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Hannibal Barca

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   Hannibal Barca i
   247 BC – 183 BC
   This Roman marble bust of Hannibal was found at Capua (Museo Nazionale,
   Naples) and was apparently made in his honour during Hannibal's own
   lifetime.
   Allegiance Carthaginian Empire
   Rank General, commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian armies
   Battles/wars Second Punic War: Battle of Lake Trasimene, Battle of
   Trebia, Battle of Cannae, Battle of Zama

   Hannibal Barca ( 247 BC – c. 183 BC; sometimes referred to as Hǎnnibal
   Barca) was a Punic military commander and politician, later also
   working in other professions, who is popularly credited as one of the
   finest commanders in history. He lived in a period of tension in the
   Mediterranean, when Rome (then the Roman Republic) established its
   supremacy over other great powers such as Carthage, Macedon, Syracuse
   and the Seleucid empire. He is one of the best known Carthaginian
   commanders. His most famous achievement was at the outbreak of the
   Second Punic War, when he marched an army, which included war
   elephants, from Iberia over the Pyrenees and the Alps into northern
   Italy.

   During his invasion of Italy he defeated the Romans in a series of
   battles, including those at Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae. After Cannae,
   the second largest city in Italy, Capua, joined Hannibal through
   defection from Rome. Hannibal lacked the strength necessary to attack
   the city of Rome itself. He maintained an army in Italy for more than a
   decade afterward, never losing a major engagement, but never able to
   push the war through to a conclusion. During that period of time, the
   Roman armies regrouped. A Roman counter-invasion of North Africa forced
   him to return to Carthage, where he was defeated in the Battle of Zama.
   The defeat forced the Carthaginian Senate to send him into exile.
   During this exile, he lived at the Seleucid court, where he acted as
   military advisor to Antiochus III in his war against Rome. Defeated in
   a naval battle, Hannibal fled again, this time to the Bithynian court.
   When the Romans demanded his surrender, he preferred to commit suicide
   rather than submit.

   Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest military
   commanders and tacticians in history. Military historian Theodore
   Ayrault Dodge once famously christened Hannibal the "father of
   strategy" because his greatest enemy, Rome, came to adopt elements of
   his military tactics in their strategic canon. This praise has earned
   him a strong reputation in the modern world and he was regarded as a
   "gifted strategist" by men like Napoleon Bonaparte and the Duke of
   Wellington. He has also been the basis for a number of films and
   documentaries.

Background and early career

   Hannibal Barca: a 19th century engraved portrait based on the Capua
   bust
   Enlarge
   Hannibal Barca: a 19th century engraved portrait based on the Capua
   bust

   Hannibal Barca ("mercy of Baal") was the son of Hamilcar Barca. 'Barca'
   was an epithet, meaning " lightning" and not a family name, but it was
   carried by his sons. Historians refer to the Hamilcar's family as the
   Barcids to avoid confusion with other Carthaginians of the same name.
   After Carthage's defeat in the First Punic War, Hamilcar set out to
   improve his family's and Carthage's fortunes. With that in mind and
   supported by Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of the
   Iberian Peninsula. Carthage at the time was in such a poor state that
   its navy was unable to transport his army to Iberia ( Hispania);
   instead, Hamilcar had to march it towards the Pillars of Hercules and
   ferry it across the Strait of Gilbratrar (present-day Morocco).

   According to Livy, Hannibal much later said that when he came upon his
   father while he was making a sacrifice to the gods before leaving for
   Hispania, Hannibal, then a boy, begged to go with him. Hamilcar agreed
   and demanded him to swear that as long as he lived he would never be a
   friend of Rome. Other sources report that Hannibal told his father, "I
   swear so soon as age will permit...I will use fire and steel to arrest
   the destiny of Rome."

   (Some historians consider that Hannibal swore at the altar to Ba'al
   "never to be a friend to Rome". According to Polybius, that "Barcid
   Rage" is a mere post-war Roman opinion. Being a friend of Rome could
   also be a political point of view, advocated by some influential groups
   in Carthage.)

   Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania. When he was
   killed in a battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to
   his command of the army. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of
   Carthage's Iberian interests, even signing a treaty with Rome whereby
   Carthage would not expand north of the Ebro River, so long as Rome did
   not expand south of it.

   Upon the assassination of Hasdrubal ( 221 BC), Hannibal was proclaimed
   commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed in his appointment by the
   Carthaginian government. Titus Livy, a Roman scholar, gives a depiction
   of the young Carthaginian:


   Hannibal Barca

    No sooner had he arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar
   in his youth given back to them; the same bright look; the same fire in
   his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. Never was one and
      the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey, or to
                                 command...


   Hannibal Barca

   After he assumed command, Hannibal spent two years consolidating his
   holdings and completing the conquest of Hispania south of the Ebro.
   However, Rome, fearing the growing strength of Hannibal in Iberia, made
   an alliance with the city of Saguntum which lay a considerable distance
   south of the River Ebro and claimed the city as its protectorate.
   Hannibal perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal
   and so he laid siege to the city, which fell after eight months. Rome
   reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty and demanded justice
   from Carthage. In view of Hannibal's great popularity, the Carthaginian
   government did not repudiate Hannibal's actions, and the war he sought
   was declared at the end of the year. Hannibal was now determined to
   carry the war into the heart of Italy by a rapid march through Hispania
   and southern Gaul.

Second Punic War in Italy (218–203 B.C.)

Overland Journey to Italy

   Hannibal´s route of invasion given graciously by The Department of
   History, United States Military Academy
   Enlarge
   Hannibal´s route of invasion given graciously by The Department of
   History, United States Military Academy

   Hannibal departed New Carthage in late spring of 218 B.C. He fought his
   way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes
   through clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. He left a
   detachment of 11,000 troops to garrison the newly conquered region. At
   the Pyrenees, he released another 11,000 Iberian troops who showed
   reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul
   with 50,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen.

   Hannibal recognized that he still needed to cross the Pyrenees, the
   Alps, and many significant rivers. Additionally, he would have to
   contend with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed
   through. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he easily fought his way
   through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees and, by conciliating the
   Gaulish chiefs along his passage, reached the Rhône River before the
   Romans could take any measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the
   Rhône in September, Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000
   cavalry, and thirty-seven war elephants.

   After outmaneuvering the natives, who had tried to prevent his
   crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in
   Gaul. He then proceeded up the valley of one of the tributaries of the
   Rhône River and by autumn arrived at the foot of the Alps. His passage
   over the Alps is one of the most celebrated achievements of any
   military force in ancient warfare. Hannibal successfully crossed the
   mountains, despite numerous obstacles such as harsh climate and
   terrain, the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes, and the challenge
   of commanding an army diverse in race and language. He descended from
   the foothills and arrived into northern Italy, but accompanied by only
   half the forces he had started with, and only a few elephants. From the
   start he seems to have calculated that he would have to operate without
   aid from Hispania. Historian Adrian Goldsworthy, however, points out
   that the figures for the number of troops he had when he left Hispania
   are less than reliable.

Battle of Trebia

   Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory and
   frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on
   foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley,
   moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new allegiance
   to the Romans before the latter could take steps to check the
   rebellion.
   A diagram depicting the tactics used in the Battle of Trebbia
   Enlarge
   A diagram depicting the tactics used in the Battle of Trebbia

   Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman force sent
   to intercept Hannibal, had not expected Hannibal to make an attempt to
   cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to fight the war in
   Iberia. With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul, Scipio made
   an attempt to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt decision and speedy
   movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea, in
   time to meet Hannibal. After allowing his soldiers a brief rest to
   recover from their exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by
   subduing the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern Turin). While moving
   down the Po Valley, the opposing forces were engaged in a small
   confrontation at Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, by virtue
   of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of Lombardy. This
   victory, though essentially a minor engagement, did much to weaken
   Roman control over the Gauls. As a result of Rome’s defeat at Ticinus,
   the Gauls were encouraged to join the Carthaginian cause. Soon the
   entirety of northern Italy was unofficially allied, both Gallic and
   Ligurian troops soon bolstering his army back to 40,000 men. Hannibal’s
   army, significantly supplemented, now stood poised to invade Italy.
   Scipio, severely injured in the battle, retreated across the River
   Trebia with his army still intact, and encamped at the town of
   Placentia to await reinforcements.

   The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before
   news of the defeat at Ticinus had reached Rome, the senate had ordered
   the consul Sempronius Longus to bring his army back from Sicily to meet
   Scipio and face Hannibal. Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was in
   position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between
   Placentia and Arminum, by which Sempronius would have to march in order
   to reinforce Scipio. He then captured Clastidium, from which he drew
   large amounts of rations for his men. But this gain was not without its
   loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's watchfulness, slipped around his
   flank, and joined his colleague in his camp near the Trebbia River near
   Placentia. There, in December of the same year, Hannibal had an
   opportunity to show his superior military skill at Trebia; after
   wearing down the excellent Roman infantry he cut it to pieces by a
   surprise attack from an ambush in the flank.

Battle of Lake Trasimene

   Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal
   quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose support for
   him abated. So, in spring 217 BC Hannibal decided to find a more
   reliable base of operations farther south. Expecting Hannibal to carry
   on advancing to Rome, Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius (the new
   Consuls of Rome) took their armies to block the Eastern and Western
   routes Hannibal could use to get to Rome.
   Battle of Lake Trasimene, -217.From the Department of History, United
   States Military Academy
   Enlarge
   Battle of Lake Trasimene, -217.
   From the Department of History, United States Military Academy

   The only alternate route to central Italy lay at the mouth of the Arno.
   This route was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be
   overflowing more than usual during this particular season. Hannibal
   knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the
   surest and certainly the quickest route to Central Italy. As Polybius
   claims for four days and three nights, Hannibal’s men marched “through
   a route which was under water” suffering terribly from fatigue and
   enforced want of sleep. He crossed the Apennines (during which he lost
   his right eye because of conjunctivitis) and the seemingly impassable
   Arno without opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno, he
   lost a large part of his force, including, it would seem, his remaining
   elephants.

   Arriving in Eturia in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure
   the main Roman army under Flaminius into a pitched battle, by
   devastating under his very own eye the area he had been sent to
   protect. As Polybius tells us, “he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he
   passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius
   (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation)
   would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the
   country but would spontaneously follow him . . . and give him
   opportunities for attack.” At the same time, he tried to break the
   allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that she was powerless to
   protect them. Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively
   encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere
   devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank
   and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the first
   recorded turning movement in military history). Advancing through the
   uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty pursuit and,
   catching him in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his
   army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes while killing Flaminius
   as well (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). He had now disposed of the only
   field force which could check his advance upon Rome, but, realizing
   that without siege engines he could not hope to take the capital, he
   preferred to exploit his victory by passing into central and southern
   Italy and encouraging a general revolt against the sovereign power.
   After Lake Trasimeno, Hannibal stated, “I have not come to fight
   Italians, but on behalf of the Italians against Rome.”

   The Romans appointed Fabius Maximus as a dictator. Departing from Roman
   military traditions, Fabian adopted the Fabian strategy — named after
   him — of refusing open battle with his opponent while placing several
   Roman armies in Hannibal’s vicinity to limit his movement.
   Hannibal - Silver double shekel, c. 230 BC, The British Museum
   Enlarge
   Hannibal - Silver double shekel, c. 230 BC, The British Museum

   Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius to battle, Hannibal
   decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and
   most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw
   Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal’s path of
   destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn, and thus
   remained on the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans
   who believed it was a form of cowardice.

   Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the already
   devastated lowlands of Campania but Fabius had ensured that all the
   passes out of Campania were blocked. To avoid this, Hannibal deceived
   the Romans into thinking that the Carthaginian Army was going to escape
   through the woods. As the Romans moved off towards the woods,
   Hannibal's army occupied the pass, and his army made their way through
   the pass unopposed. Fabius was within striking distance but in this
   case his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly) he
   stayed put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the
   Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as
   Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding
   its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being
   used by later military manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius’s
   prestige, and soon after this, his period of power ended.

Battle of Cannae

   Destruction of the Roman army, courtesy of The Department of History,
   United States Military Academy.
   Enlarge
   Destruction of the Roman army, courtesy of The Department of History,
   United States Military Academy.
   Hannibal counting the rings of the Roman knights killed during the
   battle, statue by Sébastien Slodzt, 1704, Louvre
   Enlarge
   Hannibal counting the rings of the Roman knights killed during the
   battle, statue by Sébastien Slodzt, 1704, Louvre

   In the Spring of 216 B.C. Hannibal took the initiative and seized the
   large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. By seizing Cannae,
   Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source
   of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their Consular elections in
   216, they appointed Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus
   as Consuls. In the meantime, the Romans, hoping to gain success through
   sheer strength in numbers, raised a new army of unprecedented size,
   estimated by some to be as large as 100,000 men.

   The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls, resolving to confront
   Hannibal, marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found him on the
   left bank of the Audifus River, and encamped six miles away. On this
   occasion, the two armies were combined into one, the Consuls having to
   alternate their command on a daily basis. The Consul Varro, who was in
   command on the first day, was a man of reckless and hubristic nature,
   and was determined to defeat Hannibal. Hannibal capitalized on the
   eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using an envelopment
   tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical advantage by shrinking the
   surface area where combat could occur. Hannibal drew up his least
   reliable infantry in a semicircle in the centre with the wings composed
   of the Gallic and Numidian horse. The Roman legions forced their way
   through Hannibal's weak centre but the Libyan Mercenaries in the wings
   swung around by the movement, menaced their flanks. The onslaught of
   Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, and who commanded the left, pushed
   in the Roman right and then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's
   cavalry on the Roman left. Then he attacked the legions from behind. As
   a result, the Roman army was hemmed in with no means of escape.

   Due to these brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers,
   managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this
   force. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000
   Romans were killed or captured at Cannae. Among the dead were the Roman
   consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as well two consuls for the preceding
   year, two quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military
   tribunes, and an additional eighty senators (at a time when the Roman
   Senate was comprised of no more than 300 men, this constituted 25%–30%
   of the governing body). This makes the Battle of Cannae one of the most
   catastrophic defeats in the history of Ancient Rome, and one of the
   bloodiest battles in all of human history (in terms of the number of
   lives lost within a single day). After Cannae, the Romans refused to
   fight Hannibal in pitched battles, aiming instead to defeat him by
   attrition, relying on their advantages of supply and manpower.

   The effect on morale of this victory meant that most of southern Italy
   joined Hannibal's cause. As Polybius notes, "How much more serious was
   the defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the
   behaviour of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty
   remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that
   they despaired of Roman Power.". During that same year, the Greek
   cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political
   control, while the Macedonian king, Philip V pledged his support to
   Hannibal – thus initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome.
   Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed King Hieronymous
   of Syracuse. Had Hannibal now received proper material reinforcements
   from his countrymen at Carthage he might have made a direct attack upon
   Rome; for the present he had to content himself with subduing the
   fortresses which still held out against him, and the only other notable
   event of 216 BC was the defection of Capua, the second largest city of
   Italy, which Hannibal made his new base. However, only a few of the
   Italian city-states which he had expected to gain as allies consented
   to join him.

Stalemate

   The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans
   utilized the attritional strategies Fabius had taught them, and which,
   they finally realized, were the only feasible means of defeating
   Hannibal. The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and
   instead, assaulted his weakening army with multiple smaller armies in
   an attempt to both weary him and create unrest in his troops. For the
   next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a scorched earth policy
   and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations
   throughout Southern Italy. His immediate objectives were reduced to
   minor operations which centered mainly round the cities of Campania.

   As the forces detached under his lieutenants were generally unable to
   hold their own, and neither his home government nor his new ally Philip
   V of Macedon helped to make good his losses, his position in southern
   Italy became increasingly difficult and his chance of ultimately
   conquering Rome grew ever more remote. Hannibal still won a number of
   notable victories: completely destroying two Roman armies in 212 BC,
   and at one point, killing two Consuls (which included the famed Marcus
   Claudius Marcellus) in a battle in 208 BC. Nevertheless, without the
   resources his allies could contribute, or reinforcements from Carthage,
   Hannibal could not make further significant gains. Thus, inadequately
   supported by his Italian allies, abandoned by his government, and
   unable to match Rome’s resources, Hannibal slowly began losing ground.
   Hannibal continued defeating the Romans whenever he could bring them
   into battle, yet he was never able to complete another decisive victory
   that produced a lasting strategic effect.

End of War in Italy

   In 212 BC Hannibal captured Tarentum but he failed to obtain control of
   the harbour. The tide was slowly turning against him, and in favour of
   Rome.

   The Romans mounted two sieges of Capua, which fell in 211 BC, and the
   Romans completed their conquest of Syracuse and destruction of a
   Carthaginian army in Sicily. Shortly thereafter, the Romans pacified
   Sicily and entered into an alliance with the Aetolian League to counter
   Phillip V. Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's preoccupation in
   Italy to conquer Illyria, now found himself under attack from several
   sides at once and was quickly subdued by Rome and her Greek allies.
   Meanwhile, Hannibal had defeated Fulvius at Herdonea in Apulia, but
   lost Tarentum in the following year.

   In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by a severe
   defeat inflicted at Herdoniac (modern Ordona) in Apulia upon a
   proconsular army, and in 208 BC destroyed a Roman force engaged in the
   siege of Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum in 209 BC and
   the gradual reconquest by the Romans of Samnium and Lucania, his hold
   on south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded in making his
   way again into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a
   combined march upon Rome with his brother Hasdrubal Barca. On hearing,
   however, of his brother's defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired
   into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. The
   combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal's success in
   Italy. With the failure of his brother Mago Barca in Liguria (205
   BC-203 BC) and of his own negotiations with Philip of Macedon, the last
   hope of recovering his ascendancy in Italy was lost. In 203 BC, after
   nearly fifteen years of fighting in Italy, and with the military
   fortunes of Carthage rapidly declining, Hannibal was recalled to
   Carthage to direct the defense of his native country against a Roman
   invasion under Scipio Africanus.

Conclusion of Second Punic War (203–201 B.C.)

   Scipio Africanus
   Enlarge
   Scipio Africanus

Return to Carthage

   In 203 BC, when Scipio was carrying all before him in Africa and the
   Carthaginian peace party were arranging an armistice, Hannibal was
   recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a
   record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon brazen
   tablets in the temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. His
   arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, who
   placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his
   mercenaries from Italy. In 202 BC, Hannibal met Scipio in a fruitless
   peace conference. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered
   due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of
   protocols which ended the First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on
   Saguntum, as well as perceived breach in contemporary military
   etiquette (Hannibal's numerous ambuscades). The decisive battle at Zama
   soon followed.

Battle of Zama

   Unlike most battles of the Second Punic War, the Romans had superiority
   in cavalry and the Carthaginians had superiority in infantry. This
   Roman cavalry superiority was due to the betrayal of Masinissa, who had
   earlier assisted Carthage in Iberia, but changed sides in 206 B.C. with
   the promise of land and due to his personal conflicts with Syphax, a
   Carthaginian ally. This betrayal gave Scipio Africanus an advantage
   that had previously been possessed by the Carthaginians. Although the
   aging Hannibal was suffering from mental exhaustion and deteriorating
   health after years of campaigning in Italy, the Carthaginians still had
   the advantage in numbers and were boosted by the presence of 80 war
   elephants.
   Painting of the Battle of Zama by Cornelis Cort, 1567
   Enlarge
   Painting of the Battle of Zama by Cornelis Cort, 1567

   The Roman cavalry won an early victory, and Scipio had devised tactics
   for defeating Carthaginian war elephants. However, the battle remained
   closely fought. At one point it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge
   of victory, but Scipio was able to rally his men, and his cavalry
   attacked Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the
   Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. With their
   foremost general defeated, the Carthaginians had no choice but to
   accept defeat and surrender to Rome. Carthage lost approximately 31,000
   troops with an additional 15,000 wounded. In contrast, the Romans
   suffered only 1500 casualties. The battle resulted in a loss of respect
   for Hannibal by his fellow Carthaginians. It marked the last major
   battle of the Second Punic War, with Rome the victor. The conditions of
   defeat were such that Carthage could no longer battle for Mediterranean
   supremacy. However, Hannibal has still been glorified despite this loss
   due to the fact that Scipio had used Hannibal's tactics to defeat him.

Later career

Peacetime Carthage (200–196 B.C.)

   Hannibal was still only in his forty-sixth year and soon showed that he
   could be a statesman as well as a soldier. Following the conclusion of
   a peace that left Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire
   Hannibal prepared to take a back seat for a time. However, the blatant
   corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a chance of a come back and
   he was elected as suffet, or chief magistrate. The office had become
   rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its power and authority.
   The oligarchy, always jealous of him, had even charged him with having
   betrayed the interests of his country while in Italy, for neglecting to
   take Rome when he might have done so. So effectively did Hannibal
   reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by
   installments without additional and extraordinary taxation. He also
   reformed the Hundred and Four, stipulating that its membership be
   chosen by direct election rather than co-option. He also used citizen
   support to change the term of office in the Hundred and Four from life
   to a year with a term limit of two years.

Exile and death (195–183 B.C.)

   Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed by
   Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender. Hannibal
   thereupon went into voluntary exile. First he journeyed to Tyre, the
   mother-city of Carthage, and then to Ephesus, where he was honorably
   received by Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for war with
   Rome. Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match for the
   Romans. He advised him to equip a fleet and land a body of troops in
   the south of Italy, offering to take command himself. But he could not
   make much impression on Antiochus, who listened to his courtiers and
   would not entrust Hannibal with any important office.

   According to Cicero, while at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal attended
   a lecture by Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics.
   When Phormio finished a discourse on the duties of a general, Hannibal
   was asked his opinion. He replied: "I have seen during my life many an
   old fool; but this one beats them all." Another story about Hannibal in
   exile gives a strange slant to his supposed Punic perfidy. Antiochus
   III showed off a vast and well-armed formation to Hannibal and asked
   him if they would be enough for the Roman Republic, to which Hannibal
   replied, "Yes, enough for the Romans, however greedy they may be." It
   should be noted that in this situation Hannibal had not been given
   command of the army, but Antiochus himself had developed the battle
   plan and was subsequently defeated.

   In 190 BC he was placed in command of a Phoenician fleet but was
   defeated in a battle off the Eurymedon River. According to Strabo and
   Plutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian court of
   Artaxias I where he planned and supervised the building of the new
   royal capital Artaxata. From the court of Antiochus, who seemed
   prepared to surrender him to the Romans, Hannibal fled to Crete, but he
   soon went back to Asia Minor and sought refuge with Prusias I of
   Bithynia, who was engaged in warfare with Rome's ally, King Eumenes II
   of Pergamum. Hannibal went on to serve Prusias in this war. In one of
   the victories he gained over Eumenes at sea, it is said that he used
   one of the first examples of biological warfare - he threw cauldrons of
   snakes into the enemy vessels. Once more the Romans were determined to
   hunt him down, and they sent Flaminius to insist on his surrender.
   Prusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal was determined not to fall
   into his enemies' hands. At Libyssa on the eastern shore of the Sea of
   Marmora, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried about
   with him in a ring. The precise year of his death is a matter of
   controversy. If, as Livy seems to imply, it was 183 BC, he died in the
   same year as Scipio Africanus at the age of sixty four.

Legacy to the ancient world

   Long after his death, his name continued to carry a portent of great or
   imminent danger within the Roman Republic. It was written that he
   taught the Romans, who claimed to be fierce descendants of Mars, the
   meaning of fear. For generations, Roman housekeepers would tell their
   children brutal tales of Hannibal when they misbehaved. In fact,
   Hannibal became such a figure of terror, that whenever disaster struck,
   the Roman Senators would exclaim " Hannibal ad portas" (“Hannibal is at
   the Gates!”) to express their fear or anxiety. This famous Latin phrase
   evolved into a common expression that is often still used when a client
   arrives through the door or when one is faced with calamity. This
   illustrates the psychological impact Hannibal's presence in Italy had
   on Roman Culture.

   A grudging admiration for Hannibal is evident in the works of Roman
   historians such as Livy and Juvenal. The Romans even built statues of
   the Carthaginian in the very streets of Rome to advertise their defeat
   of such a worthy adversary. It is plausible to suggest that Hannibal
   engendered the greatest fear Rome had towards an enemy. Nevetheless,
   they grimly refused to admit the possibility of defeat and rejected all
   overtures for peace, and they even refused to accept the ransom of
   prisoners after Cannae (Livy, The War With Hannibal 22.61).

   During the course of the war there were no Roman revolutions, no
   factions with the Senate that desired peace, no pro-Carthaginian Roman
   Quislings, no coups or dictatorships ; and Roman aristocrats still
   ferociously competed with each other for positions of command to fight
   against Rome's most dangerous enemy. Hannibal's military genius was not
   enough to really disturb the Roman political process and the collective
   political and military genius of the Roman people. Rome's attitude
   towards Hannibal was amply demonstrated when he marched on Rome in 211
   and the real estate that his army was encamped on was sold at the very
   time of its occupation, and for the same price. After Cannae the Romans
   showed a considerable steadfastness in adversity, but this is not to
   say that they were at the same time unafraid. After the disaster Rome
   was left virtually defenseless, but the Senate still chose not to
   withdraw a single garrison from an overseas province to strengthen the
   city. In fact, they were reinforced and the campaigns there maintained
   until victory was secured; beginning first in Sicily under direction of
   Claudius Marcellus, and later Spain under Scipio Africanus . Although
   the long-term consequences of Hannibal's war are debatable, this war
   was undeniably Rome's "finest hour".

   Most of the sources available to historians about Hannibal are from
   Romans. They considered him the greatest enemy Roma had ever faced.
   Livy gives us the idea that he was extremely cruel. Even Cicero, when
   he talked of Rome and her two great enemies, spoke of the "honorable"
   Pyrrhus and the "cruel" Hannibal. Yet a different picture is sometimes
   revealed. When Hannibal's successes had brought about the death of two
   Roman consuls, he vainly searched for the body of Gaius Flaminius on
   the shores of Lake Trasimene, held ceremonial rituals in recognition of
   Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and sent Marcellus' ashes back to his family
   in Rome. Any bias attributed to Polybius, however, is more troublesome,
   since he was clearly sympathetic towards Hannibal. Nevertheless,
   Polybius spent a long period as a hostage in Italy and relied heavily
   on Roman sources, so there remains the possibility that he was
   reproducing elements of Roman propaganda.

Legacy to the modern world

   The material of legend: in "Snow-storm: Hannibal and his Army Crossing
   the Alps", J.M.W. Turner envelopes Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps in
   impressionist atmosphere
   Enlarge
   The material of legend: in "Snow-storm: Hannibal and his Army Crossing
   the Alps", J.M.W. Turner envelopes Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps in
   impressionist atmosphere

   Hannibal's name is also commonplace in later art and popular culture,
   an objective measure of his influence on Western European history.
   Although his influence should not be mixed up with the Saint Hannibal
   Mary Di Francia ( external source).

   Like other military leaders Hannibal's victories against superior
   forces in an ultimately losing cause won him enduring fame that
   outlasted his native country. His crossing of the Alps remains one of
   the most monumental military feats of ancient warfare and has since
   captured the imagination of the Western World (romanticized by several
   artworks and subject to Roman folklore). In many schools in Rome, and
   even Italy overall, when a child behaves badly, the teacher will say,
   "Behave well or Hannibal will come and get you". This shows how his
   legend and fear still goes on today.

TV and film

   Some controversy has been stirred up in recent years by an unreleased
   20th Century Fox film project titled "Hannibal", starring Denzel
   Washington in the title role. It is notable that Vin Diesel is also
   planning his own project, in which he would take the starring role.
                            Year Film Other notes
   2008 Hannibal Upcoming Motion Picture starring Vin Diesel
   2006 Hannibal - Rome's Worst Nightmare TV film, starring Alexander
   Siddig
   2005 Hannibal vs. Rome in National Geographic Channel
   2004 The Phantom of the Opera The beginning Opera being rehearsed is
   one about Hannibal so titled Hannibal
   2005 The True Story of Hannibal English documentary
   2001 Hannibal: The Man Who Hated Rome English documentary
   1997 The Great Battles of Hannibal English documentary
   1996 Gulliver’s Travels Gulliver summons Hannibal from a magic mirror.
   1960 Annibale Italian Motion Picture starring Victor Mature
   1955 Jupiter's Darling English Motion Picture starring Howard Keel
   1939 Scipio Africanus - the Defeat of Hannibal (Scipione l'africano)
   Italian Motion Picture
   1914 Cabiria Italian Silent film

Literature

   Novel unless otherwise noted
     * 1300s, Dante's Divine Comedy, poem, Inferno XXXI.97-132, 115-124 (
       Battle of Zama) and Paradiso VI
     * 1700s, Gulliver's Travels, satirical work
     * 1862, Gustave Flaubert's Salammbô, set in Carthage at the time of
       Hamilcar Barca. Hannibal appears as a child.
     * 1996, Elisabeth Craft, A Spy for Hannibal: A Novel of Carthage,
       091015533X
     * Ross Leckie, Carthage trilogy, source of the 2006 film (1996,
       Hannibal: A Novel, ISBN 0-89526-443-9 ; 1999, Scipio, a Novel, ISBN
       0-349-11238-X ; Carthage, 2000, ISBN 0-86241-944-1)
     * 2005, Terry McCarthy, The Sword of Hannibal, ISBN 0-446-61517-X
     * 2006, David Anthony Durham, Pride of Carthage: A Novel of Hannibal,
       ISBN 0-385-72249-4
     * 2006, Angela Render, Forged By Lightning: A Novel of Hannibal and
       Scipio, ISBN 1-4116-8002-2

Theatre and opera

     * In Berlioz's Les Troyens, he appears in a vision to Dido just
       before she dies.

Military history

   Hannibal's legacy also extends to the field of military history, as he
   is universally ranked as one of the greatest military strategists and
   tacticians of the Western world, alongside Alexander the Great, Julius
   Caesar, Robert E. Lee, Erwin Rommel, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Frederick
   the Great among others. In fact, his exploits (especially his victory
   at Cannae) continue to be studied in several military academies all
   over the world.
   Hannibal's celebrated feat in crossing the Alps with war elephants
   passed into European legend: a fresco detail, ca. 1510, Capitoline
   Museums, Rome
   Enlarge
   Hannibal's celebrated feat in crossing the Alps with war elephants
   passed into European legend: a fresco detail, ca. 1510, Capitoline
   Museums, Rome

   The author of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article praises Hannibal
   in these words:


   Hannibal Barca

   As to the transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot be two
     opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold his ground in a
     hostile country against several powerful armies and a succession of
     able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme
       capacity. In the use of stratagems and ambuscades he certainly
         surpassed all other generals of antiquity. Wonderful as his
    achievements were, we must marvel the more when we take into account
   the grudging support he received from Carthage. As his veterans melted
    away, he had to organize fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a
    mutiny in his army, composed though it was of Africans, Iberians and
    Gauls. Again, all we know of him comes for the most part from hostile
   sources. The Romans feared and hated him so much that they could not do
    him justice. Livy speaks of his great qualities, but he adds that his
     vices were equally great, among which he singles out his more than
   Punic perfidy and an inhuman cruelty. For the first there would seem to
    be no further justification than that he was consummately skilful in
     the use of ambuscades. For the latter there is, we believe, no more
    ground than that at certain crises he acted in the general spirit of
   ancient warfare. Sometimes he contrasts most favorably with his enemy.
   No such brutality stains his name as that perpetrated by Claudius Nero
    on the vanquished Hasdrubal. Polybius merely says that he was accused
    of cruelty by the Romans and of avarice by the Carthaginians. He had
   indeed bitter enemies, and his life was one continuous struggle against
    destiny. For steadfastness of purpose, for organizing capacity and a
       mastery of military science he has perhaps never had an equal.


   Hannibal Barca

   Even his Roman chroniclers acknowledged his military genius, writing
   that, "he never required others to do what he could and would not do
   himself". Napoleon Bonaparte regarded Hannibal as a gifted strategist,
   describing him as "the most audacious of all, probably the most
   stunning, so hardy, so sure, so great in all things." Alfred Graf von
   Schlieffen's eponymously-titled " Schlieffen Plan" was developed from
   his military studies, with particularly heavy emphasis on Hannibal's
   victory at Cannae. Patton believed that he was a reincarnation of
   General Hannibal as well as many other people including a Roman
   legionary. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the Coalition Forces in
   the Gulf War, claimed that "The technology of war may change, the
   sophistication of weapons certainly changes. But those same principles
   of war that applied to the days of Hannibal apply today".

   After his defeat, Hannibal reportedly met Scipio Africanus while in the
   court of Antiochus: the two commanders conversed amicably and Scipio
   asked Hannibal his opinion on who the greatest military mind of all
   time was. Hannibal said, "Alexander the Great". Scipio then asked him
   who was the second. " Pyrrhus of Epirus", said Hannibal. Scipio asked
   why he, who defeated Hannibal, was not included. Hannibal replied that
   this did not change his opinion, except that if Hannibal had defeated
   Scipio, he would then have ranked himself first, ahead of Alexander.

   According to the military historian, Theodore Ayrault Dodge,


   Hannibal Barca

      Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle in history is a finer
   sample of tactics than Cannae. But he was yet greater in logistics and
    strategy. No captain ever marched to and fro among so many armies of
      troops superior to his own numbers and material as fearlessly and
    skillfully as he. No man ever held his own so long or so ably against
    such odds. Constantly overmatched by better soldiers, led by generals
     always respectable, often of great ability, he yet defied all their
    efforts to drive him from Italy, for half a generation. Excepting in
   the case of Alexander, and some few isolated instances, all wars up to
     the Second Punic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely, by
   battle-tactics. Strategic ability had been comprehended only on a minor
    scale. Armies had marched towards each other, had fought in parallel
       order, and the conqueror had imposed terms on his opponent. Any
    variation from this rule consisted in ambuscades or other stratagems.
   That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking battle; that the
     results of a victory could be earned by attacks upon the enemy’s
     communications, by flank-maneuvers, by seizing positions from which
      safely to threaten him in case he moved, and by other devices of
    strategy, was not understood . . .[However] For the first time in the
     history of war, we see two contending generals avoiding each other,
     occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about each other's
   flanks to seize cities or supplies in their rear, harassing each other
    with small-war, and rarely venturing on a battle which might prove a
      fatal disaster—all with a well-conceived purpose of placing his
   opponent at a strategic disadvantage. . .That it did so was due to the
                            teaching of Hannibal.


   Hannibal Barca

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