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Sino-German cooperation (1911-1941)

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Recent History

   Sino-German cooperation played a great role in Chinese history of the
   early and mid 20th century.
   Enlarge
   Sino-German cooperation played a great role in Chinese history of the
   early and mid 20th century.

   The Sino-German cooperation (Chinese: 中德合作 ; German:
   Chinesisch-Deutsche Kooperation) during the 1920s and 1930s refers to
   the cooperation between the Republic of China and Germany. The
   cooperation was instrumental in modernizing the industry and the armed
   forces of the Republic of China, immediately prior to the Second
   Sino-Japanese War. The Republic of China, which succeeded the Qing
   Dynasty in 1912, was fraught with factional warlordism and foreign
   incursions. The Northern Expedition of 1928 nominally unified China
   under Kuomintang (KMT) control, yet Imperial Japan loomed as the
   greatest foreign threat. The Chinese urgency to modernize the military
   and its national defense industry, coupled with Germany's need for a
   stable supply of raw materials, put the two countries on the road of
   close relations from the late 1920s to the late 1930s. Although intense
   cooperation lasted only from the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933 to
   the start of the war with Japan in 1937, and concrete measures at
   industrial reform started in earnest only in 1936, it had a profound
   effect on Chinese modernization and capability to resist the Japanese
   in the war.

Early Sino-German relations

   The earliest Sino-German trading occurred overland through Siberia, and
   was subject to transit taxes by the Russian government. In order to
   make trading more profitable, Germany decided to take the sea route and
   the first German merchant ships arrived in China, then under the Qing
   Dynasty, as part of the Royal Prussian Asian Trading Company of Emden,
   in the 1750s. In 1861, following China's defeat in the Second Opium
   War, the Treaty of Tientsin was signed, which opened formal commercial
   relations between various European states, including Prussia, with
   China.
   The Beiyang Army in training.
   Enlarge
   The Beiyang Army in training.

   During the late 19th century, Sino-foreign trade was dominated by the
   British Empire, and Otto von Bismarck was eager to establish German
   footholds in China to balance the British dominance. In 1885, Bismarck
   had the Reichstag pass a steamship subsidy bill which offered direct
   service to China. In the same year, he sent the first German banking
   and industrial survey group to evaluate investment possibilities, which
   led to the establishment of the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank in 1890.
   Through these efforts Germany was second to Britain in trading and
   shipping in China by 1896.

   During this period, Germany did not actively pursue imperialist
   ambitions in China, and appeared relatively restrained compared to
   Britain and France. Thus, the Chinese government saw Germany as a
   partner in helping China in its modernization. After China's first
   modernization efforts apparently failed following its defeat in the
   First Sino-Japanese War, Yuan Shi-kai requested German help in creating
   the Self-Strengthening Army (Chinese: 自強軍; pinyin: Zìqiáng Jūn) and the
   Newly Created Army (新建陸軍; Xīnjìan Lùjūn). In addition, German
   assistance not only concerned the military, but also industrial and
   technical matters. For example, in the late 1880s, the German company
   Krupp was contracted by the Chinese government to build a series of
   fortifications around Port Arthur.

   Germany's relatively benign China policy, as shaped by Bismarck, was
   changed drastically under the reign of Wilhelm II, who assumed a more
   imperialistic attitude. For example, in the Triple Intervention
   following the First Sino-Japanese War, Japan was forced to transfer its
   concessions in Hankow and Tientsin to Germany. Also, in 1897, Germany
   obtained a ninety-nine year leasehold on the Kiaochow Bay in Shandong,
   after a German military attachment was sent in response to the attacks
   on missionaries by the Chinese in the region. Perhaps the lowest point
   in Sino-German relations was the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, during which
   foreign nationals were killed and the German military retaliated with
   brutality (indeed, Kaiser Wilhelm urged his troops to "fight like
   Huns," from which the label "Huns" became a derisive term applied to
   German soldiers in the First and Second World Wars).^

   During this period, Germany also had a major impact on the development
   of Chinese law. In the years preceding the fall of the Qing dynasty,
   Chinese reformers began drafting a Civil Code based largely on the
   German Civil Code^ , which had already been adopted in neighboring
   Japan. Although this draft code was not promulgated before the collapse
   of the Qing dynasty, it was the basis for the Civil Code of the
   Republic of China introduced in 1930, which is the current civil law in
   Taiwan and has influenced current law in mainland China. The General
   Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China, drafted in
   1985, for example, is modelled after the German Civil Code. ^

   However, in the period preceding World War I, Sino-German relations
   became less intense. One reason for this was that Germany was
   politically isolated, as evident by the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance
   and the Triple Entente of 1907. Because of this, Germany proposed a
   German-Chinese-American entente in 1907, but the proposal never came to
   fruition.^ In 1912 Germany offered a six million German Goldmark loan
   to the new Chinese Republican Government and returned to the Chinese
   railway building rights in Shandong. When World War I broke out in
   Europe, Germany offered to return Kiaochow Bay to China, in an attempt
   to keep the concession from falling into Japanese hands. However, the
   Japanese entered the war on the side of the Allies and proceeded to
   attack German concessions in China, and seized Tsingtao and Kiaochow
   Bay. During the war, Germany had no active role or initiative in
   conducting any meaningful actions in the Far East as it was preoccupied
   with the war in Europe.

   On August 14, 1917, China declared war on Germany and recovered German
   concessions in Hankow and Tientsin, and was promised the return of
   other German spheres of influence following the defeat of Germany.
   However, instead of China, Japan acquired these concessions in the
   Treaty of Versailles. The feeling of betrayal by the Allied powers
   sparked the nationalistic May Fourth Movement. As a result, World War I
   dealt a severe blow to Sino-German relations, particularly in trade.
   For example, of the almost three hundred German firms in China in 1913,
   only two remained in 1919. ^

Sino-German cooperation in the 1920s

   Chu Chia-hua, later the second president of the Academia Sinica,
   started much of the initial Sino-German contact
   Enlarge
   Chu Chia-hua, later the second president of the Academia Sinica,
   started much of the initial Sino-German contact

   The Treaty of Versailles severely limited Germany's industrial output.
   Its army was restricted to 100,000 men and its military production was
   greatly reduced. However, the treaty did not diminish Germany's place
   as a leader in military innovation, and many industrial firms still
   retained the machinery and technology to produce military hardware.
   Therefore, to circumvent the treaty's restrictions, these industrial
   firms formed partnerships with foreign nations, such as the Soviet
   Union and Argentina, to legally produce weapons and sell them.

   After the death of Yuan Shi-kai, the central Beiyang Government
   collapsed and the country fell into civil war, with various warlords
   vying for supremacy. Therefore, many German arms producers began
   looking to reestablish commercial links with China to tap into its vast
   market for weapons and military assistance. ^
   Max Bauer and Chiang Kai-shek, 1929
   Enlarge
   Max Bauer and Chiang Kai-shek, 1929

   The Kuomintang government in Guangzhou also sought German assistance,
   and the German-educated Chu Chia-hua (朱家驊; Zhū Jiāhuá) emerged as the
   most prominent and had his hands in arranging almost all Sino-German
   contact from 1926 to 1944. There were several reasons other than
   Germany's technological expertise that made it the top candidate in
   Sino-foreign relations. First was that Germany, having lost all of its
   spheres of influence following World War I, had no imperialistic
   interest in China anymore, and the 1925-1926 anti-foreign protests were
   mainly directed at Great Britain. In addition, unlike the Soviet Union,
   which helped with Kuomintang reorganization and opened party membership
   to communists, Germany had no political interest in China that could
   have lead to confrontations with the central government. Also, Chiang
   Kai-shek saw German history as something that China should emulate, as
   the German unification was something that Chiang thought would provide
   valuable lessons to his own unification of China. Thus, Germany was
   seen as a primary force in the "international development" of China. ^

   In 1926, Chu Chia-hua invited Max Bauer to survey investment
   possibilities in China and the next year Bauer arrived in Guangzhou and
   was offered a post as Chiang Kai-shek's adviser. In 1928, Bauer
   returned to Germany to make appropriate industrial contacts for China's
   "reconstruction" efforts and began recruitment for a permanent advisory
   mission to Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking. However, Bauer was not entirely
   successful as many industrial firms hesitated because of China's
   unstable political situation, and because Bauer was persona non grata
   for his participation in the 1920 Kapp Putsch. In addition, Germany was
   still constrained by the Treaty of Versailles, making direct investment
   involving the military impossible. Max Bauer contracted smallpox seven
   months after his return to China and was buried in Shanghai. ^Bauer's
   short time in China provided the foundation for later Sino-German
   cooperation, as he advised on the modernization of Chinese industry and
   army to the Kuomintang government. He argued for the reduction of the
   Chinese army to produce a small but elite force, and supported opening
   up the Chinese market to spur German production and exports.

Sino-German cooperation in the 1930s

   Chinese representatives inspecting a Junkers aircraft, 1933
   Enlarge
   Chinese representatives inspecting a Junkers aircraft, 1933

   However, Sino-German trade slowed between 1930 and 1932 because of the
   Great Depression. ^Furthermore, Chinese industrialization was not able
   to progress as fast as it could because of conflicting interests
   between various Chinese reconstruction agencies, German industries,
   German import-export houses and the Reichswehr, all of which wanted to
   profit from the development. Things did not pick up speed until the
   1931 Mukden Incident, in which Manchuria was annexed by Japan. This
   incident created the need for a concrete industrial policy that aimed
   to create the military and industrial capability to resist Japan. In
   essence, it spurred the creation of a centrally planned, national
   defense economy. This both consolidated Chiang's rule over the
   nominally unified China and hastened industrialization efforts in
   China. ^

   The 1933 seizure of power by the Nazi Party further accelerated the
   formation of a concrete Sino-German policy. Before the Nazi rise to
   power, German policy in China had been contradictory, as the Foreign
   Ministry under the Weimar Government urged for a policy of neutrality
   in East Asia and discouraged the Reichswehr-industrial complex from
   involving directly with the Chinese government. The same feeling was
   shared by the German import-export houses, for fear that direct
   government ties would exclude them from profiting as the middleman. On
   the other hand, the new Nazi government's policy of Wehrwirtschaft (war
   economy) called for the complete mobilization of society and
   stockpiling of raw materials, particularly militarily important
   materials such as tungsten and antimony, which China could supply in
   bulk. Thus, from this period on, the main driving force behind
   Germany's China policy became that of raw materials. ^

   In May 1933, Hans von Seeckt arrived in Shanghai and was offered the
   post of senior adviser to oversee economic and military development
   involving Germany in China. In June of that year, he submitted the
   Denkschrift für Marschall Chiang Kai-shek memorandum, outlining his
   program of industrializing and militarizing China. He called for a
   small, mobile, and well-equipped force as opposed to a massive but
   under-trained army. In addition, he provided a framework that the army
   is the "foundation of ruling power," that the military power rests in
   qualitative superiority, and that this superiority derives from the
   quality of its officer corps. ^

   Von Seeckt suggested that the first steps toward achieving this
   framework was that the Chinese military needed to be uniformly trained
   and consolidated under Chiang's command, and that the entire military
   system must be subordinated into a centralized network like a pyramid.
   Toward this goal, von Seeckt proposed the formation of a "training
   brigade" in lieu of the German eliteheer which would propagate training
   to other units to create a professional, competent army, with its
   officer corps selected from strict military placements directed by a
   centralized personnel office. ^
   This Heinkel 111A, one of 11 bought by the Aviation Ministry, later
   found its way to the CNAC
   Enlarge
   This Heinkel 111A, one of 11 bought by the Aviation Ministry, later
   found its way to the CNAC

   In addition, with German help, China would have to build up its own
   defense industry because it could not rely on buying arms from abroad
   forever. The first step toward efficient industrialization was the
   centralization of not only the Chinese reconstruction agencies, but
   also German ones. In January 1934, the Handelsgesellschaft für
   industrielle Produkte, or Hapro, was created to unify all German
   industrial interests in China.^ Hapro was nominally a private company
   to avoid oppositions from other foreign countries. In August 1934,
   "Treaty for the Exchange of Chinese Raw Materials and Agricultural
   Products of German Industrial and Other Products" was signed in which
   the Chinese government would send strategically important raw material
   in exchange for German industrial products and development. This barter
   agreement was beneficial to Sino-German cooperation since China had a
   very high budget deficit due to military expenditures through years of
   civil war and was unable to secure monetary loans from the
   international community. The agreement that led to massive Chinese
   export of raw material also made Germany independent of international
   raw material markets. In addition, the agreement expedited not only
   Chinese industrialization, but also military reorganization. The
   agreement also specified that China and Germany were equal partners and
   that they were both important in this economic exchange. Having
   accomplished this important milestone in Sino-German cooperation, von
   Seeckt transferred his post to General Alexander von Falkenhausen and
   returned to Germany, in March 1935, where he died in 1936.

Germany and Chinese industrialization

   Chinese Minister Chiang Tso-pin and entourage visiting a German
   factory, 1928
   Enlarge
   Chinese Minister Chiang Tso-pin and entourage visiting a German
   factory, 1928
   Chinese engineering students in Germany, 1934
   Enlarge
   Chinese engineering students in Germany, 1934

   In 1936, China had only about 10,000 miles of railways, far lower than
   the 100,000 miles that Sun Yat-sen had envisioned for his ambition of a
   modernized China. In addition, half of these were in Manchuria, which
   was already lost to Japan and out of Kuomintang control. The slow
   progress of modernizing China's transportation was because of
   conflicting foreign interests in China, such as the 1920 New Four-Power
   Consortium of British, French, American, and Japanese banking
   interests. This consortium aimed to regularize foreign investment in
   China and unanimous approval was required before any of the four could
   provide credit to the Chinese government for building railways. In
   addition, other foreign countries were hesitant to provide funding
   because of the depression.

   However, a series of Sino-German agreements in 1934–1936 greatly
   accelerated railway construction in China. Major railroads were built
   between Nanchang, Zhejiang, and Guizhou. These fast developments were
   made possible because Germany needed efficient transportation to export
   raw materials, and because the railway lines served the Chinese
   government's need to build an industrial centre south of the Yangtze,
   in the south-central provinces. In addition, these railways served
   important military functions. For example, the Hangzhou- Guiyang rail
   was built to facilitate military transport in the Yangtze delta valley,
   even after Shanghai and Nanking were lost. Another similar railway was
   the Guangzhou- Hankou network, which provided transportation between
   the eastern coast and the Wuhan area. This railway would later prove
   its worth in the early stages of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

   The most important industrial project from Sino-German cooperation was
   the 1936 Three-Year Plan, which was administered by the Chinese
   government's National Resources Commission and the Hapro corporation.
   The purpose of this plan was to create an industrial powerhouse capable
   of resisting Japan in the short run, and to create a centre for future
   Chinese industrial development for the long run. It had several basic
   components such as the monopolization of all operations pertaining to
   tungsten and antimony, the construction of the central steel and
   machine works in provinces such as Hubei, Hunan, and Sichuan, and the
   development of power plants and other chemical factories. As outlined
   in the 1934 barter agreement, China would provide raw materials in
   return for German expertise and equipment in setting up these ventures.
   Cost overrun for these projects was partly assuaged by the fact that
   the price of tungsten had more than doubled between 1932 and 1936.^
   Germany also extended RM 100 million line of credit to the Chinese
   government. The Three-Year Plan also introduced a class of highly
   educated technocrats who were trained to run these state-owned
   projects. At the height of this program, Sino-German exchange accounted
   for 17% of China's foreign trade and China was the third largest
   trading partner with Germany. The Three-Year Plan had many promises,
   but unfortunately much of its intended benefits would eventually be
   undermined by the breakout of full-scale war with Japan in 1937. ^

Germany and Chinese military modernization

   German military personnel in China, 1936
   Enlarge
   German military personnel in China, 1936
   Image:Chinese Sdkfz 222.jpg
   Sdkfz 222 armored cars in a German trained division

   Alexander von Falkenhausen was responsible for most of military
   training conducted as part of the deal. Original plans by von Seeckt
   called for a drastic reduction of the military to 60 well-equipped and
   well-trained divisions based on German military doctrines, but
   questions as to which factions would be axed remained a problem. As a
   whole, officer corps trained by the Whampoa Academy up until 1927 were
   of marginally better quality than the warlord armies, but they remained
   valuable to Chiang Kai-shek for sheer loyalty.^ Nonetheless, some
   80,000 troops, in eight divisions, were trained to German standards and
   formed the elite of Chiang's army. These new divisions might have
   contributed to Chiang's determination to escalate the skirmish at Marco
   Polo Bridge to full-scale war. However, China was not ready to face
   Japan on equal terms, and Chiang's decision to pit all of his new
   divisions in the Battle of Shanghai, despite objections from his staff
   officers and von Falkenhausen himself, would cost him one-third of his
   best troops that took years to train. Chiang was suggested to preserve
   his strength to maintain order and fight later.

   Von Falkenhausen recommended that Chiang fight a war of attrition with
   Japan as Falkenhausen calculated that Japan could never hope to win a
   long term war. He suggested that Chiang should hold the Yellow River
   line, but not attack north of that until much later in the war. Also
   Chiang should be prepared to give up a number of regions in northern
   China, including Shandong, but the retreats must be made slowly; Japan
   was to pay for every advance it made. He also recommended a number of
   fortifications to be constructed, near mining areas, coastal, river
   locations, and so on. Falkenhausen also advised the Chinese to
   establish a number of guerrilla operations (which the Communists were
   adept at) behind Japanese lines. These efforts would help to weaken an
   already militarily challenged Japan.

   Von Falkenhausen also believed that it was too optimistic to expect the
   Chinese army to be adequately supported by armor and heavy artillery in
   the war against Japan. Chinese industry was just starting to modernize
   and it would take a while to fully equip the Chinese army in Wehrmacht
   fashion. Thus, he emphasized on the creation of a mobile force that
   relied on small arms and adept with infiltration tactics, similar to
   the stormtroopers near the end of World War I.
   The National Revolutionary Army were trained troops standing at
   attention during an inspection by German officers during Second
   Sino-Japanese War.
   Enlarge
   The National Revolutionary Army were trained troops standing at
   attention during an inspection by German officers during Second
   Sino-Japanese War.

   German assistance in the military realm was not limited to personnel
   training and reorganization, but also involved military hardware.
   According to von Seeckt, around eighty percent of China's weapons
   output was below par or unsuitable for modern warfare. Therefore,
   projects were undertaken to expand and upgrade existing armories along
   the Yangtze River and to create new arsenals and munitions plants. For
   example, the Hanyang Arsenal was reconstructed during 1935–1936 to
   bring its standards up to date. The arsenal was to produce Maxim
   machine guns, various 82mm trench mortars and the Chiang Kai-shek Rifle
   (中正式; Zhōngzhèng Shì), which was based on the German Karabiner 98k
   rifle. The Chiang Kai-shek and Hanyang 88 rifles remained as the
   predominant firearm used by Chinese armies throughout the war.^ Another
   factory was established to produce gas masks, with plans to construct a
   mustard gas plant that was eventually scrapped. In May 1938, several
   arsenals were built in Hunan to produce 20mm, 37mm, and 75mm
   artilleries. In late 1936 a plant was built near Nanking to manufacture
   military optical equipment such as binoculars and sniper rifle scopes.
   Additional arsenals were built or upgraded to manufacture other weapons
   and ordnances, such as the MG-34, pack guns of different calibers, and
   even replacement parts for vehicles of the Leichter Panzerspähwagen
   series serving in the Chinese army. Several research institutes were
   also established under German auspices, such as the Ordnance and
   Arsenal Office, the Chemical Research Institute under the direction
   from IG Farben, and others. Many of these institutes were headed by
   German-returned Chinese engineers. In 1935 and 1936, China ordered a
   total of 315,000 of the M35 Stahlhelm, and also large numbers of Gewehr
   88, 98 rifles and the C96 Broomhandle Mauser. China also imported other
   military hardware, such as a small number of Stuka, Junkers, Heinkel
   and Messerschmitt aircraft, some of them to be assembled in China, and
   Rheinmetall and Krupp howitzers, anti-tank and mountain guns, such as
   the PaK 37mm, as well as AFVs such as the Panzer I.

   These modernization efforts proved their usefulness with the outbreak
   of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Although the Japanese, in the end,
   were able to capture the Nationalist capital at Nanjing, the process
   took several months with a cost far higher than either side had
   anticipated. Despite this loss, the fact that Chinese troops could
   credibly challenge Japanese troops boosted the morale of the Chinese.
   In addition, the cost of the campaign made the Japanese reluctant to go
   deeper into the Chinese interior, allowing the Nationalist government
   to relocate China's political and industrial infrastructure into
   Sichuan.

End of Sino-German cooperation

   A soldier fully decked in German equipment - Stahlhelm, gas mask, and
   Mauser pistol
   Enlarge
   A soldier fully decked in German equipment - Stahlhelm, gas mask, and
   Mauser pistol

   The outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937 destroyed much of
   the progress and promises made in the nearly ten years of intense
   Sino-German cooperation. Besides the destruction of industries in the
   war, Adolf Hitler's foreign policy would prove the most detrimental to
   Sino-German relations. In essence, Hitler chose Japan as his ally
   against the Soviet Union, because Japan was militarily far more capable
   to resist Bolshevism.^ In addition, the Sino-Soviet Nonaggression Pact
   of August 21, 1937 definitely did not help to change Hitler's mind,
   despite persistent protests from the China lobby and German investors.
   However, Hitler did agree to have Hapro finish shipments already
   ordered by China, but did not allow any more orders from Nanking to be
   taken.

   There were plans of a German-mediated peace between China and Japan,
   but the fall of Nanking in December 1937 effectively put an end to any
   mediation acceptable to the Chinese government. Therefore, all hope of
   a German-mediated truce was lost. In early 1938, Germany officially
   recognized Manchukuo as an independent nation. In April of that year,
   Hermann Göring banned the shipment of war materials to China and in
   May, German advisors were recalled to Germany at Japanese insistence.

   This shift from a pro-China policy to a pro-Japan one was also damaging
   to German business interests, as Germany had far less economic exchange
   with either Japan or Manchukuo than China. Also, pro-China sentiment
   was also apparent in most Germans in China. For example, Germans in
   Hankow raised more money for the Red Cross than all other Chinese and
   foreign nationals in the city combined. Military advisors also wished
   to honour their contracts with Nanking. Von Falkenhausen was finally
   forced to leave at the end of June 1938, but promised Chiang that he
   would never reveal his work to aid the Japanese. On the other hand,
   Nazi Party organs in China proclaimed Japan as the last bulwark against
   communism in China.
   Wang Jingwei of the puppet government meeting with Nazi diplomats in
   1941
   Enlarge
   Wang Jingwei of the puppet government meeting with Nazi diplomats in
   1941

   Germany's newfound relationship with Japan would prove to be less than
   fruitful, however. Japan enjoyed a monopoly in North China and
   Manchukuo, and many foreign businesses were seized. German interests
   were treated no better than any other foreign interests.^ While
   negotiations were going on in mid-1938 to solve these economic
   problems, Hitler signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact with the Soviet
   Union, thereby nullifying the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of
   1936, destroying further negotiations. The Soviet Union agreed to allow
   Germany to use the Trans-Siberian Railway to transport goods from
   Manchukuo to Germany. However, quantities remained low, and the lack of
   established contacts and networks between Soviet, German, and Japanese
   personnel further compounded the problem. When Germany attacked the
   Soviet Union in 1941, Germany's economic goals in Asia were
   conclusively put to an end.^

   Contact between China and Germany persisted to 1941, with elements from
   both sides wishing to resume the cooperation, as German-Japanese
   alliance was not very beneficial. However, Germany's failure to conquer
   the United Kingdom in the Battle of Britain in mid-1940 steered Hitler
   away from this move.^ Germany signed the Tripartite Pact, along with
   Japan and Italy, at the end of that year. In July 1941, Hitler
   officially recognized Wang Jingwei's puppet government in Nanking,
   therefore extinguishing any hope of contact with Chiang's Chinese
   government which had relocated to Chungking. Following the attack on
   Pearl Harbour, China formally joined the Allies and declared war on
   Germany on December 9, 1941.

Legacy

   Chiang Wei-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, received military training in
   Germany
   Enlarge
   Chiang Wei-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, received military training in
   Germany

   Sino-German cooperation of the 1930s was perhaps the most ambitious and
   successful of Sun Yat-sen's ideal of an "international development" to
   modernize China. Germany's loss of territories in China following World
   War I, its need for raw materials, and its lack of interest in Chinese
   politics, advanced the rate and productiveness of their cooperation
   with China, as both countries were able to cooperate on the basis of
   equality and economic dependability, without the imperialist undertones
   that marred much of other Sino-foreign relations. China's urgent need
   for industrial development to fight an eventual showdown with Japan
   also precipitated this progress. Furthermore, admiration of Germany's
   rapid rise after its defeat in World War I and its Fascist and
   militaristic ideology also prompted some Chinese within the ruling
   circle to fashion Fascism as a quick solution to China's continuing
   woes of disunity and political confusion. In sum, although the period
   of Sino-German cooperation spanned only a short period of time, and
   much of its results and promises were destroyed in the war with Japan
   that China was far from prepared for, it had some lasting effect on
   China's modernization. After Kuomintang's defeat in the Chinese Civil
   War, the central government relocated to Taiwan. In the Republic of
   China on Taiwan, many government officials and ministers were trained
   in Germany, as were many faculties, research personnel, and military
   officers, such as Chiang's own son Chiang Wei-kuo. Much of Taiwan's
   rapid post-war industrialization can be attributed to the plans and
   goals laid down in the Three-Year Plan of 1936.
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