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Battle of Leyte Gulf

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Battle of Leyte Gulf
   Part of World War II, Pacific War
   USS Princeton on fire east of Luzon
   USS Princeton on fire, east of Luzon, 24 October 1944.

     Date   23 October 1944 – 26 October 1944
   Location The Philippines
    Result  Decisive Allied victory
   Combatants
   United States
   British Empire
   Australia
   various others Empire of Japan
   Commanders
   William Halsey, Jr Jisaburo Ozawa
   Strength
   17 aircraft carriers
   18 escort carriers
   12 battleships
   24 cruisers
   141 destroyers and destroyer escorts
   Many PT boats, submarines and fleet auxiliaries
   About 1,500 planes 4 aircraft carriers
   9 battleships
   19 cruisers
   34 destroyers
   About 200 planes
   Casualties
   3,500 dead;
   1 aircraft carrier,
   2 escort carriers,
   2 destroyers,
   1 destroyer escort sunk 10,000 dead;
   4 aircraft carriers,
   3 battleships,
   8 cruisers,
   12 destroyers sunk
                           Philippines campaign, 1944-45
   Leyte – Leyte Gulf – Ormoc Bay – Mindoro – Lingayen Gulf – Luzon –
   Cabanatuan – Bataan – Manila – Corregidor – Los Baños – Palawan –
   Visayas – Mindanao

   The Battle of Leyte Gulf the largest naval battle in recent history. It
   was fought during the Pacific War of World War II, in the seas
   surrounding the Philippine island of Leyte from 23 October to 26
   October 1944 between the Allies and the Empire of Japan. The Japanese
   attempted to repel or destroy the Allied forces stationed on Leyte
   after the preceding Allied invasion in the Battle of Leyte. Instead,
   the Allied navies inflicted a major defeat on the outnumbered Imperial
   Japanese Navy which took away Japan's strategic force in the Pacific
   War. The battle was the last major naval engagement of World War II.

   Leyte Gulf also saw the first use of kamikaze aircraft by the Japanese.
   The Australian heavy cruiser HMAS Australia was hit on 21 October, and
   organized suicide attacks by the "Special Attack Force" began on 25
   October.

Strategic background

   The battles of 1943 had driven the Imperial Japanese Army from its
   bases in the Solomon Islands, and in 1944, a series of Allied
   amphibious landings supported by large carrier forces captured the
   Northern Mariana Islands. The Allied victory in the Battle of the
   Philippine Sea in June destroyed the Japanese carrier power and
   established Allied air and sea superiority over the Western Pacific.
   (Japanese airmen were not well trained due to Japan's loss of her
   expierienced pilots. American airmen found it so easy to shoot down the
   Japanese that they nicknamed the air battle "The Great Marianas Turkey
   Shoot".)

   This gave the Allies freedom to choose where to strike next. Admiral
   Chester Nimitz favored blockading Japanese forces in the Philippines
   and attacking Formosa (now Taiwan). Possession of Formosa would give
   the Allies control of the sea routes to Japan from southern Asia,
   severing Japan's links with its garrisons, which would then perish from
   lack of supplies. General Douglas MacArthur favoured an invasion of the
   Philippines, which also lay across the supply lines to Japan. Leaving
   the Philippines in Japanese possession would be a blow to American
   prestige, and a personal affront to MacArthur, who in 1942 had famously
   vowed to return. President Franklin Roosevelt adjudicated the dispute;
   he chose the Philippines.

   The Allied options were equally apparent to the Imperial Japanese Navy.
   Combined Fleet Chief Toyoda Soemu prepared four "victory" plans: Shō-Go
   1 (捷１号作戦 Shō ichigō sakusen) was a major naval operation in the
   Philippines, while Shō-Go 2, Sho-Go 3 and Sho-Go 4 were responses to
   attacks on Formosa, the Ryūkyū Islands and the Kurile Islands
   respectively. The plans were uncompromising, complex, aggressive
   operations committing all available forces to a decisive battle.

   Thus, when on 12 October 1944, Nimitz launched a carrier raid against
   Formosa to make sure that planes based there could not intervene in the
   Leyte landings, the Japanese put Shō-Go 2 into action, launching wave
   after wave of attacks against the carriers, losing 600 planes in three
   days, almost their entire air force (or what was left of it), and
   leaving the Japanese navy without air cover.

   Shō-Go 1 called for Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's fleet, known as
   Northern Force, to lure the U.S. 3^rd Fleet away from the landings
   using an apparently vulnerable force of carriers. The Allied landing
   forces, now lacking air cover, would then be attacked from the west by
   three Japanese forces: Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita's command, Centre
   Force, based in Brunei, would enter Leyte Gulf and destroy the Allied
   landing forces. Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura's and Vice-Admiral
   Kiyohide Shima's fleets, collectively called Southern Force, would act
   as mobile strike forces. All three forces would consist of surface
   ships.

   The plan was likely to result in the destruction of one or more of the
   forces, but Toyoda later justified it to his American interrogators as
   follows:

          Should we lose in the Philippines operations, even though the
          fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be
          completely cut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to
          Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should
          remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of
          ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet
          at the expense of the loss of the Philippines.

   The four engagements in the battle of Leyte Gulf.
   Enlarge
   The four engagements in the battle of Leyte Gulf.

Overview of the battle

   The battle consisted of four large, distinct engagements. Before these
   was a small strike by American submarines. See the map to the right.
    1. On the night of 23 October, two American submarines, Italic
       textDaceItalic text and Italic textDarterItalic text spotted
       Kurita's Center Force entering the Palawan Passage. The two subs
       submerged and fired torpedos, sinking two cruisers and crippling a
       third. One of the sinking cruisers was the flagship of Center
       Force. Admiral Kurita swam for his life. Centre Force was in chaos
       for hours, before Kurita was finally rescued. Kurita transferred
       his flag to the super-battleship Italic textYamatoItalic text. The
       order was then given to continue on to Leyte Gulf.
    2. Kurita's force entered the Sibuyan Sea, northwest of Leyte, on 24
       October. In the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea it was attacked by
       carrier aircraft and Musashi was sunk. When Kurita turned around,
       the American pilots thought he was retreating, but he turned again
       and made his way through the San Bernardino Strait in the night, to
       appear off Samar in the morning.
    3. Nishimura's fleet headed for the Surigao Strait to the south, where
       at 03:00 on 25 October it ran into an American battlegroup. In the
       Battle of Surigao Strait the Japanese battleships Fusō and
       Yamashiro were sunk, Nishimura was killed, and his surviving ships
       retreated west.
    4. Halsey learned of the approach of Ozawa and took the bait, taking
       his carriers in pursuit on 25 October. In the Battle off Cape
       Engaño four Japanese carriers were sunk by air attacks. Ozawa's
       surviving ships fled for Japan.
    5. Kurita arrived off Samar at about 06:00 on 25 October. With Halsey
       away in pursuit of Ozawa, the American vessels supporting the
       landing were vulnerable to daylight attack. But in the Battle off
       Samar, desperate American destroyer torpedo attacks, relentless air
       attacks and bad weather bluffed Kurita into turning back.

Battle of the Sibuyan Sea

   Yamato under attack in the Sibuyan Sea.
   Enlarge
   Yamato under attack in the Sibuyan Sea.

   Kurita's powerful "Centre Force" consisted of five battleships (
   Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongō, and Haruna), and twelve cruisers (
   Atago, Maya, Takao, Chōkai, Myōkō, Haguro, Noshiro, Kumano, Suzuya,
   Chikuma, Tone, and Yahagi), supported by thirteen destroyers.

   As Kurita passed Palawan Island shortly after midnight on October 23,
   his force was spotted by the submarines USS Dace and Darter. Although
   the submarines' report of the sighting was picked up by the radio
   operator on Yamato, the Japanese failed to take anti-submarine
   precautions. Kurita's flagship Atago was sunk by Darter and Maya by
   Dace. Kurita transferred his flag to Yamato. Takao was damaged and
   turned back to Brunei with two destroyers, shadowed by the submarines.
   On October 24, Darter grounded on the Bombay Shoal. All efforts to get
   her off failed, and she was abandoned; her entire crew was rescued by
   Dace.

   At about 08:00 on October 24, the force was spotted entering the narrow
   Sibuyan Sea by planes from USS Intrepid. 260 planes from carriers
   Intrepid and Cabot of Task Group 38.2 attacked at about 10:30, scoring
   hits on Nagato, Yamato, Musashi and severely damaging Myōkō. The second
   wave of planes concentrated on Musashi, scoring many direct hits with
   bombs and torpedoes. As she retreated, listing to port, a third wave
   from Enterprise and Franklin hit her with eleven bombs and eight
   torpedoes. Kurita turned his fleet around to get out of range of the
   planes, passing the crippled Musashi as he retreated. He waited until
   17:15 before turning around again to head for the San Bernardino
   Strait. Musashi finally rolled over and sank at about 19:30.

   Meanwhile, Vice Admiral Onishi Takijiro had directed his First Air
   Fleet of 80 planes based on Luzon against the carriers Essex,
   Lexington, Princeton and Langley of Task Group 38.3 (whose planes were
   being used to attack airfields in Luzon to prevent Japanese land based
   aircraft attacks on the Allied ships in the Leyte Gulf). Princeton was
   hit by an armour-piercing bomb and burst into flames. At 15:30, the aft
   magazine exploded, killing 200 sailors on Princeton and 80 on the
   cruiser Birmingham which was alongside assisting with the firefighting.
   Birmingham was so badly damaged that she was forced to retire, and
   other nearby vessels were damaged too. All efforts to save Princeton
   failed, and she sank at 17:50.

   The battle of Surigao Strait.
   Enlarge
   The battle of Surigao Strait.

Battle of Surigao Strait

   Nishimura's "Southern Force" consisted of the battleships Yamashiro and
   Fusō, the cruiser Mogami, and four destroyers. They were attacked by
   bombers on October 24 but sustained only minor damage.

   Because of the strict radio silence imposed on the Central and Southern
   Forces, Nishimura was unable to synchronise his movements with Shima
   and Kurita. When he entered the narrow Surigao Strait at about 02:00
   Shima was 40 km behind him, and Kurita was still in the Sibuyan Sea,
   several hours from the beaches at Leyte.

   As they passed the cape of Panaon Island, they ran into a deadly trap
   set for them by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse
   Oldendorf had six battleships ( Mississippi, Maryland, West Virginia,
   Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, all but the Mississippi having
   been resurrected from Pearl Harbour), eight cruisers ( heavy cruisers
   USS Louisville (Flagship), Portland, Minneapolis and HMAS Shropshire,
   light cruisers USS Denver, Columbia, Phoenix, Boise), 29 destroyers and
   39 PT boats. To pass the strait and reach the landings, Nishimura would
   have to run the gauntlet of torpedoes from the PT boats, evade two
   groups of destroyers, proceed up the strait under the concentrated fire
   of six battleships in line across the far mouth of the strait, and then
   break through the screen of cruisers and destroyers.

   At about 03:00, Fusō and the destroyers Asagumo, Yamagumo, and
   Mishishio were hit by torpedoes launched by the destroyer groups. Fusō
   broke in two, but did not sink. Then at 03:50, the battleships opened
   fire. Radar fire control allowed American battleships to hit targets
   from a distance at which the Japanese could not reply. Yamashiro and
   Mogami were crippled by 16-inch (406 mm) armour-piercing shells.
   Shigure turned and fled, but lost steering and stopped dead. Yamashiro
   sank at 04:19.

   At 04:25, Shima's two cruisers ( Nachi and Ashigara) and eight
   destroyers reached the battle. Seeing what they thought were the wrecks
   of both Nishimura's battleships (actually the two halves of Fusō), he
   ordered a retreat. His flagship, Nachi, collided with Mogami, flooding
   the latter's steering-room. Mogami fell behind in the retreat and was
   sunk by aircraft the next morning. The bow half of Fusō was destroyed
   by Louisville and the stern half sank off Kanihaan Island. Of
   Nishimura's seven ships, only Shigure survived.

   Yamashiro was the last battleship to engage another in combat, and one
   of very few to have been sunk by another battleship. The battle itself
   was the last in naval history to take place solely between all-gun
   warships. This was also the last battle in which one force (the
   Americans, in this case) was able to cross the T of its opponent,
   enabling the US ships to bring all their firepower to bear on the
   Japanese ships.

Battle off Cape Engaño

   The Japanese aircraft carriers Zuikaku, left, and (probably) Zuihō come
   under attack by dive bombers early in the battle off Cape Engaño.
   Enlarge
   The Japanese aircraft carriers Zuikaku, left, and (probably) Zuihō come
   under attack by dive bombers early in the battle off Cape Engaño.
   The Japanese cruiser Oyodo comes alongside the damaged Zuikaku so that
   Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa can transfer his flag.
   Enlarge
   The Japanese cruiser Oyodo comes alongside the damaged Zuikaku so that
   Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa can transfer his flag.
   The crew of Zuikaku salute as the flag is lowered, and the Zuikaku
   ceases to be the flagship of the Japanese Navy.
   Enlarge
   The crew of Zuikaku salute as the flag is lowered, and the Zuikaku
   ceases to be the flagship of the Japanese Navy.

   Ozawa's "Northern Force" had four aircraft carriers ( Zuikaku — the
   last surviving carrier of the Attack on Pearl Harbour — Zuihō, Chitose,
   and Chiyoda), two World War I battleships partially converted to
   carriers ( Hyūga and Ise — the aft turrets had been replaced by hangar,
   deck and catapult, but neither carried any planes in this battle),
   three cruisers ( Ōyodo, Tama, and Isuzu), and nine destroyers. He had
   only 108 planes.

   Ozawa's force was not spotted until 16:40 on October 24, because the
   Americans were too busy attacking Kurita and dealing with the air
   strikes from Luzon. On the evening of October 24, Ozawa intercepted a
   (mistaken) American communication of Kurita's withdrawal, and began to
   withdraw as well. But at 20:00, Toyoda Soemu ordered all forces to
   attack.

   Halsey saw that he had an opportunity to destroy the last Japanese
   carrier forces in the Pacific, a blow that would completely destroy
   Japanese sea power and allow the U.S. Navy to attack the Japanese
   homelands. Believing that Kurita had been defeated by the airstrikes in
   the Sibuyan Sea, and was retiring to Brunei, Halsey set out in pursuit
   of Ozawa just after midnight with all three carrier groups and the
   battleships of Admiral Willis A. Lee's Task Force 34. In so doing,
   Halsey or members of his staff ignored reports from scout planes from
   the USS Independence that Kurita had turned back towards San Bernardo
   Strait and that the navigation lights in the strait had been turned on.
   When Admiral G.F. Bogan, commanding TF 38.2, radioed this information
   to Halsey's flagship, he was rebuffed by a staff officer, who replied
   "Yes, yes, we have that information." Admiral Willis A. Lee, who had
   correctly recognized that Ozawa's force was a decoy and indicated the
   same in a blinker message to Halsey's ship, was similarly rebuffed.

   The U.S. Third Fleet was formidable and completely outgunned the
   Japanese Northern Force. Halsey had nine fleet carriers ( Intrepid,
   Hornet, Franklin, Lexington, Bunker Hill, Wasp, Hancock, Enterprise,
   and Essex), eight light carriers ( Independence, Princeton, Belleau
   Wood, Cowpens, Monterey, Langley, Cabot, and San Jacinto), six
   battleships ( Alabama, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Dakota,
   and Washington), seventeen cruisers and sixty-three destroyers. He
   could put more than 1,000 planes in the air. But it left the landings
   on Leyte covered only by a handful of escort carriers and destroyers.

   Halsey had taken the bait so temptingly dangled in front of him by
   Ozawa; fittingly, the engagement was to take place off a cape whose
   name means "deceit" in Spanish.

   On the morning of October 25, Ozawa launched 75 planes to attack the
   Americans, doing little damage. Most of the planes were shot down by
   the American covering patrols. A handful of survivors made it to Luzon.

   The American carriers launched their first attack group of 180 aircraft
   at dawn, before the Northern Force had been located. The search
   aircraft made contact at 7:10. At 8:00, the American fighters destroyed
   the defensive screen of 30 aircraft. Air strikes began and continued
   until the evening, by which time the American aircraft had flown 527
   sorties against the Northern Force, sinking three of Ozawa's carriers
   (Zuikaku, Zuihō and Chiyoda) and the destroyer Akitsuki. The fourth
   carrier, Chitose, was disabled, as was the cruiser Tama. Ozawa
   transferred his flag to Ōyodo.

   With all the Japanese carriers sunk or disabled, the main targets
   remaining were the converted battleships Ise and Hyūga. Their massive
   construction proved resistant to the air strikes, so Halsey sent Task
   Force 34 forward to engage them directly. But then news reached Halsey
   of the engagement off Samar and the disaster facing Sprague's Task
   Group 77.4. He abandoned the pursuit and turned south, detaching only a
   small force of cruisers and destroyers under Laurence T. DuBose to sink
   the disabled Japanese ships. Ise and Hyūga returned to Japan, where
   they were sunk at their moorings in 1945.

Battle off Samar

   The battle off Samar.
   Enlarge
   The battle off Samar.
   The Yamato and a heavy cruiser, possibly Tone or Chikuma, in action off
   Samar.
   Enlarge
   The Yamato and a heavy cruiser, possibly Tone or Chikuma, in action off
   Samar.

   Kurita passed through San Bernardino Strait at 03:00 on 25 October 1944
   and steamed south along the coast of Samar.

   To stop them, there were three groups of the Seventh Fleet commanded by
   Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, each with six escort carriers, and seven or
   eight destroyers and/or destroyer escorts. Admiral Thomas Sprague's
   Task Unit 77.4.1 ("Taffy 1") consisted of the escort carriers Sangamon,
   Suwannee, Santee, and Petrof Bay. (The remaining two escort carriers
   from Taffy 1, Chenango and Saginaw Bay, had departed for Morotai,
   Indonesia on October 24, carrying "dud" aircraft from other carriers
   for transfer ashore. They returned with replacement aircraft after the
   battle.) Admiral Felix Stump's Task Unit 77.4.2 ("Taffy 2") consisted
   of Natoma Bay, Manila Bay, Marcus Island, Kadashan Bay, Savo Island,
   and Ommaney Bay. Admiral Clifton Sprague's Task Unit 77.4.3 ("Taffy 3")
   consisted of Fanshaw Bay, St Lo, White Plains, Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay,
   and Gambier Bay. Each escort carrier carried about 30 planes, making
   more than 500 planes in all. Escort carriers were slow and lightly
   armoured and stood little chance in an encounter with a battleship.

   A mix-up in communications led Kinkaid to believe that Willis A. Lee's
   Task Force 34 of battleships was guarding the San Bernardino Strait to
   the north and that there would be no danger from that direction. But
   Lee had gone with Halsey in pursuit of Ozawa. The Japanese came upon
   Taffy 3 at 06:45, taking the Americans completely by surprise. Kurita
   mistook the escort carriers for fleet carriers and thought that he had
   the whole of the American Third Fleet under the 18 inch (457 mm) guns
   of his battleships.

   Clifton Sprague (no relation to Thomas Sprague) directed his Taffy 3
   carriers to turn and flee towards a squall to the east, hoping that bad
   visibility would reduce the accuracy of Japanese gunfire, and sent his
   destroyers in to distract the Japanese battleships and buy time. The
   destroyers attacked the Japanese line with suicidal determination,
   drawing fire and scattering the Japanese formations as ships turned to
   avoid torpedoes. Yamato found herself between two torpedoes on parallel
   courses and for ten minutes, she headed away from the action, unable to
   turn back for fear of being hit. The American destroyers Hoel and
   Johnston, and destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts were sunk and four
   others were damaged, but they had bought enough time for Sprague to
   launch planes from all three Taffy groups. There was no time to reload
   with armour-piercing bombs, so the planes attacked with whatever they
   happened to be carrying, (in some cases with depth charges). According
   to Morison, many aircraft, their ordnance expended, made dry runs
   against the Japanese warships.

   Taffy 3 turned south and fled with shells falling around its carriers.
   Gambier Bay, bringing up the rear, was holed, slowed, then sunk, and
   most of the others were hit and damaged. The small carriers returned
   fire with the only guns they had, their single stern-mounted five-inch
   (127mm) anti-aircraft guns. These weapons, loaded solely with
   anti-aircraft shells, had little chance of inflicting significant
   damage on even unarmored surface ships. St. Lo scored a hit, to date
   the only known hit inflicted directly by an aircraft carrier (as
   opposed to by its aircraft) on an opposing surface vessel.

   It seemed impossible for Taffy 3 to escape total destruction, and the
   Japanese force also began firing on the other two Taffy groups as they
   were able to close the range with their superior speed, but at 09:20,
   Kurita suddenly turned and retreated north. The air and destroyer
   attacks had broken up his formations, he had lost tactical control, and
   the heavy cruisers ( Chōkai, Suzuya, Chikuma) had been sunk by
   concentrated sea and air attack. Signals from Ozawa had disabused him
   of the notion that he was attacking the whole of the 3rd Fleet, which
   meant that the longer he continued to engage, the more likely it was
   that he would suffer devastating air strikes from Halsey's carriers. He
   retreated north and then west through the San Bernardino Strait under
   continuous air attack. Nagato, Haruna and Kongō were severely damaged.
   He had begun the battle with five battleships; when he returned to
   Japan, only Yamato remained combat-worthy.

Aftermath

   A 60th Anniversary ceremony in Tacloban, Philippines, on October 20,
   2004
   A 60th Anniversary ceremony in Tacloban, Philippines, on October 20,
   2004

   The battle of Leyte Gulf secured the beachheads of the U.S. Sixth Army
   on Leyte against attack from the sea. However, much hard fighting would
   be required before the island was completely in Allied hands at the end
   of December 1944: the Battle of Leyte on land was fought in parallel
   with an air and sea campaign in which the Japanese reinforced and
   resupplied their troops on Leyte while the Allies attempted to
   interdict them and establish air-sea superiority for a series of
   amphibious landings in Ormoc Bay — engagements collectively referred to
   as the Battle of Ormoc Bay.

   The Battle of Leyte Gulf destroyed Japanese naval power and opened the
   way for the advance to the Ryūkyū Islands in 1945. The only significant
   Japanese naval operation for the rest of the war was the disastrous
   Operation Ten-Go in April 1945.

   As the battle was coming to an end, Vice Admiral Takijiro Onishi put
   his "Special Attack Force" into operation, launching kamikaze attacks
   against the Allied ships in Leyte Gulf. On 25 October, Australia was
   hit for a second time and forced to retire for repairs, while the
   escort carrier St. Lo was sunk.

Criticism of Halsey

   Halsey was criticized for his decision to take Task Force 34 with him
   in pursuit of Ozawa, and for failing to dispatch it when Kinkaid first
   appealed for help. US Navy slang for Halsey's action has ever since
   been Bull's Run, a neologism combining Halsey's nickname "Bull" and the
   Battles of the Bull Run in the American Civil War. In his dispatch
   after the battle, he justified the decision as follows:

          Searches by my carrier planes revealed the presence of the
          Northern carrier force on the afternoon of 24 October, which
          completed the picture of all enemy naval forces. As it seemed
          childish to me to guard statically San Bernardino Strait, I
          concentrated TF 38 during the night and steamed north to attack
          the Northern Force at dawn. I believed that the Centre Force had
          been so heavily damaged in the Sibuyan Sea that it could no
          longer be considered a serious menace to Seventh Fleet.

   Clifton Sprague, commander of Task Unit 77.4.3 in the battle off Samar,
   was later critical of Halsey's decision:

          In the absence of any information that this exit [of the San
          Bernardino Strait] was no longer blocked, it was logical to
          assume that our northern flank could not be exposed without
          ample warning.

   Naval historian Samuel Morison wrote:

          If TF 34 had been detached a few hours earlier, after Kinkaid's
          first urgent request for help, and had left the destroyers
          behind, since their fueling caused a delay of over two hours and
          a half, a powerful battle line of six modern battleships under
          the command of Admiral Lee, the most experienced battle squadron
          commander in the Navy, would have arrived off San Bernardino
          Strait in time to have clashed with Kurita's Centre Force… Apart
          from the accidents common in naval warfare, there is every
          reason to suppose that Lee would have crossed Kurita's T and
          completed the destruction of Centre Force.

   A message from Nimitz asking for the location of Task Force 34 led to
   ill-feeling between him and Halsey, owing to a misunderstood piece of
   security padding (see " the world wonders").
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