautour
   Helicopters Mi-6, Mi-8 Super Frelon, CH-53, S-58, AB-205, MD500
   Defender
   Small Arms Carl Gustav M/45, AK-47, RPK, RPD, DShK UZI, FN FAL, FN MAG,
   M2 Browning

Long-term effects of the war

   The peace discussion at the end of the war was the first time that Arab
   and Israeli officials met for direct public discussions since the
   aftermath of the 1948 war.

   For the Arab nations (and Egypt in particular), the psychological
   trauma of their defeat in the Six-Day War had been healed. In many
   ways, it allowed them to negotiate with the Israelis as equals.
   However, given that the war had started about as well as the Arab
   leaders could have wanted, at the end they had made only limited
   territorial gains in the Sinai front, while Israel gained more
   territory on the Golan Heights than it held before the war; also given
   the fact that Israel managed to gain a foothold on African soil west of
   the canal, the war helped convince many in the Arab world that Israel
   could not be defeated militarily, thereby strengthening peace
   movements.

   The war had a stunning effect on the population in Israel. Following
   their victory in the Six-Day War, the Israeli military had become
   complacent. The shock and sudden defeats that occurred at the beginning
   of the war sent a terrible psychological blow to the Israelis, who had
   thought they had military supremacy in the region. (Rabinovich,
   497–498) However, in time, they began to realize what an astounding,
   almost unprecedented, turnaround they had achieved: "Reeling from a
   surprise attack on two fronts with the bulk of its army still
   unmobilized, and confronted by staggering new battlefield realities,
   Israel's situation was one that could readily bring strong nations to
   their knees. Yet, within days, it had regained its footing and within
   less than two weeks it was threatening both enemy capitals, an
   achievement having few historical parallels." (Rabinovich, 498).
   However, in Israel, the casualty rate was high. Proportionately, Israel
   suffered three times as many casualties in 3 weeks of fighting as the
   United States did during almost a decade of fighting in Vietnam.
   (Rabinovich, 498)

   In response to U.S. support of Israel, OAPEC nations, the Arab members
   of OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, decided to reduce oil production by 5%
   per month on October 17, and threatened an embargo. President Nixon
   then appealed to Congress on October 18th for $2.2 billion for arms
   shipments to Israel. On October 20th, in the midst of the war, Saudi
   Arabia declared an embargo against the United States, later joined by
   other oil exporters and extended against the Netherlands and other
   states, causing the 1973 energy crisis. Though widely believed to be a
   reaction to the war, it now appears that the embargo had been
   coordinated in a secret visit of Anwar Sadat to Saudi Arabia in August.

   The initial success greatly increased Sadat's popularity, giving him
   much firmer control of the Egyptian state and the opportunity to
   initiate many of the reforms he felt were necessary. In later years
   this would fade, and in the destructive anti-government food riot of
   1977 in Cairo had the slogan "Hero of the crossing, where is our
   breakfast?" ("يا بطل العبور، فين الفطور؟", "Yā batl al-`abūr, fēn
   al-futūr?").

Fallout in Israel

   A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the
   war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the
   northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not
   to be captured by the Egyptians (Rabinovich, 499). Anger against the
   Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat,
   President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry,
   the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the
   setbacks of the first few days (Rabinovich, 501).

   The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2,
   1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel's
   failings:
     * IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal,
       after the Commission found he bore "personal responsibility for the
       assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF."
     * Intelligence Chief, Aluf Eli Zeira, and his deputy, head of
       Research, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for
       dismissal.
     * Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt.
       Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command,
       were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
     * Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by
       the initial report to be relieved of active duty (Rabinovich, 502).
       He was forced to leave the army after the publication of the
       Commission's final report, on January 30, 1975, which found that
       "he failed to fulfill his duties adequately, and bears much of the
       responsibility for the dangerous situation in which our troops were
       caught."

   Rather than quieting public discontent, the report—which "had stressed
   that it was judging the ministers' responsibility for security
   failings, not their parliamentary responsibility, which fell outside
   its mandate"—inflamed it. Although it had cleared Meir and Dayan of all
   responsibility, public calls for their resignation (especially Dayan's)
   became more vociferous (Rabinovich, 502).

   Finally, on April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed
   suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and
   was turned down both times by Meir. Yitzhak Rabin, who had spent most
   of the war as an advisor to Elazar in an unofficial capacity
   (Rabinovich, 237), became head of the new Government, which was seated
   in June.

   In 1999, the issue was revisited by Israel's political leadership, and
   in order to correct the shortcomings of the war from being repeated,
   the Israeli National Security Council was created to help in better
   coordinating between the different security and intelligence bodies,
   and between these and the political branch.

Camp David Accords

   Rabin's government was hamstrung by a pair of scandals, and he was
   forced to step down in 1977. The right-wing Likud party, under the
   prime ministership of Menachem Begin, won the elections that followed.
   This marked a historic change in the Israeli political landscape as for
   the first time since Israel's founding, a coalition not led by the
   Labour party was in control of the government.

   Sadat, who had entered the war in order to recover the Sinai, grew
   frustrated at the slow pace of the peace process. In November 1977, he
   took the unprecedented step of visiting Israel, becoming the first Arab
   leader to do so (and implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist).

   The act jump-started the peace process. United States President Jimmy
   Carter invited both Sadat and Begin to a summit at Camp David to
   negotiate a final peace. The talks took place from September 5–17,
   1978. Ultimately, the talks succeeded, and Israel and Egypt signed the
   Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty in 1979. Israel withdrew its troops and
   settlers from the Sinai, in exchange for normal relations with Egypt
   and a lasting peace.

   Many in the Arab community were outraged at Egypt's peace with Israel.
   Egypt was expelled from the Arab League. Until then, Egypt had been "at
   the helm of the Arab world" (Karsh, 86).

   Anwar Sadat was assassinated two years later, on October 6, 1981, while
   attending a parade marking the eighth anniversary of the start of the
   war, by army members who were outraged at his negotiations with Israel.

Commemorations

   Yom Kippur is the holiest day for Jews. Apart from the usual ceremonies
   of the holiday and the fasting, in Israel Yom Kippur also commemorates
   the war of 1973. This is very apparent in the Israeli media.

   October 6 is a national holiday in Egypt called Armed Forces Day.

   In commemoration of the war, many places in Egypt were named after the
   October 6 date and Ramadan 10, its equivalent in the Islamic calendar (
   6th of October city and 10th of Ramadan city).
   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_Kippur_War"
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   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
   Documentation License. See also our Disclaimer.
