   #copyright

Blitzkrieg

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Blitzkrieg   (German, literally lightning war or flash war) is a
   popular name for an offensive operational-level military doctrine which
   involves an initial bombardment followed by employment of mobile forces
   attacking with speed and surprise to prevent an enemy from implementing
   a coherent defense. The founding principles of these types of
   operations were developed in the 19th Century by various nations, and
   adapted in the years after World War I, largely by the German
   Wehrmacht, to incorporate modern weapons and vehicles as a method to
   help prevent trench warfare and linear warfare in future conflicts. The
   first practical implementations of these concepts coupled with modern
   technology were instituted by the Wehrmacht in the opening battles of
   World War II. While operations in Poland were rather conventional,
   subsequent battles — particularly the invasions of France, The
   Netherlands and initial operations in the Soviet Union — were effective
   owing to surprise penetrations, general enemy unpreparedness and an
   inability to react swiftly enough to German offensive operations. That
   the German Army quickly defeated numerically and technically superior
   enemies in France led many analysts to believe that a new system of
   warfare had been invented.

   The generally accepted definition of blitzkrieg operations include the
   use of maneuver rather than attrition to defeat an opponent, and
   describe operations using combined arms concentration of mobile assets
   at a focal point, armour closely supported by mobile infantry,
   artillery and close air support assets. These tactics required the
   development of specialized support vehicles, new methods of
   communication, new tactics, and an effective decentralized command
   structure. Broadly speaking, blitzkrieg operations required the
   development of mechanized infantry, self-propelled artillery and
   engineering assets that could maintain the rate of advance of the
   tanks. German forces avoided direct combat in favour of interrupting an
   enemy's communications, decision-making, logistics and of reducing
   morale. In combat, blitzkrieg left little choice for the slower
   defending forces but to clump into defensive pockets that were
   encircled and then destroyed by following German infantry.

   Tactically speaking, once the weakest area of defence is identified,
   tactical bombers would strike at logistical, communication, and supply
   targets while field and self-propelled artillery units struck at
   defence installations. These bombardments were then pre-ceded by
   probing attacks and smoke screens to conceal the main armoured
   spearhead, and once the main armoured force broke through the
   designated strike area, motorized infantry would then fan out behind
   the armoured spearhead to capture or destroy any enemy forces encircled
   by panzer and mechanized infantry units or tactically important
   objectives like bridges, airfields, supply depots, rail yards, naval
   ports, anti-aircraft batteries, and radar installations.

Etymology and modern meaning

   "Blitzkrieg" is a German compound meaning "lightning war". The word did
   not enter official terminology of the Wehrmacht either before or during
   the war, even though it was already used in the military Journal
   "Deutsche Wehr" in 1935, in the context of an article on how states
   with insufficient food and raw materials supply can win a war. Another
   appearance is in 1938 in the "Militär-Wochenblatt", where Blitzkrieg is
   defined as a "strategic attack", carried out by operational use of
   tanks, air force, and airborne troops. Karl-Heinz Frieser in his book
   'Blitzkrieg Legende', who researched the origin of the term and found
   the above examples, points out that the pre-war use of the term is
   rare, and that it practically never entered official terminology
   throughout the war.

   It was first popularised in the English-speaking world by the American
   newsmagazine TIME describing the 1939 German invasion of Poland.
   Published on September 25 1939, well into the campaign, the account
   reads:

          The battlefront got lost, and with it the illusion that there
          had ever been a battlefront. For this was no war of occupation,
          but a war of quick penetration and obliteration—Blitzkrieg,
          lightning war. Swift columns of tanks and armored trucks had
          plunged through Poland while bombs raining from the sky heralded
          their coming. They had sawed off communications, destroyed
          animal, scattered civilians, spread terror. Working sometimes 30
          miles (50 km) ahead of infantry and artillery, they had broken
          down the Polish defenses before they had time to organize. Then,
          while the infantry mopped up, they had moved on, to strike again
          far behind what had been called the front.

   Military historians have defined blitzkrieg as the employment of the
   concepts of maneuver and combined arms warfare developed in Germany
   during both the interwar period and the Second World War.
   Strategically, the ideal was to swiftly effect an adversary's collapse
   through a short campaign fought by a small, professional army.
   Operationally, its goal was to use indirect means, such as, mobility
   and shock, to render an adversary's plans irrelevant or impractical. To
   do this, self-propelled formations of tanks; motorized infantry,
   engineers, artillery; and ground-attack aircraft operated as a
   combined-arms team. Historians have termed it a period form of the
   longstanding German principle of Bewegungskrieg, or movement war.

   "Blitzkrieg" has since expanded into multiple meanings in more popular
   usage. From its original military definition, "blitzkrieg" may be
   applied to any military operation emphasizing the surprise, speed, or
   concentration stressed in accounts of the Invasion of Poland. During
   the war, the Luftwaffe terror bombings of London came to be known as
   The Blitz. Similarly, blitz has come to describe the " blitz" (rush)
   tactic of American football, and the blitz form of chess in which
   players are allotted very little time. Blitz or blitzkrieg is used in
   many other non-military contexts.

Interwar period

Reichswehr

   Blitzkrieg's immediate development began with Germany's defeat in the
   First World War. Shortly after the war, the new Reichswehr created
   committees of veteran officers to evaluate 57 issues of the war. The
   reports of these committees formed doctrinal and training publications
   which were the standards in the Second World War. The Reichswehr was
   influenced by its analysis of pre-war German military thought, in
   particular its infiltration tactics of the war, and the maneuver
   warfare which dominated the Eastern Front.

   German military history had been influenced heavily by Carl von
   Clausewitz, Alfred von Schlieffen and von Moltke the Elder, who were
   proponents of maneuver, mass, and envelopment. Their concepts were
   employed in the successful Franco-Prussian War and attempted "knock-out
   blow" of the Schlieffen Plan. Following the war, these concepts were
   modified by the Reichswehr. Its Chief of Staff, Hans von Seeckt, moved
   doctrine away from what he argued was an excessive focus on
   encirclement towards one based on speed. Speed gives surprise, surprise
   allows exploitation if decisions can be reached quickly and mobility
   gives flexibility and speed. Von Seeckt advocated effecting
   breakthroughs against the enemy's centre when it was more profitable
   than encirclement or where encirclement was not practical. Under his
   command a modern update of the doctrinal system called "Bewegungskrieg"
   and its associated tactical system called " Auftragstaktik" was
   developed which resulted in the popularly known blitzkrieg effect. He
   additionally rejected the notion of mass which von Schlieffen and von
   Moltke had advocated. While reserves had comprised up to four-tenths of
   German forces in pre-war campaigns, von Seeckt sought the creation of a
   small, professional (volunteer) military backed by a defense-oriented
   militia. In modern warfare, he argued, such a force was more capable of
   offensive action, faster to ready, and less expensive to equip with
   more modern weapons. The Reichswehr was forced to adopt a small and
   professional army quite aside from any German plans, for the Treaty of
   Versailles limited it to 100,000 men.

   Bewegungskrieg required a new command hierarchy that allowed military
   decisions to be made closer to the unit level. This allowed units to
   react and make effective decisions faster, which is a critical
   advantage and a major reason for the success of Blitzkrieg.

   German leadership had also been criticized for failing to understand
   the technical advances of the First World War, having given tank
   production the lowest priority and having conducted no studies of the
   machine gun prior to that war. In response, German officers attended
   technical schools during this period of rebuilding after the war.

   Infiltration tactics invented by the German Army during the First World
   War became the basis for later tactics. German infantry had advanced in
   small, decentralised groups which bypassed resistance in favour of
   advancing at weak points and attacking rear-area communications. This
   was aided by co-ordinated artillery and air bombardments, and followed
   by larger infantry forces with heavy guns, which destroyed centres of
   resistance. These concepts formed the basis of the Wehrmacht's tactics
   during the Second World War.

   On the war's Eastern Front, combat did not bog down into trench
   warfare. German and Russian armies fought a war of maneuver over
   thousands of miles, giving the German leadership unique experience
   which the trench-bound Western Allies did not have. Studies of
   operations in the East led to the conclusion that small and coordinated
   forces possessed more combat worth than large, uncoordinated forces.

Foreign influence

   During this period, all the war's major combatants developed mechanized
   force theories. Theories of the Western Allies differed substantially
   from the Reichswehr's. British, French, and American doctrines broadly
   favored a more set-piece battle, less combined arms focus, and less
   focus on concentration. Early Reichswehr periodicals contained many
   translated works, though they were often not adopted. Technical
   advances in foreign countries were, however, observed and used in-part
   by the Weapons Office. Foreign doctrines are widely considered to have
   had little serious influence.

   Col. Charles de Gaulle, in France, was a known advocate of
   concentration of armor and airplanes — views that little endeared him
   to the French high command, but are claimed by some to have influenced
   Heinz Guderian.

   British theorists J.F.C. Fuller and Captain B. H. Liddell Hart have
   often been associated with blitzkrieg's development, though this is a
   matter of controversy. The British War Office did permit an
   Experimental Mechanised Force, formed on 1 May 1927, that was wholly
   motorized including self propelled artillery and motorised engineers.
   It is argued that Guderian, a critical figure in blitzkrieg's
   conception, drew some of his inspiration from Liddell Hart. This was
   based on a paragraph in the English edition of Guderian's autobiography
   in which he credits Liddell Hart. In opposition, it is argued that
   Liddell Hart, as editor of the autobiography's English edition, wrote
   that paragraph himself or, more broadly, that his influence on Guderian
   was not as significant as held. Fuller's influence is less clear.
   During the war, he developed plans for massive, independent tank
   operations and was subsequently studied by the German leadership. It is
   variously argued that Fuller's wartime plans and post-war writings were
   an inspiration, or that his readership was low and German experiences
   during the war received more attention.

   What is clear is the practical implementation of this doctrine in a
   wide and successful range of scenarios by Guderian and other Germans
   during the war. From early combined-arms river crossings and
   penetration exploitations during the advance in France in 1940 to
   massive sweeping advances in Russia in 1941, Guderian showed a mastery
   and innovation that inspired many others. This leadership was supported
   and fostered by the Reichswehr General Staff system, which worked the
   Army to greater and greater levels of capability through massive and
   systematic Movement Warfare war games in the 1930s.

   The Reichswehr and Red Army collaborated in wargames and tests in Kazan
   and Lipetsk beginning in 1926. During this period, the Red Army was
   developing the theory of Deep operations, which would guide Red Army
   doctrine throughout World War II. Set within the Soviet Union, these
   two centers were used to field test aircraft and armored vehicles up to
   the battalion level, as well as housing aerial and armored warfare
   schools through which officers were rotated. This was done in the
   Soviet Union, in secret, to evade the Treaty of Versailles's
   occupational agent, the Inter-Allied Commission.

   It should be noted that early forms of Blitzkrieg were used in the
   First World War - most notably by General Alexei Brusilov in Russia's
   Brusilov Offensive of 1916 and Britain's General Allenby in the Battle
   of Megiddo in September 1918, making heavy use of armored vehicles,
   quick-strike cavalry attacks, and aerial bombardment to facilitate a
   swift and decisive victory. The Germans themselves used a variation of
   such tactics in their 1918 Spring Offensive.

Guderian into the Wehrmacht

   Following Germany's military reforms of the 1920s, Heinz Guderian
   emerged as a strong proponent of mechanized forces. Within the
   Inspectorate of Transport Troops, Guderian and colleagues performed
   theoretical and field exercise work. There was opposition from many
   officers who gave primacy to the infantry or simply doubted the
   usefulness of the tank. Among them was Chief of the General Staff
   Ludwig Beck (1935–38), who skeptical that armored forces could be
   decisive. Nonetheless, the panzer divisions were established during his
   tenure.

   Guderian argued that the tank was the decisive weapon of war. "If the
   tanks succeed, then victory follows", he wrote. In an article addressed
   to critics of tank warfare, he wrote "until our critics can produce
   some new and better method of making a successful land attack other
   than self-massacre, we shall continue to maintain our beliefs that
   tanks—properly employed, needless to say—are today the best means
   available for land attack." Addressing the faster rate at which
   defenders could reinforce an area than attackers could penetrate it
   during the First World War, Guderian wrote that "since reserve forces
   will now be motorized, the building up of new defensive fronts is
   easier than it used to be; the chances of an offensive based on the
   timetable of artillery and infantry co-operation are, as a result, even
   slighter today than they were in the last war." He continued, "We
   believe that by attacking with tanks we can achieve a higher rate of
   movement than has been hitherto obtainable, and—what is perhaps even
   more important—that we can keep moving once a breakthrough has been
   made." Guderian additionally required that tactical radios be widely
   used to facilitate co-ordination and command.

Panzertruppe and Luftwaffe

   Organisation of a 1941 German panzer division.
   Enlarge
   Organisation of a 1941 German panzer division.

   Blitzkrieg would not have been possible without modifying Germany's
   standing interwar military, which under the Treaty of Versailles was
   limited to 100,000 men, its air force disbanded, and tank development
   forbidden. After becoming head of state in 1933, Adolf Hitler ignored
   these provisions. A command for armored troops was created within the
   German Wehrmacht—the Panzertruppe, as it came to be known later. The
   Luftwaffe, or air force, was re-established, and development begun on
   ground-attack aircraft and doctrines. Hitler was a strong supporter of
   this new strategy. He read Guderian's book Achtung! Panzer! and upon
   observing armored field exercises at Kummersdorf he remarked "That is
   what I want—and that is what I will have."

Spanish Civil War

   German volunteers first used armor in live field conditions during the
   Spanish Civil War of 1936. Armor commitments consisted of Panzer
   Battalion 88, a force built around three companies of PzKpfw I tanks
   that functioned as a training cadre for Nationalists. The Luftwaffe
   deployed squadrons of fighters, dive-bombers, and transports as the
   Condor Legion. Guderian called the tank deployment "on too small a
   scale to allow accurate assessments to be made." The true test of his
   "armored idea" would have to wait for the Second World War. However,
   the German Air Force also provided volunteers to Spain to test both
   tactics and aircraft in combat, including the first combat use of the
   Stuka.

Methods of operations

Schwerpunkt

   Blitzkrieg sought decisive actions at all times. To this end, the
   theory of a schwerpunkt (focal point) developed; it was the point of
   maximum effort. Panzer and Luftwaffe forces were used only at this
   point of maximum effort whenever possible. By local success at the
   schwerpunkt, a small force achieved a breakthrough and gained
   advantages by fighting in the enemy's rear. It is summarized by
   Guderian as "Nicht kleckern, klotzen!" ("Don't tickle, smash!")

   To achieve a breakout, armored forces themselves would attack the
   enemy's defensive line directly, supported by their own infantry
   (Panzergrenadiers), artillery fire and aerial bombardment in order to
   create a breach in the enemy's line. Through this breach the tanks
   could break through without the traditional encumbrance of the slow
   logistics of a pure infantry regiment. The breaching force never lost
   time by 'stabilising its flanks' or by regrouping; rather it continued
   the assault in a towards the interior of the enemies lines, sometimes
   diagonally across them. This point of breakout has been labeled a
   "hinge", but only because a change in direction of the defender's lines
   is naturally weak and therefore a natural target for blitzkrieg
   assault.

   In this, the opening phase of an operation, air forces sought to gain
   superiority over enemy air forces by attacking aircraft on the ground,
   bombing their airfields, and seeking to destroy them in air to air
   combat.(See below).

   A final element was the use of airborne forces beyond the enemy lines
   in order to disrupt enemy activities and take important positions (such
   as Eben Emael).

Paralysis

   Having achieved a breakthrough into the enemy's rear areas, German
   forces attempted to paralyze the enemy's decision making and
   implementation process. Moving faster than enemy forces, mobile forces
   exploited weaknesses and acted before opposing forces could formulate a
   response. Guderian wrote that "Success must be exploited without
   respite and with every ounce of strength, even by night. The defeated
   enemy must be given no peace."

   Central to this is the decision cycle. Every decision made by German or
   opposing forces required time to gather information, make a decision,
   disseminate orders to subordinates, and then implement this decision
   through action. Through superior mobility and faster decision-making
   cycles, mobile forces could take action on a situation sooner than the
   forces opposing them.

   Directive control was a fast and flexible method of command. Rather
   than receiving an explicit order, a commander would be told of his
   superior's intent and the role which his unit was to fill in this
   concept. The exact method of execution was then a matter for the
   low-level commander to determine as best fit the situation. Staff
   burden was reduced at the top and spread among commands more
   knowledgeable about their own situation. In addition, the encouragement
   of initiative at all levels aided implementation. As a result,
   significant decisions could be effected quickly and either verbally or
   with written orders a few pages in length.

Kesselschlacht

   An operation's final phase, the Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle), was a
   concentric attack on an encircled force. It was here that most losses
   were inflicted upon the enemy, primarily through the capture of
   prisoners and weapons.

Effect on civilians

   Blitzkrieg tactics often affected civilians in a way perceived by some
   to be negative — sometimes intentionally, and sometimes not. Whereas
   more traditional conflict resulted in a well-defined, slow moving front
   line, giving civilians time to be evacuated to safety, the new approach
   did not provide for this luxury. As a result, civilian casualties, as a
   percentage of the total, increased substantially. Furthermore, in the
   total war doctrine, civilians were explicitly targeted (as in the
   Allied bombing of Dresden), in an effort to break the morale of the
   citizenry of a country in order to frustrate attempts at production,
   and ultimately support for the cause over which the war was fought.

Operations in History

Poland 1939

   In Poland, fast moving armies encircled Polish forces (blue circles),
   but the "blitzkrieg" idea never really took hold - artillery and
   infantry forces acted in time-honoured fashion to crush these pockets.
   Enlarge
   In Poland, fast moving armies encircled Polish forces (blue circles),
   but the "blitzkrieg" idea never really took hold - artillery and
   infantry forces acted in time-honoured fashion to crush these pockets.

   Despite the term blitzkrieg being coined during the Invasion of Poland
   of 1939, historians generally hold that German operations during it
   were more consistent with more traditional methods. The Wehrmacht's
   strategy was more inline with Vernichtungsgedanken, or a focus on
   envelopment to create pockets in broad-front annihilation. Panzer
   forces were deployed among the three German concentrations without
   strong emphasis on independent use, being used to create or destroy
   close pockets of Polish forces and seize operational-depth terrain in
   support of the largely un-motorized infantry which followed. The
   Luftwaffe gained air superiority by a combination of superior
   technology and numbers. Common claims that the Polish Air Force was
   destroyed early in the campaign while it was on the ground are not
   true. Polish aircraft were moved to hidden airstrips approximately 48
   hours before the outbreak of the hostilities.

   The understanding of operations in Poland has shifted considerably
   since the Second World War. Many early postwar histories incorrectly
   attribute German victory to "enormous development in military technique
   which occurred between 1918 and 1940", incorrectly citing that
   "Germany, who translated (British inter-war) theories into
   action...called the result Blitzkrieg." More recent histories identify
   German operations in Poland as relatively cautious and traditional.
   Matthew Cooper wrote that

          "...(t)hroughout ( the Polish Campaign), the employment of the
          mechanized units revealed the idea that they were intended
          solely to ease the advance and to support the activities of the
          infantry....Thus, any strategic exploitation of the armored idea
          was still-born. The paralysis of command and the breakdown of
          morale were not made the ultimate aim of the ... German ground
          and air forces, and were only incidental by-products of the
          traditional maneuvers of rapid encirclement and of the
          supporting activities of the flying artillery of the Luftwaffe,
          both of which had has their purpose the physical destruction of
          the enemy troops. Such was the Vernichtungsgedanke of the Polish
          campaign."

   He went on to say that the use of tanks "left much to be desired...Fear
   of enemy action against the flanks of the advance, fear which was to
   prove so disastrous to German prospects in the west in 1940 and in the
   Soviet Union in 1941, was present from the beginning of the war." John
   Ellis further asserted that "...there is considerable justice in
   Matthew Cooper's assertion that the panzer divisions were not given the
   kind of strategic mission that was to characterize authentic armored
   blitzkrieg, and were almost always closely subordinated to the various
   mass infantry armies."

   In fact, "Whilst Western accounts of the September campaign have
   stressed the shock value of the panzers and Stuka attacks, they have
   tended to underestimate the punishing effect of German artillery on
   Polish units. Mobile and available in significant quantity, artillery
   shattered as many units as any other branch of the Wehrmacht.",

France 1940

   The invasion of France consisted of two phases, Operation Yellow (Fall
   Gelb) and Operation Red. Yellow opened with a feint conducted against
   the Netherlands and Belgium by two armoured corps and paratroopers.
   Three days later, the main effort of Panzer Group von Kleist attacked
   through the Ardennes and achieved a breakthrough with air support. The
   group raced to the coast of the English Channel, dislodging the British
   Expeditionary Force, Belgian Army, and some divisions of the French
   Army. The motorized units initially advanced far beyond the following
   divisions. When the German motorized forces were met with a
   counterattack at the Battle of Arras (1940), British tanks with heavy
   armour (Matilda I & IIs) created a brief panic in the German High
   Command. The motorized forces were halted outside the port city of
   Dunkirk which was being used to evacuate the Allied forces. Hermann
   Göring had promised his Luftwaffe would complete the job but aerial
   operations did not prevent the evacuation of the majority of Allied
   troops (which the British named Operation Dynamo); some 330,000 French
   and British. Operation Red then began with XV Panzer Corps attacking
   towards Brest and XIV Panzer Corps attacking south, east of Paris,
   towards Lyon, and XIX Panzer Corps completing the encirclement of the
   Maginot Line. The defending forces were hard pressed to organize any
   sort of counter-attack. The French forces were continually ordered to
   form new lines along rivers, often arriving to find the German forces
   had already passed them.

Soviet Union: the Eastern Front: 1941–42

   After 1941–42, armoured formations were increasingly used as a mobile
   reserve against Allied breakthroughs.
   Enlarge
   After 1941–42, armoured formations were increasingly used as a mobile
   reserve against Allied breakthroughs.

   Use of armored forces was crucial for both sides on the Eastern Front.
   Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941,
   involved a number of breakthroughs and encirclements by motorized
   forces. Its stated goal was "to destroy the Russian forces deployed in
   the West and to prevent their escape into the wide-open spaces of
   Russia." This was generally achieved by four panzer armies which
   encircled surprised and disorganized Soviet forces, followed by
   marching infantry which completed the encirclement and defeated the
   trapped forces. The first year of the Eastern Front offensive can
   generally be considered to have had the last successful major
   blitzkrieg operations.

   After Germany's failure to destroy the Soviets before the winter of
   1941, the limits of German tactical superiority became apparent.
   Although the German invasion successfully conquered large areas of
   Soviet territory, the overall strategic effects were more limited. The
   Red Army was able to regroup far to the rear of the main battle line,
   and eventually defeat the German forces for the first time in the
   Battle of Moscow.

   In the summer of 1942, when Germany launched another offensive in the
   southern USSR against Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the Soviets again
   lost tremendous amounts of territory, only to counter-attack once more
   during winter. German gains were ultimately limited by Hitler diverting
   forces from the attack on Stalingrad itself and seeking to pursue a
   drive to the Caucasus oilfields simultaneously as opposed to
   subsequently as the original plan had envisaged.

Western Front, 1944–45

   As the war progressed, Allied armies began using combined arms
   formations and deep penetration strategies that Germany had attempted
   to use in the opening years of the war. Many Allied operations in the
   Western Desert and on the Eastern Front relied on massive
   concentrations of firepower to establish breakthroughs by fast-moving
   armoured units. These artillery-based tactics were also decisive in
   Western Front operations after Operation Overlord and both the British
   Commonwealth and American armies developed flexible and powerful
   systems for utilizing artillery support. What the Soviets lacked in
   flexibility, they made up for in number of multiple rocket launchers,
   cannon and mortar tubes. The Germans never achieved the kind of
   response times or fire concentrations their enemies were capable of by
   1944.

   After the Allied landings at Normandy, Germany made attempts to
   overwhelm the landing force with armored attacks, but these failed for
   lack of co-ordination and Allied air superiority. The most notable
   attempt to use deep penetration operations in Normandy was at Mortain,
   which exacerbated the German position in the already-forming Falaise
   Pocket and assisted in the ultimate destruction of German forces in
   Normandy. The Mortain counter-attack was effectively destroyed by U.S.
   12th Army Group with little effect on its own offensive operations.

   The Allied offensive in central France, spearheaded by armored units
   from George S. Patton's Third Army, used breakthrough and penetration
   techniques that were essentially identical to Guderian's prewar
   "armoured idea." Patton acknowledged that he had read both Guderian and
   Rommel before the war, and his tactics shared the traditional cavalry
   emphasis on speed and attack. A phrase commonly used in his units was
   "haul ass and bypass."

   Germany's last offensive on its Western front, Operation Wacht am
   Rhein, was an offensive launched towards the vital port of Antwerp in
   December 1944. Launched in poor weather against a thinly-held Allied
   sector, it achieved surprise and initial success as Allied air power
   was stymied by cloud cover. However, stubborn pockets of defence in key
   locations throughout the Ardennes, the lack of serviceable roads, and
   poor German logisitics planning caused delays. Allied forces deployed
   to the flanks of the German penetration, and Allied aircraft were again
   able to attack motorized columns. However, the stubborn defense of US
   units and German weakness led to a defeat for the Germans.

Countermeasures and limitations

Environment

   The concepts associated with the term "Blitzkrieg" - deep penetrations
   by armour, large encirclements, and combined arms attacks - were
   largely dependent upon terrain and weather conditions. Where the
   ability for rapid movement across "tank country" was not possible,
   armoured penetrations were often avoided or resulted in failure.
   Terrain would ideally be flat, firm, unobstructed by natural barriers
   or fortifications, and interspersed with roads and railways. If it was
   instead hilly, wooded, marshy, or urban, armour would be vulnerable to
   infantry in close-quarters combat and unable to break out at full
   speed. Additionally, units could be halted by mud ( thawing along the
   Eastern Front regularly slowed both sides) or extreme snow. Artillery
   observation and aerial support was also naturally dependent on weather.

Air superiority

   Ilyushin Il-2, formidable Soviet ground attack aircraft that
   specialized in destroying German armor
   Enlarge
   Ilyushin Il-2, formidable Soviet ground attack aircraft that
   specialized in destroying German armor

   Allied air superiority became a significant hindrance to German
   operations during the later years of the war. Early German successes
   enjoyed air superiority with unencumbered movement of ground forces,
   close air support, and aerial reconnaissance. However, the Western
   Allies' air-to-ground aircraft were so greatly feared out of proportion
   to their actual tactical success, that following the lead up to
   Operation Overlord German vehicle crews showed reluctance to move en
   masse during daylight. Indeed, the final German blitzkrieg operation in
   the west, Operation Wacht am Rhein, was planned to take place during
   poor weather which grounded Allied aircraft. Under these conditions, it
   was difficult for German commanders to employ the "armoured idea" to
   its envisioned potential.

Counter-tactics

   General Stanisław Maczek, one of the early developers of
   anti-blitzkrieg tactics
   Enlarge
   General Stanisław Maczek, one of the early developers of
   anti-blitzkrieg tactics

   Blitzkrieg was very effective against static defense doctrines that
   most countries developed in the aftermath of the First World War. Early
   attempts to defeat the blitzkrieg can be dated to the Invasion of
   Poland in 1939, where Polish general Stanisław Maczek, commander of
   10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade, prepared a detailed report of
   blitzkrieg tactics, its usage, effectiveness and possible precautions
   for the French military from his experiences. However, the French staff
   disregarded this report (it was captured, unopened, by the German
   army). Later, Maczek would become one of the most successful Allied
   armoured forces commanders in the war.

   During the Battle of France in 1940, De Gaulle's 4th Armour Division
   and elements of the British 1st Army Tank Brigade in the British
   Expeditionary Force both made probing attacks on the German flank,
   actually pushing into the rear of the advancing armored columns at
   times (See Battle of Arras (1940) ). This may have been a reason for
   Hitler to call a halt to the German advance. Those attacks combined
   with Maxime Weygand's Hedgehog tactic would become the major basis for
   responding to blitzkrieg attacks in the future: deployment in depth,
   permitting enemy forces to bypass defensive concentrations, reliance on
   anti-tank guns, strong force employment on the flanks of the enemy
   attack, followed by counter-attacks at the base to destroy the enemy
   advance in detail. Holding the flanks or 'shoulders' of a penetration
   was essential to channeling the enemy attack, and artillery, properly
   employed at the shoulders, could take a heavy toll of attackers. While
   Allied forces in 1940 lacked the experience to successfully develop
   these strategies, resulting in France's capitulation with heavy losses,
   they characterized later Allied operations. For example, at the Battle
   of Kursk the Red Army employed a combination of defense in great depth,
   extensive minefields, and tenacious defense of breakthrough shoulders.
   In this way they depleted German combat power even as German forces
   advanced. In August 1944 at Mortain, stout defense and counterattacks
   by the US and Canadian armies closed the Falaise Gap. In the Ardennes,
   a combination of hedgehog defense at Bastogne, St Vith and other
   locations, and a counterattack by the US 3rd Army were employed.

   The US doctrine of massing high-speed tank destroyers was not generally
   employed in combat since few massed German armor attacks occurred by
   1944.

Logistics

   Although effective in quick campaigns against Poland and France,
   blitzkrieg could not be sustained by Germany in later years. Blitzkrieg
   strategy has the inherent danger of the attacking force overextending
   its supply lines, and the strategy as a whole can be defeated by a
   determined foe who is willing to sacrifice territory for time in which
   to regroup and rearm, as the Soviets did on the Eastern Front. Tank and
   vehicle production was a constant problem for Germany; indeed, late in
   the war many panzer "divisions" had no more than a few dozen tanks. As
   the end of the war approached, Germany also experienced critical
   shortages in fuel and ammunition stocks as a result of Anglo-American
   strategic bombing. Although production of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft
   continued, they would be unable to fly for lack of fuel. What fuel
   there was went to panzer divisions, and even then they were not able to
   operate normally. Of those Tiger tanks lost against the United States
   Army, nearly half of them were abandoned for lack of fuel.

Influence

   Blitzkrieg's widest influence was within the Western Allied leadership
   of the war, some of whom drew inspiration from the Wehrmacht's
   approach. United States General George S. Patton emphasized fast
   pursuit, the use of an armored spearhead to effect a breakthrough, then
   cut off and disrupt enemy forces prior to their flight. In his comments
   of the time, he credited Guderian and Rommel's work, notably Infantry
   Attacks, for this insight. He also put into practice the idea
   attributed to cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest, "Get there fastest
   with the mostest." (Get there fastest, with the most forces).

   Blitzkrieg also has had some influence on subsequent militaries and
   doctrines. The Israel Defense Forces may have been influenced by
   blitzkrieg in creating a military of flexible armored spearheads and
   close air support. The 1990's United States theorists of " Shock and
   awe" claim blitzkrieg as a subset of strategies which they term "rapid
   dominance".

   It must also be stated that Napoleon Bonaparte used some form of the
   "blitzkrieg" tactic when conquering Europe centuries prior to the
   invasion of Poland by Adolf Hitler.

Changing interpretations of Blitzkrieg

   Beginning in the 1970s, the interpretation of Blitzkrieg, particularly
   with respect to the Second World War, has undergone a shift in the
   historical community. John Ellis described the shift:

     Our perception of land operations in the Second World War has...been
     distorted by an excessive emphasis upon the hardware employed. The
     main focus of attention has been the tank and the formations that
     employed it, most notably the (German) panzer divisions. Despite the
     fact that only 40 of the 520 German divisions that saw combat were
     panzer divisions (there were also an extra 24
     motorised/panzergrenadier divisions), the history of German
     operations has consistently almost exclusively been written largely
     in terms of blitzkrieg and has concentrated almost exclusively upon
     the exploits of the mechanized formations. Even more misleadingly,
     this presentation of ground combat as a largely armored
     confrontation has been extended to cover Allied operations, so that
     in the popular imagination the exploits of the British and
     Commonwealth Armies, with only 11 armored divisions out of 73 (that
     saw combat), and of the Americans in Europe, with only 16 out of 59,
     are typified by tanks sweeping around the Western Desert or trying
     to keep up with Patton in the race through Sicily and across
     northern France. Of course, these armored forces did play a somewhat
     more important role in operations than the simple proportions might
     indicate, but it still has to be stressed that they in no way
     dominated the battlefield or precipitated the evolution of
     completely new modes of warfare.

   Ellis, as well as Zaloga in his study of the Polish Campaign in 1939,
   points to the effective use of other arms such as artillery and aerial
   firepower as equally important to the success of German (and later,
   Allied) operations. Panzer operations in Russia failed to provide
   decisive results; Leningrad never fell despite an entire Panzer Group
   being assigned to take it, nor did Moscow. In 1942 panzer formations
   overstretched at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, and what successes did
   take place - such as Manstein at Kharkov or Krivoi Rog - were of local
   significance only.

   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg"
   This reference article is mainly selected from the English Wikipedia
   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
   Documentation License. See also our Disclaimer.
