   #copyright

Battle of the Eastern Solomons

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Battle of the Eastern Solomons
   Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
   USS Enterprise (centre left), heeling over under aerial attack and
   afire on August 24, 1942. Anti-aircraft shell bursts directed at the
   attacking Japanese dive bombers are visible above the carrier.

     Date   August 24, 1942 – August 25, 1942
   Location North of Santa Isabel, Solomon Islands
    Result  Allied tactical and strategic advantage
   Combatants
   United States (U.S.),
   Australia Empire of Japan
   Commanders
   Robert Ghormley
   Frank Jack Fletcher Isoroku Yamamoto
   Chuichi Nagumo
   Strength
   2 fleet carriers,
   1 battleship,
   4 cruisers,
   11 destroyers,
   176 aircraft 2 fleet carriers,
   1 light carrier,
   2 battleships,
   16 cruisers,
   25 destroyers,
   1 seaplane tender,
   4 patrol boats,
   3 transports,
   171 aircraft
   Casualties
   1 carrier heavily damaged,
   25 aircraft destroyed,
   90 killed 1 light carrier,
   1 destroyer,
   1 transport sunk,
   1 light cruiser,
   1 seaplane tender heavily damaged,
   75 aircraft destroyed,
   290+ killed
                                Guadalcanal campaign
   Tulagi – Savo I. – Tenaru – Eastern Solomons – Edson's Ridge –
   Cape Esperance – Henderson Field – Santa Cruz Is. – Naval Guadalcanal –
   Tassafaronga – Ke – Rennell I.
                              Solomon Islands campaign
   1st Tulagi – Guadalcanal – Blackett Strait – Cartwheel – Death of
   Yamamoto – New Georgia – Kula Gulf – Kolombangara – Vella Gulf –
   Horaniu – Vella Lavella – Naval Vella Lavella – Treasury Is. – Choiseul
   – Empress Augusta Bay – Cape St. George – Green Is. – 2nd Rabaul –
   Bougainville

   The naval Battle of the Eastern Solomons (also known as the Battle of
   the Stewart Islands and, in Japanese sources, as the Second Battle of
   the Solomon Sea (第二次ソロモン海戦)) took place on 24- 25 August 1942 and was
   the third carrier battle of the Pacific campaign of World War II and
   the second major engagement fought by the United States Navy and the
   Imperial Japanese Navy during the lengthy Battle of Guadalcanal in the
   Solomon Islands campaign. As at Coral Sea and Midway, the ships of the
   two adversaries were never in direct visual range of each other.
   Instead, all of the attacks by either side were carried out by either
   carrier or land-based aircraft.

   After several damaging air attacks, the naval surface combatants from
   both the United States of America (U.S.) and Japan withdrew from the
   battle area without either side securing a clear victory. However, the
   U.S. and its allies apparently gained a greater tactical and strategic
   advantage from the battle than Japan because the Allied forces suffered
   fewer losses than the Japanese, who lost a significant amount of
   aircraft and experienced aircrews. Also, Japanese reinforcements
   intended for Guadalcanal were delayed and eventually delivered by naval
   warships instead of transport ships, giving the Allies more time to
   prepare for the Japanese counteroffensive and preventing the Japanese
   from landing heavy artillery, ammunition, and other logistical supplies
   that would have significantly assisted their forces in the struggle for
   the island.

Background

   On August 7, 1942, Allied forces (primarily U.S.) landed on
   Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and Florida Islands in the southern Solomon
   Islands. The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by
   the Japanese as bases to threaten the supply routes between the U.S.
   and Australia, and to use them as starting points for a campaign with
   the eventual goal of isolating the major Japanese base at Rabaul while
   also supporting the Allied New Guinea and New Britain campaigns. The
   landings initiated the six-month-long Battle of Guadalcanal.

   The Allied landings were directly supported by three U.S. aircraft
   carrier task forces: TF 11 ( Saratoga), TF 16 ( Enterprise), and TF 18
   ( Wasp), their respective air groups, and supporting surface warships,
   including a battleship, cruisers, and destroyers. The overall commander
   of the three carrier task forces was Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
   who flew his flag on Saratoga. The aircraft from the three U.S.
   carriers provided close air support for the invasion forces and
   defended against Japanese air attacks from Rabaul. However, worried
   over the losses of many of his fighter aircraft in combat with Japanese
   aircraft, which he felt made this carriers too vulnerable to air
   attack, and concerned about the Allied defeat in The Battle of Savo
   Island, Fletcher, claiming a need to fuel, withdrew his carriers to a
   safer distance between the Solomons and New Hebrides (Vanuatu) islands
   on August 9. Here, U.S. carriers were charged with guarding the line of
   communication between the major Allied bases at New Caledonia and
   Espiritu Santo, supporting the Allied ground forces at Guadalcanal and
   Tulagi against any Japanese counteroffensives, covering the movement of
   supply ships to Guadalcanal, and last, but not least, engaging and
   destroying any Japanese warships, especially carriers, that came within
   range.
   U.S. carriers Wasp (foreground), Saratoga, and Enterprise (background)
   operating in the Pacific south of Guadalcanal on August 12 1942
   Enlarge
   U.S. carriers Wasp (foreground), Saratoga, and Enterprise (background)
   operating in the Pacific south of Guadalcanal on August 12 1942

   Between August 15 and August 20, the U.S. carriers covered the delivery
   of fighter and bomber aircraft to the newly opened Henderson Field on
   Guadalcanal. Henderson Field and the aircraft based there soon began
   having a telling effect on the movement of Japanese forces in the
   Solomon Islands and in the attrition of Japanese air forces in the
   South Pacific Area. In fact, Allied control of Henderson Field became
   the key factor in the entire battle for Guadalcanal.

   Taken by surprise by the Allied offensive in the Solomons, Japanese
   naval (under Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto) and army forces prepared a
   counteroffensive, with the goal of driving the Allies out of
   Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The counteroffensive was called Operation Ka
   (Ka comes from the first syllable for Guadalcanal as pronounced in
   Japanese) with the naval portion having an additional objective of
   destroying Allied warship forces in the South Pacific area,
   specifically the U.S. carriers.

Battle

Prelude

   A convoy containing 1,500 Japanese troops, loaded on three slow
   transport ships, left Truk (Chuuk) on August 16 and headed towards
   Guadalcanal. The transports were guarded by light cruiser Jintsu, eight
   destroyers, and four patrol boats, led by Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka
   (flag in Jintsu) Also departing from Rabaul to help protect the convoy
   was a "Close Cover force" of four heavy cruisers, commanded by Vice
   Admiral Gunichi Mikawa. These were the same cruisers that had defeated
   an Allied naval surface force in the earlier Battle of Savo Island.
   Tanaka planned to land the troops from his convoy on Guadalcanal on
   August 24.
   Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
   Enlarge
   Japanese Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo

   On August 21, the rest of the Japanese Ka naval force departed Truk,
   heading for the southern Solomons. These ships were basically divided
   into three groups: the "Main Body" contained the Japanese carriers —
   Shōkaku and Zuikaku, light carrier Ryūjō, plus a screening force of one
   heavy cruiser and eight destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi
   Nagumo in Shōkaku; the "Vanguard Force" consisted of two battleships,
   three heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and three destroyers,
   commanded by Rear Admiral Hiroaki Abe; the "Advanced Force" contained
   five heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, six destroyers, and a seaplane
   carrier ( Chitose), commanded by Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo. Finally,
   a force of about 100 IJN land-based bomber, fighter, and reconnaissance
   aircraft at Rabaul and nearby islands were positioned to support.
   Nagumo's Main Body positioned itself behind the Vanguard and Advanced
   forces in order to more easily remain hidden from U.S. reconnaissance
   aircraft.

   The Ka plan dictated once U.S. carriers were located, either by
   Japanese scout aircraft or an attack on one of the Japanese surface
   forces, Nagumo's carriers would immediately launch a strike force to
   destroy them. With the U.S. carriers destroyed or disabled, Abe's
   Vanguard and Kondo's Advanced forces would close with and destroy the
   rest of the allied naval forces in a warship surface action. The
   Japanese naval forces would then be free to neutralize Henderson Field
   through bombardment while covering the landing of the Japanese army
   troops to retake the islands of Guadalcanal and Tulagi.

   In response to an unanticipated land battle fought between U.S. Marines
   on Guadalcanal and Japanese forces on August 19–20, the U.S. carrier
   task forces under Fletcher headed back towards Guadalcanal from their
   positions 400 miles (740 km) to the south on August 21. The U.S.
   carriers were to support the Marines, protect Henderson Field, and to
   combat and destroy any Japanese naval forces, especially carriers, that
   arrived to support Japanese troops in the land battle on Guadalcanal.
   U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher
   Enlarge
   U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher

   Both the Allied and Japanese naval forces continued to head towards
   each other on August 22. Although both sides conducted intense aircraft
   scouting efforts neither side located the other. Due to the
   disappearance of at least one of their scouting aircraft (shot down by
   Enterprise aircraft before it could send a radio report of what was
   happening), the Japanese strongly suspected the presence of U.S.
   carriers in the area. The U.S., however, was unaware of the disposition
   and strength of approaching Japanese surface warship forces.

   At 09:50 on August 23, a U.S. PBY Catalina aircraft, based at Ndeni in
   the Santa Cruz Islands, sighted Tanaka's convoy. By late afternoon,
   with no further sightings of Japanese ships, two aircraft strike forces
   from Saratoga and Henderson Field took-off to attack Tanaka's convoy.
   However, Tanaka, knowing that an attack would be coming his way after
   being sighted, reversed course once the Catalina left the area, and
   both the Saratoga and Henderson Field aircraft were unable to locate
   his ships. After Tanaka reported to his superiors that he had lost time
   due to his turn to the north to avoid the Allied air attacks, the
   landings of his troops on Guadalcanal was pushed back to August 25. By
   18:23 on August 23, with no Japanese carriers sighted, and no new
   intelligence reporting their presence in the area, Fletcher detached
   Wasp, which was getting low on fuel, and the rest of TF18 for the
   two-day trip south towards Efate to refuel. Thus, Wasp and her
   escorting warships wouldn't take part in the upcoming battle.

Carrier action on August 24

   U.S. Navy map from 1943 showing approximate paths and actions of
   Japanese (top) and Allied (bottom) naval forces in the battle from
   August 23 through August 26, 1942. Guadalcanal is the large, roughly
   oval-shaped island in the center-left of the map. (Click on map to see
   a larger image.)
   Enlarge
   U.S. Navy map from 1943 showing approximate paths and actions of
   Japanese (top) and Allied (bottom) naval forces in the battle from
   August 23 through August 26, 1942. Guadalcanal is the large, roughly
   oval-shaped island in the centre-left of the map. (Click on map to see
   a larger image.)

   At 01:45 on August 24, Nagumo ordered the light carrier Ryūjō, along
   with the heavy cruiser Tone and destroyers Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze,
   to proceed ahead of the main Japanese force and send an aircraft attack
   force against Henderson Field at daybreak. The Ryūjō mission may have
   been intended by Nagumo as a decoy to divert U.S. attention so that the
   rest of the Japanese force could approach the U.S. naval forces
   undetected as well as to help provide protection and cover for Tanaka's
   convoy. Most of the aircraft on Shōkaku and Zuikaku were readied to
   launch on short notice if the U.S. carriers were located. Between 05:55
   and 06:30, the U.S. carriers (mainly Enterprise), augmented by
   Catalinas from Ndeni, launched their own scout aircraft to search for
   the Japanese naval forces.

   At 09:35 a Catalina made the first sighting of the Ryūjō force. Several
   more sightings of Ryūjō and ships of Kondo's and Mikawa's forces by
   carrier and other U.S. reconnaissance aircraft followed later that
   morning. Throughout the morning and early afternoon, U.S. aircraft also
   sighted several Japanese scout aircraft and submarines, leading
   Fletcher to believe that the Japanese knew where his carriers were,
   which, however, was not yet the case. Still, Fletcher hesitated to
   order a strike against the Ryūjō group until he was sure there weren't
   other Japanese carriers in the area. Finally, with no firm word on the
   presence or location of other Japanese carriers, Fletcher launched a
   strike of 38 aircraft from Saratoga at 13:40 to attack Ryūjō. However,
   he kept aircraft from both U.S. carriers ready just in case any
   Japanese fleet carriers were sighted.

   At 12:20, Ryūjō launched six "Kate" bombers and nine A6M Zero fighters
   to attack Henderson Field in conjunction with an attack by 24 "Betty"
   bombers and 14 Zero fighters from Rabaul. However, unknown to the Ryūjō
   aircraft, the Rabaul aircraft had encountered severe weather and
   returned to their base at 11:30. The Ryūjō aircraft were detected on
   radar by Saratoga as they flew towards Guadalcanal, further fixing the
   location of their ship for the impending U.S. attack. The Ryūjō
   aircraft arrived over Henderson Field at 14:23, and tangled with
   Henderson's fighter aircraft while bombing the airfield. In the
   resulting engagement three Kates, three Zeros, and three U.S. fighters
   were shot down and no damage was done to Henderson Field .

   At 14:25, a Japanese scout aircraft sighted the U.S. carriers. Although
   it was shot down, its report was transmitted in time, and Nagumo
   immediately ordered his strike force launched from Shōkaku and Zuikaku.
   The two Japanese carriers' first wave of attack aircraft, 27 "Val" dive
   bombers and 15 Zeros, was off by 14:50 and on its way towards
   Enterprise and Saratoga. About this same time, two U.S. scout aircraft
   finally sighted the Main force containing the Japanese fleet carriers.
   However, due to communication problems, these sighting reports never
   reached Fletcher. The two U.S. scout aircraft attacked Shōkaku before
   leaving the area, causing negligible damage. A second wave of 27 Vals
   and nine Zeros was launched by the Japanese carriers at 16:00 and
   headed south towards the U.S. carriers. Abe's Vanguard force also now
   surged ahead in anticipation of meeting the U.S. ships in a surface
   action after nightfall.
   The disabled Ryujo (just right of center) being bombed on August 24,
   1942 from high level by B-17 bombers. The destroyer Amatsukaze (center
   bottom) is moving away from Ryujo at full speed and Tokitsukaze
   (faintly visible, center right) is backing away from the bow of Ryujo
   in order to evade the B-17's falling bombs
   Enlarge
   The disabled Ryujo (just right of centre) being bombed on August 24,
   1942 from high level by B-17 bombers. The destroyer Amatsukaze (centre
   bottom) is moving away from Ryujo at full speed and Tokitsukaze
   (faintly visible, centre right) is backing away from the bow of Ryujo
   in order to evade the B-17's falling bombs

   About this same time, the Saratoga strike force arrived and began their
   attacks on Ryūjō, hitting her with three to five bombs, perhaps one
   torpedo, and killing 120 of her crew. Heavily damaged, Ryūjō abandoned
   ship at nightfall and sank soon after. Amatsukaze and Tokitsukaze
   rescued Ryūjō's survivors as well as the aircrews from her returning
   strike force, who ditched their aircraft in the ocean nearby. During
   this time, several U.S. B-17 bombers attacked the crippled Ryūjō, but
   caused no additional damage (see photo at left). After the rescue
   operations were complete, both Japanese destroyers and Tone rejoined
   Nagumo's Main force.

   At 16:02, still waiting for a definitive report on the location of the
   Japanese fleet carriers, the U.S. carriers' radar detected the first
   incoming wave of Japanese strike aircraft. Fifty-three F4F Wildcat
   fighters from the two U.S. carriers were directed by radar control
   towards the approaching Japanese aircraft. However, communication
   problems, limitations of the aircraft identification capabilities of
   the radar, primitive control procedures, and effective screening of the
   Japanese dive bombers by their escorting Zero fighters, prevented all
   but a few of the U.S. fighters from engaging the Vals before they began
   their attacks on the U.S. carriers. Just before the Japanese dive
   bombers began their attacks, Enterprise and Saratoga cleared their
   decks for the impending action by launching the aircraft that they had
   been holding ready in case the Japanese fleet carriers were sighted.
   These aircraft were told to fly north and attack anything they could
   find, or else to circle outside the battle zone, until it was safe to
   return.
   A Japanese "Val" dive bomber is shot down by anti-aircraft fire
   directly over Enterprise.
   Enlarge
   A Japanese "Val" dive bomber is shot down by anti-aircraft fire
   directly over Enterprise.

   At 16:29, the Japanese dive bombers began their attacks on the U.S.
   ships. Although several of the Japanese aircraft attempted to set-up to
   attack the Saratoga, they quickly shifted back to the nearer carrier,
   which was Enterprise. Thus, Enterprise was the target of almost the
   entire Japanese air attack. Several Wildcats followed the Vals into
   their attack dives, in spite of the intense anti-aircraft artillery
   fire from Enterprise and her screening warships, in a desperate attempt
   to disrupt their attacks. As many as four Wildcats were shot-down by
   U.S. anti-aircraft fire, as well as several Vals.

   Due to the effective anti-aircraft fire from the U.S. ships, plus
   evasive maneuvers, the bombs from the first nine Vals missed
   Enterprise. However, at 16:44, an armor-piercing, delayed-action bomb
   penetrated the flight deck near the after elevator and passed through
   three decks before detonating below the waterline, killing 35 men and
   wounding 70 more. Incoming sea water caused Enterprise to develop a
   slight list, but it wasn't a major breach of hull integrity.

   Just 30-seconds later, the next Val to attack planted its bomb only
   15-feet away from where the first bomb hit. The resulting detonation
   ignited a large secondary explosion from one of the nearby 5-inch gun's
   ready powder casings, killing 35 members of the nearby gun crews, and
   starting a large fire.
   The third and last bomb hits Enterprise, causing minor damage. Smoke
   from the first two bomb hits can be seen in the upper left of the
   picture
   Enlarge
   The third and last bomb hits Enterprise, causing minor damage. Smoke
   from the first two bomb hits can be seen in the upper left of the
   picture

   About a minute later, at 16:46, the third and last bomb hit Enterprise
   on the flight deck forward of where the first two bombs hit. This bomb
   exploded on contact, creating a 10-foot hole in the deck, but caused no
   further damage. Four Vals then broke-off from the attack on Enterprise
   to attack the U.S. battleship North Carolina, but all of their bombs
   missed. The attack was over at 16:48 and the surviving Japanese
   aircraft reassembled in small groups and returned to their ships.

   Both sides thought that they had done more damage to each other during
   the attack than had actually occurred, due to many factors, but
   probably mainly due to the confused and complex nature of the
   engagement. The U.S. claimed to have shot down 70 Japanese aircraft in
   the attack, even though only 42 Japanese aircraft actually
   participated. Actual Japanese losses, from all causes, in the
   engagement were 25 aircraft, with most of the crews of the lost
   aircraft not being recovered or rescued. The Japanese, for their part,
   mistakenly believed that they had heavily damaged two, instead of just
   one, U.S. carrier. The U.S. lost six aircraft in the engagement, with
   most of the crews being rescued.

   Although Enterprise was heavily damaged and on fire, her damage-control
   teams were able to make sufficient repairs for the ship to resume
   flight operations at 17:46, only one hour after the engagement ended.
   At 18:05, the Saratoga strike force returned from sinking Ryūjō and
   landed without major incident. The second wave of Japanese aircraft
   approached the U.S. carriers at 18:15, but was unable to locate the
   U.S. formation due to communication problems and had to return to their
   carriers without attacking any U.S. ships, losing several aircraft in
   the process due to operational mishaps. Most of the U.S. carrier
   aircraft launched just before the first wave of Japanese aircraft
   attacked failed to find any targets. However, five TBF Avengers from
   Saratoga sighted Kondo's Advanced force and attacked the seaplane
   tender Chitose, scoring two near misses which heavily damaged the
   unarmored ship. The U.S. carrier aircraft either landed at Henderson
   Field or were able to return to their carriers after dusk. The U.S.
   ships retired to the south to get out of range of any approaching
   Japanese warships. In fact, Abe's Vanguard force and Kondo's Advance
   force were steaming south to try to catch the U.S. carrier task forces
   in a surface battle, but turned around at midnight without having made
   contact with the U.S. warships. Nagumo's Main body, having taken heavy
   aircraft losses in the engagement, plus being low on fuel, also
   retreated from the area towards the north.

Actions on August 25

   Believing that two U.S. carriers had been taken out of action with
   heavy damage, Tanaka's reinforcement convoy again headed towards
   Guadalcanal and, by 08:00 on August 25, was within 150 miles of their
   destination. At 08:05, 18 U.S. aircraft from Henderson Field attacked
   Tanaka's convoy, causing heavy damage to Jintsu, killing 24 crewmen,
   and knocking Tanaka unconscious. The troop transport, Kinryu Maru, was
   also hit and eventually sank. Just as the Japanese destroyer Mutsuki
   pulled-alongside Kinryu Maru to rescue her crew and embarked troops,
   she was attacked by four U.S. B-17s from Espiritu Santo which landed
   five bombs on or around Mutsuki, sinking her immediately. A revived but
   shaken Tanaka ordered the convoy to retreat. Both the Japanese and U.S.
   elected to completely withdraw their warships from the area, ending the
   battle. The Japanese naval forces hovered near the northern Solomons,
   out of range of the U.S. aircraft based at Henderson Field, before
   finally returning to Truk on September 5.

Aftermath

   The burned-out 5 inch (127 mm) gun gallery on Enterprise, photographed
   after the battle
   Enlarge
   The burned-out 5 inch (127 mm) gun gallery on Enterprise, photographed
   after the battle

   The battle is generally considered to be more or less a tactical and
   strategic victory for the U.S. due to the fact that the Japanese lost
   more ships, aircraft, and aircrew and Japanese troop reinforcements for
   Guadalcanal were delayed. Summing up the significance of the battle,
   historian Richard B. Frank states,


   Battle of the Eastern Solomons

      The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was unquestionably an American
      victory, but it had little long-term result, apart from a further
      reduction in the corps of trained Japanese carrier aviators. The
    (Japanese) reinforcements that could not come by slow transport would
                   soon reach Guadalcanal by other means.


   Battle of the Eastern Solomons

   The U.S. lost only seven aircrew members in the battle. However, the
   Japanese lost about 100, hard-to-replace, veteran aircrew members. The
   troops in Tanaka's convoy were later loaded onto destroyers at the
   Shortland Islands and delivered piecemeal, without most of their heavy
   equipment, to Guadalcanal beginning on August 29, 1942.

   Emphasizing the strategic value of Henderson Field, in a separate
   reinforcement effort, Japanese destroyer Asagiri was sunk and two other
   Japanese destroyers heavily damaged on August 28, 70 miles (130 km)
   north of Guadalcanal in the " The Slot" by U.S. aircraft based at the
   airfield. The Japanese effort to retake Guadalcanal continued as the
   battle for the island settled into a two-month long stalemate,
   punctuated by a large surface naval engagement at Cape Esperance on
   October 11-12, 1942.

   Enterprise traveled to Pearl Harbour for extensive repairs which were
   completed on October 15, 1942. She returned to the South Pacific on
   October 24, just in time for the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and
   her rematch with Shōkaku and Zuikaku.
   Retrieved from "
   http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Eastern_Solomons"
   This reference article is mainly selected from the English Wikipedia
   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
   of authors and sources) and is available under the GNU Free
   Documentation License. See also our Disclaimer.
