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Battle of Jutland

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Military History and War

                        Battle of Jutland
   Part of World War I
   The Battle of Jutland, 1916

     Date   31 May 1916– 1 June 1916
   Location Near Denmark, in the North Sea
    Result  Tactical German victory
                            Combatants

                                 Royal Navy
                               ( Grand Fleet)

                                             Kaiserliche Marine
                                             ( High Seas Fleet)

                            Commanders
   Sir John Jellicoe,
   Sir David Beatty                          Reinhard Scheer,
                                             Franz von Hipper
                             Strength
   28 battleships,
   9 battlecruisers,
   8 heavy cruisers,
   26 light cruisers,
   78 destroyers,
   1 minelayer,
   1 seaplane carrier                        16 battleships,
                                             5 battlecruisers,
                                             6 pre-dreadnoughts,
                                             11 light cruisers,
                                             61 torpedo-boats
                            Casualties
   6,094 killed
   510 wounded
   177 captured
   3 battlecruisers
   3 armoured cruisers
   8 destroyers
   (115,025 tons sunk)                       2,551 killed
                                             507 wounded
                                             1 battlecruiser
                                             1 pre-dreadnought
                                             4 light cruisers
                                             5 torpedo-boats
                                             (61,180 tons sunk)
                           North Sea 1914-1918
   1st Heligoland Bight – Dogger Bank – Jutland – 2nd Heligoland Bight

   The Battle of Jutland (German: Skagerrakschlacht ( Battle of the
   Skagerrak); Danish: Søslaget ved Jylland / Søslaget om Skagerrak), was
   the largest naval battle of World War I, and the only full-scale clash
   of battleships in that war. It was fought on May 31– June 1, 1916, in
   the North Sea near Jutland, the mainland of Denmark. The combatants
   were the Kaiserliche Marine’s High Seas Fleet commanded by Vice Admiral
   Reinhard Scheer and the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet commanded by Admiral
   of the Fleet Sir John Jellicoe. The intention of the German fleet was
   to break the British naval blockade of the North Sea and allow German
   mercantile shipping to operate again.

   The Germans plan was to use Vice Admiral Franz Hipper’s scouting group
   of five modern battlecruisers to lure Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty’s
   battlecruiser squadrons into the path of the main German battle fleet
   and so destroy them. But the British had learned from signal intercepts
   (the British had been given a German codebook from the light cruiser
   SMS Magdeburg, boarded by Russian naval officers after the ship ran
   aground in Russian territorial waters) that a major fleet operation was
   likely, and on 30 May Jellicoe sailed with the Grand Fleet to
   rendezvous with Beatty.

   On the afternoon of 31 May, Beatty and Hipper encountered each other,
   and in a running battle to the south Hipper drew the British into the
   path of the High Seas Fleet. Beatty turned and fled towards the Grand
   Fleet and from 18:30 until nightfall at about 20:30 the two huge fleets
   — totaling 250 ships between them — were heavily engaged. Fourteen
   British and eleven German ships were sunk with great loss of life.
   Jellicoe tried to cut the Germans off from their base in the hope of
   continuing the battle in the morning, but under cover of darkness
   Scheer crossed the wake of the British fleet and returned to port.

   Both sides claimed victory. The British had lost more ships and many
   more sailors, but Scheer’s plan of destroying Beatty’s squadrons had
   failed. The Germans continued to pose a threat that required the
   British to keep their battleships concentrated in the North Sea, but
   they never again contested control of the seas. Instead, the German
   Navy turned its efforts and resources to unrestricted submarine
   warfare.

Background

Naval tactics in 1916

   Tactics called for a fleet approaching battle to be in parallel columns
   moving in-line ahead, allowing relatively easy maneuvering. Several
   short columns could change their heading faster than a single long
   column while maintaining formation. Also signals made with flags or
   searchlights from the flagship (usually placed at the head of the
   centre column) could be seen by many ships. In single-column formations
   a signal could take 10 minutes or more to be passed from the flagship
   at the front of the column to the last ship at the end, since smoke
   from the funnels often made it impossible to identify signals on ships
   beyond the one directly ahead or behind, so every ship had to repeat
   the signal for the following one to understand. The time required for
   this was often doubled as most signals had to be confirmed by every
   ship before they could be executed.
   The British Grand Fleet in parallel columns steaming in line astern
   Enlarge
   The British Grand Fleet in parallel columns steaming in line astern

   For the actual battle the fleet would deploy into a single column by
   the leading ships of the columns turning 90 degrees to port or
   starboard, the remaining ships following their leaders in succession,
   the column being formed at right angles to the original line of
   advance. To form the column into the right direction the fleet had to
   know from which direction the enemy was approaching before he could be
   seen by the battleships, as this maneuver took longer than two fleets
   heading towards each other at high speed needed to come within fighting
   range. It was the task of the scouting forces, consisting of
   battlecruisers and cruisers, to find the enemy and report from where he
   approached in time and if possible deny the enemy's scouting force to
   obtain the same information.

   Ideally the line of battleships would cross the path of the enemy
   column so that the maximum number of guns could be brought to bear,
   while the enemy could only fire with the front turrets of the leading
   ships. Carrying out this classic manoeuvre of " crossing the T" was
   largely a matter of luck; more common were heavy exchanges between two
   fleets on roughly parallel courses.

German plan

   The British Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland
   Enlarge
   The British Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland

   The German naval strategy, according to Scheer, was:

          to damage the English Fleet by offensive raids against the naval
          forces engaged in watching and blockading the German Bight, as
          well as by mine-laying on the British coast and submarine
          attack, whenever possible. After an equality of strength had
          been realised as a result of these operations, and all our
          forces had been got ready and concentrated, an attempt was to be
          made with our fleet to seek battle under circumstances
          unfavourable to the enemy.

   Since in 1916 the German High Seas Fleet had only 18 battleships to the
   British Grand Fleet's 33 and the Germans were falling increasingly
   further behind as the war progressed, there was no chance of defeating
   the British in a head-to-head clash of battleships. Instead, they
   planned to divide and conquer: by staging raids into the North Sea they
   would lure out small British squadrons which could then be attacked and
   destroyed. Since the British Admiralty, unknown to the Germans, had
   gained possession of the main German code books, German naval radio
   communications picked up could be deciphered, and the Admiralty was
   therefore usually quite well aware of German plans.

   The plan for May 1916 was to station a large number of U-boats off the
   British naval bases and lure Beatty's battlecruiser squadrons out by
   sending a fleet under Hipper to raid the coast of Sunderland. After
   attrition from the submarines, the British would be drawn by Hipper
   towards the German dreadnoughts under Scheer and destroyed.

British response

   Fleet movements before and during the battle of Jutland, 30 May to 1
   June 1916.

   The British intercepted and decrypted a German signal on 28 May
   ordering all ships to be ready to put to sea on the 30th. Further
   signals were intercepted and although they were not decrypted it was
   clear that a major operation was likely. The Grand Fleet of twenty-four
   dreadnoughts and three battlecruisers left Scapa Flow under Jellicoe
   before Hipper left the Jade Estuary on 30 May. Beatty's force of four
   dreadnoughts and six battlecruisers left the Firth of Forth on the next
   day, and Jellicoe's intention was to rendezvous ninety miles (145 km)
   west of the Skagerrak off the coast of Jutland and wait for the
   Germans.

Order of battle

   See Order of battle at Jutland.

The fleets

   Jellicoe's battle force was twenty-eight dreadnoughts and nine
   battlecruisers, while Scheer had sixteen dreadnoughts, five
   battlecruisers and six obsolete pre-dreadnoughts. The British were
   superior in light vessels as well. In terms of weight of broadside the
   British had an advantage of 332,400 lb (151 tonnes) against 134,000 lb
   (61 tonnes).

   This British superiority was countered by certain technical factors:
   German ships had thicker armour against torpedo attack; German ships
   had better internal sub-division because they were only designed for
   short cruises in the North Sea and their crews lived in barracks ashore
   when in harbour; German armour-piercing shells were more effective than
   the British shells; and, vitally important, the British cordite
   propellant was oversensitive, and the British magazines were not well
   protected. Further, the German Zeiss optical equipment was superior.

The Admirals

          See the respective article of each admiral:

            David Beatty

                        Franz Hipper

                                    John Jellicoe

                                                 Reinhard Scheer

The battlecruiser action

   The German U-boats were completely ineffective; they did not sink a
   single ship and provided no useful information as scouts. Jellicoe's
   ships proceeded to his rendezvous undamaged but misled by Admiralty
   intelligence that the Germans were nine hours later than they actually
   were.

   At 14:20 on 31 May, scouts from Beatty's force reported enemy ships to
   the south-east: British light units, investigating a neutral Danish
   steamer which was sailing between the two fleets, found German scouts
   engaged in the same mission. Beatty moved to cut the German ships off
   from their base. The first shots of the battle were fired when Galatea
   of the British 1st Light Cruiser Squadron mistook two German destroyers
   for cruisers and engaged them. Galatea was subsequently hit at extreme
   range by her German counterpart, Elbing, of Rear Admiral Bodicker's
   Scouting Group II.

   At 15:30, Beatty sighted Hipper's cruisers moving north-west (position
   1 on map). Hipper promptly turned away to lead Beatty towards Scheer.
   Beatty, some three miles (5 km) from Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh
   Evan-Thomas's 5th Battle Squadron, turned to the enemy and signalled by
   flag for the 5th Battle Squadron to follow. Given the distance and
   visibility, the 5th could not read the flag signals; and as Beatty made
   no effort to communicate via light signal or radio telegraph, the 5th
   continued on its original course for several minutes. At 15:45, after
   having the German ships within range for over ten minutes, and with
   both fleets roughly parallel at 15,000 yards (14 km), Hipper opened
   fire followed by Beatty (position 2). Thus began the opening phase of
   the fleet action, known as the "Run to the South".
   Beatty's flagship Lion burning after being hit by a salvo from Lützow.
   Enlarge
   Beatty's flagship Lion burning after being hit by a salvo from Lützow.

   Beatty ordered his ships to engage in a line, one British ship engaging
   with one German and his flagship Lion doubling on the German flagship
   Lützow. However, due to a mistake on the British part, Derfflinger was
   left unengaged and free to fire without disruption, while Moltke drew
   fire from two battlecruisers. The Germans drew first blood. Hipper's
   five battlecruisers promptly registered hits on three of the six
   British battlecruisers. Nearly 10 minutes passed before the British
   managed to score their first hit. The first near-disaster of the battle
   occurred when a 12 inch (305 mm) salvo from Lützow wrecked "Q" turret
   of Beatty's flagship Lion. Dozens of crewmen were instantly killed, but
   a far larger catastrophe was averted when Major Francis Harvey of the
   Royal Marines, the mortally wounded turret commander, ordered the
   magazine doors shut and the magazine flooded, thereby preventing the
   fickle propellant from setting off a massive explosion. Lion was saved,
   but Indefatigable was not so lucky. At 16:00 she was smashed aft by
   three 11 inch (280 mm) shells from Von der Tann, causing damage
   sufficient to knock her out of line. Von der Tann landed another
   11 inch (280 mm) salvo on one of her 12 inch (305 mm) turrets at
   near-maximum range. The plunging shells easily pierced the armour and,
   with no time for the heroics that saved Lion, Indefatigable was ripped
   apart by a magazine explosion, sinking in moments with all but two of
   her crew of 1,019 officers and men (position 3).

   The odds had been evened to Hipper's benefit, but not for long.
   Evan-Thomas had finally brought up his squadron of four
   "super-dreadnoughts" — fast battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class
   armed with 15 inch (381 mm) guns. With 15 inch (381 mm) shells landing
   on his ships and unable to respond effectively at long range with his
   smaller guns, Hipper was in a tight spot, but he knew Scheer's main
   body was fast approaching and his baiting mission was close to
   completion. The battlecruiser action intensified again: at 16:25 Queen
   Mary was hit by what may have been a combined salvo from Derfflinger
   and Seydlitz, and she disintegrated in a magazine explosion with all
   but nine of her 1,275 man crew lost.

   Shortly after, a salvo struck on or about the Princess Royal, which
   disappeared in spray and smoke. A signalman leapt to the bridge of the
   Lion, "Princess Royal blown up, sir." Beatty famously turned to his
   flag captain, "Chatfield, there seems to be something wrong with our
   bloody ships today. Turn two-points to port," i.e. two points nearer
   the enemy (position 4).

   At about 16:30, the Southampton of Beatty's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron
   led by Commodore William Goodenough sighted the main body of Scheer's
   High Seas Fleet, dodging numerous heavy-calibre salvos to report the
   detailed strength of the Germans: sixteen dreadnoughts with six older
   battleships. Simultaneously a destroyer action raged between the
   battlecruiser fleets, as British destroyers meleed with their German
   counterparts and managed to put a torpedo into Seydlitz. The destroyer
   Nestor, under the command of Captain Bingham, sank two German torpedo
   boats, the V-27 and the V-29, before she and another destroyer, the
   Nomad, were immobilized by hits and later sunk by Scheer's
   dreadnoughts.

   Beatty headed north to draw the Germans towards Jellicoe and broke
   contact with the Germans at about 16.45 (position 5). Beatty's move
   towards Jellicoe is called the "Run to the North". Because Beatty once
   again failed to signal his intentions adequately, the
   super-dreadnoughts of the 5th Battle Squadron found themselves lagging
   behind the battlecruisers and heading directly into the main body of
   the High Seas Fleet.Their difficulty was compounded by Evan-Thomas, who
   gave the order to "turn in succession" rather than "turn together".
   This resulted in all four ships turning, in succession, in the same
   patch of sea, for which the High Seas Fleet had ample time to find the
   range. For a period they had to fend off the lead German dreadnoughts
   and Hipper's battlecruisers on their own. Malaya sustained heavy
   casualties in the process, lessened by the initiative of the Captain in
   turning early; the 15 inch (381 mm) fire of the British ships remained
   effective, causing severe damage to the German battlecruisers (position
   6).

   Jellicoe was now aware that full fleet engagement was nearing, but had
   insufficient information on the position and course of the Germans.
   Rear Admiral Horace Hood's 3rd Battlecruiser Squadron was ordered to
   speed ahead to assist Beatty, while Rear-Admiral Arbuthnot's 1st
   Cruiser Squadron patrolled the van of the main body for eventual
   deployment of Jellicoe's dreadnought columns. Around 17:30 the cruiser
   Black Prince of Arbuthnot's squadron, bearing southeast, came within
   view of Beatty's leading 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, establishing the
   first visual link between the converging bodies of the Grand Fleet.
   Simultaneously the signals cruiser Chester, steaming behind Hood's
   battlecruisers, was intercepted by the van of the German scouting
   forces under Rear-Admiral Bodicker. Heavily outnumbered by Bodicker's
   four light cruisers, Chester was pounded before being relieved by
   Hood's heavy units which swung back westward for that purpose. Hood's
   flagship Invincible disabled the light cruiser Wiesbaden as Bodicker's
   other ships fled toward Hipper and Scheer, in the mistaken belief that
   Hood was leading a larger force of British capital ships from the north
   and east. Another destroyer action ensued as German torpedo boats
   attempted to blunt the arrival of this new formation.

The fleet action

   In the meantime Beatty and Evan-Thomas had resumed their engagement of
   Hipper's battlecruisers, this time with the visual conditions to their
   advantage. With several of his ships damaged, Hipper turned back to
   Scheer around 18.00, just as Beatty's flagship Lion was finally spotted
   by Jellicoe on the Iron Duke. Jellicoe promptly demanded the latest
   position of the German forces from Beatty, who failed to respond to the
   question for almost ten minutes.

   Jellicoe, having overestimated the enemy forces, was in a worrying
   position, needing to know the position of the Germans in order to judge
   when and how to deploy his battleships from their cruising formation in
   column into a single battle line. The deployment could be onto either
   the western or the eastern column and had to be carried out before the
   Germans arrived; but early deployment could mean losing any chance of a
   decisive encounter. Deploying to the west would bring his fleet closer
   to Scheer, gaining valuable time as dusk approached, but the Germans
   might arrive before the manoeuvre was complete. Deploying to the east
   would take the force away from Scheer, but Jellicoe's ships might be
   able to cross the "T" and would have the advantage of silhouetting
   Scheer's forces against the setting sun to the west. Deployment would
   take twenty irreplaceable minutes, and the fleets were closing at
   speed. Jellicoe ordered deployment to the east at 18:10 ❷.
   This photograph, taken from the deck of a British ship at the Battle of
   Jutland in 1916 gives some idea of the conditions in which the battle
   was fought.
   Enlarge
   This photograph, taken from the deck of a British ship at the Battle of
   Jutland in 1916 gives some idea of the conditions in which the battle
   was fought.

   Meanwhile Hipper had rejoined Scheer, and the combined High Seas Fleet
   was heading north, directly toward Jellicoe. Scheer had no indication
   that Jellicoe was at sea, let alone that he was bearing down from the
   northwest, and was distracted by the intervention of Hood's ships to
   his north and east. Beatty's four surviving battlecruisers were now
   crossing the van of the British dreadnoughts to join Hood's three
   battlecruisers; in doing so, Beatty nearly rammed Rear-Admiral
   Arbuthnot's flagship Defence.

   Arbuthnot's obsolete armoured cruisers had no real place in the coming
   clash between modern dreadnoughts, but he was attracted by the drifting
   hull of the crippled Wiesbaden. With Warrior, Defence closed in for the
   kill, only to blunder right into the gunsights of Hipper's and Scheer's
   oncoming capital ships. Defence was destroyed in a spectacular
   explosion viewed by most of the deploying Grand Fleet, sinking with all
   hands (903 officers and men). Warrior was hit badly but spared
   immolation by the mishap of the nearby superdreadnought Warspite.
   Warspite had been steaming near 25 knots (46 km/h) to keep pace with
   the 5th Battle Squadron as it tailed Beatty's battlecruisers in the run
   north, creating enough strain to jam her rudder. Drifting in a wide
   circle, she appeared as a juicy target to the German dreadnoughts and
   took thirteen hits, inadvertently drawing fire from the hapless
   Warrior. This maneouvre from Warspite was known as "Windy Corner".
   Despite surviving the onslaught, Warspite was soon ordered back to port
   by Evan-Thomas.

   As Defence sank, Hipper moved within range of Hood's 3rd Battlecruiser
   Squadron. Invincible inflicted two below-waterline hits on Lützow that
   would ultimately doom Hipper's flagship, but at about 18:30 abruptly
   appeared as a clear target before Lützow and Derfflinger. A series of
   12 inch (305 mm) shells struck Invincible, which blew up and split in
   two, killing all but six of her crew of 1,032 officers and men,
   including Rear Admiral Hood.
   Approximate positions of the British fleet at about 19:00 ❹, from The
   Fighting at Jutland, edited by H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper, circa
   1921.
   Enlarge
   Approximate positions of the British fleet at about 19:00 ❹, from The
   Fighting at Jutland, edited by H. W. Fawcett and G. W. W. Hooper, circa
   1921.

   By 18:30 the main fleet action was joined for the first time, with
   Jellicoe effectively "crossing Scheer's T" ❸. Jellicoe's flagship Iron
   Duke quickly scored a series of hits on the lead German dreadnought,
   König, but in this brief exchange, which lasted only minutes, as few as
   ten of the Grand Fleet's twenty-four dreadnoughts actually opened fire.
   The Germans were hampered by poor visibility in addition to being in an
   unfavourable tactical position. Realizing he was heading into a trap,
   Scheer ordered his fleet to turn and flee at 18:33. Amid a pall of
   smoke and mist Scheer's forces succeeded in disengaging.

   Conscious of the risks to his capital ships posed by torpedoes,
   Jellicoe did not chase directly but headed south, determined to keep
   the High Seas Fleet west of him. Scheer knew that it was not yet dark
   enough to escape and his fleet would suffer terribly in a stern chase,
   so at 18:55 he doubled back to the east ❹. In his memoirs he wrote,
   "the manoeuvre would be bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans
   for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily it would
   facilitate the breaking loose at night." But the turn to the east took
   his ships towards Jellicoe's.

   Commodore Goodenough's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron dodged the fire of
   German battleships for a second time to reestablish contact with the
   High Seas Fleet shortly after 19:00. By 19:15, Jellicoe had crossed the
   "T" yet again ❺. This time his arc of fire was tighter and deadlier,
   causing severe damage to the Germans, particularly Rear-Admiral
   Behncke's leading 3rd Battle Squadron. At 19:17, for the second time in
   less than an hour, Scheer turned to the west, ordering a major torpedo
   attack by his destroyers and a "death ride" by Scouting Group I's four
   remaining battlecruisers — Lützow being out of action and abandoned by
   Hipper — to deter a British chase. In this portion of the engagement
   the Germans sustained thirty-seven heavy hits while inflicting only
   two, Derfflinger alone receiving fourteen. Nonetheless Scheer slipped
   away as sunset (at 20:24) approached. The last major engagement between
   capital ships took place as the surviving British battlecruisers caught
   up with their German counterparts, which were briefly relieved by
   Rear-Admiral Mauve's obsolete pre-dreadnoughts ❻. As King George V and
   Westfalen exchanged a few final shots, neither side could have imagined
   that the only encounter between British and German dreadnoughts in the
   entire war was already concluded.

   At 21:00, Jellicoe, knowing of the Grand Fleet's deficiencies in
   night-fighting, decided to try to avoid a major engagement until early
   dawn. He placed a screen of cruisers and destroyers behind his battle
   fleet to patrol the rear as he headed south to guard against Scheer's
   expected escape to Ems ❼. In reality Scheer opted to cross Jellicoe's
   wake and escape via Horns Reef. Luckily for Scheer, Jellicoe's scouts
   failed to report his true course while Jellicoe himself was too
   cautious to judge from extensive circumstantial evidence that the
   Germans were breaking through his rear.

   While the nature of Scheer's escape and Jellicoe's inaction indicate
   the overall superiority of German night-fighting proficiency, the
   night's results were no more clear-cut than the battle as a whole.
   Southampton, Commodore Goodenough's flagship which had scouted so
   proficiently, was heavily damaged but managed to sink the German light
   cruiser Frauenlob which went down at 22:23 with all hands (320 officers
   and men). But at 02:00 on 1 June, Black Prince of the ill-fated 1st
   Cruiser Squadron met a grim fate at the hands of the battleship
   Thüringen, blowing up with all hands (857 officers and men) as her
   squadron leader Defence had done hours earlier. At 02:10, several
   British destroyer flotillas launched a torpedo attack on the German
   battlefleet. At the cost of five destroyers sunk and some others
   damaged, they managed to sink the predreadnought Pommern with all hands
   (844 officers and men), as well as to torpedo the light cruiser Rostock
   and causing another, Elbing, to be rammed by the dreadnought Posen and
   abandoned. The battlecruiser Lützow was torpedoed at 01:45 on orders of
   her captain (von Harder) by the destroyer G38 after the surviving crew
   of 1,150 transferred to destroyers that came alongside.

   The Germans were helped in their escape by the failure of British naval
   intelligence in London to relay a critical radio intercept giving the
   true position of the High Seas Fleet. By the time Jellicoe finally
   learned of Scheer's whereabouts at 04:15 it was clear the battle could
   no longer be resumed. There would be no " Glorious First of June" in
   1916.

The outcome

   SMS Seydlitz was heavily damaged in the battle, hit by twenty-one heavy
   shells and one torpedo. 98 men were killed and 55 injured.
   Enlarge
   SMS Seydlitz was heavily damaged in the battle, hit by twenty-one heavy
   shells and one torpedo. 98 men were killed and 55 injured.
   Member of crew of SMS Westfalen
   Enlarge
   Member of crew of SMS Westfalen

   At Jutland, 99 German ships sank 115,000 tons of British metal, while
   151 British ships sank 62,000 tons of German steel. The British lost
   6,094 seamen, the Germans 2,551. Several other ships were badly
   damaged, such as HMS Lion and SMS Seydlitz. At the end of the battle
   the British had maintained their numerical superiority and had
   twenty-four dreadnoughts and battlecruisers still able and ready to
   fight while the Germans had ten.

   For the British, the outcome was a marginal tactical gain. Although
   they had lost more ships and had not destroyed the German fleet as
   intended, the Germans had retreated to port and the British were in
   command of the area. At a strategic level the outcome was more clear
   cut. The damaged British ships were restored to operational use more
   quickly than the German ships. However, the High Seas Fleet remained
   active and its presence as a fleet in being prevented a complete
   blockade of Germany. Nevertheless the Germans showed superior fighting
   power when taking into consideration their much smaller force.

   The British examination of their performance identified two main
   problems:
     * Their armour-piercing shells exploded outside the German armour
       rather than penetrating and exploding within. As a result some
       German ships with only 8 inch (203 mm) armour survived hits from 15
       inch (381 mm) shells. Had these shells performed to design, German
       losses would probably have been greater.
     * Communication between ships and the British commander-in-chief were
       poor. For most of the battle Jellicoe had no idea where the German
       ships were, even though British ships were in contact. They failed
       to report positions contrary to the Grand Fleet Battle Plan. Some
       of the signalling was carried out by flag instead of wireless — a
       questionable procedure given the mixture of haze and smoke that
       obscured the battlefield.

Battlecruiser design and handling

   The weak design and faulty use of the battlecruisers were important in
   the serious losses of the British. The battle is often regarded as
   demonstrating that the Royal Navy was technologically and operationally
   inferior to the German Navy. Jellicoe wrote in his dispatch:

          "The disturbing feature of the battle-cruiser action is the fact
          that five German battle-cruisers engaging six British vessels of
          this class, supported after the first twenty minutes, although
          at great range, by the fire of four battleships of the "Queen
          Elizabeth" class, were yet able to sink Queen Mary and
          Indefatigable … The facts which contributed to the British
          losses were, first, the indifferent armour protection of our
          battle-cruisers, particularly as regards turret armour and deck
          plating, and, second, the disadvantage under which our vessels
          laboured in regard to the light … The German organisation at
          night is very good. Their system of recognition signals is
          excellent. Ours is practically nil. Their searchlights are
          superior to ours and they use them with great effect. Finally,
          their method of firing at night gives excellent results. I am
          reluctantly compelled to the opinion that under night conditions
          we have a good deal to learn from them".

   During the summer of 2003, a diving expedition examined the wrecks of
   Invincible, Queen Mary, Defence, and Lützow to investigate the cause of
   the British ships' tendency to suffer from internal explosions. On this
   evidence, a major part of the blame may be laid on lax handling of the
   cordite propellant for the shells of the main guns. This, in turn, was
   a product of current British naval doctrine, which emphasised a rapid
   rate of fire in the direction of the enemy rather than slower, more
   accurate fire. In practice, the cordite could not be supplied to the
   guns rapidly enough through the hoists and hatches; in order to bring
   up the propellant for the next broadside before the time when it had to
   be loaded, many safety doors which should have been kept shut to
   safeguard against flash fires were open. Furthermore, whereas the
   German propellant RP C/12 was supplied in brass cylinders, British
   cordite was supplied in silk bags, making it more susceptible to flash
   fires. The doctrine of a high rate of fire also led to the decision in
   1913 to increase the supply of shells and cordite held on the British
   ships by 50 per cent, for fear of running out of ammunition; when this
   caused the capacity of the ships' magazines to be exceeded, cordite was
   stored in insecure places (Lambert, 36).

   The memoirs of Alexander Grant, gunner on Lion, show that some British
   officers were well aware of the dangers of careless handling of
   cordite:

          "With the introduction of cordite to replace powder for firing
          guns, regulations regarding the necessary precautions for
          handling explosives became unconsciously considerably relaxed,
          even I regret to say, to a dangerous degree throughout the
          Service. The gradual lapse in the regulations on board ship
          seemed to be due to two factors. First, cordite is a much safer
          explosive to handle than gun-powder. Second, but more important,
          the altered construction of the magazines on board led to a
          feeling of false security … The iron or steel deck, the
          disappearance of the wood lining, the electric lights fitted
          inside, the steel doors, open because there was now no chute for
          passing cartridges out; all this gave officers and men a
          comparative easiness of mind regarding the precautions necessary
          with explosive material".

   After the battle the Admiralty produced a report critical of the
   cordite handling practices. By this time, however, Jellicoe had been
   promoted to First Sea Lord and Beatty to command of the Grand Fleet;
   the report, which indirectly placed part of the blame for the disaster
   on the fleet's officers, was suppressed.

   The battle showed that the British concept and use of the battlecruiser
   was wholly flawed. The battlecruiser had been designed according to
   Jackie Fisher's dictum that "speed is armour". They were intended to be
   faster than battleships, with superior fire control, and able to pound
   enemy cruisers at ranges at which the enemy could not reply. Indeed,
   the whole concept was negated when British battlecruisers were asked to
   fight German ships which were just as fast, and better armoured.

The Jellicoe controversy

   At the time Jellicoe was criticised for his caution and for allowing
   Scheer to escape. Beatty in particular was convinced that Jellicoe had
   missed a tremendous opportunity to win another Trafalgar and annihilate
   the High Seas Fleet. Jellicoe's career stagnated; he was promoted away
   from active command to become First Sea Lord, while Beatty replaced him
   as commander of the British Grand Fleet.

   The controversy raged within the navy for about a decade after the war.
   Criticism focused on Jellicoe's decision at 19:15. Scheer had ordered
   his cruisers and destroyers forward in a torpedo attack to cover the
   turning away of his battleships. Jellicoe chose to turn away to the
   southeast and so keep out of range of the torpedoes. If Jellicoe had
   instead turned to the west, could his ships have dodged the torpedoes
   and destroyed the German fleet? Supporters of Jellicoe, including the
   naval historian Julian Corbett, pointed out the folly of risking defeat
   in battle when you already have command of the sea. Jellicoe himself,
   in a letter to the Admiralty before the battle, had stated that in the
   event of a fleet engagement in which the enemy turned away he would
   assume that the intention was to draw him over mines or submarines and
   would decline to be so drawn. This appreciation was at the time
   accepted by the Admiralty. (Corbett's volume of the official history of
   the war, Naval Operations, contains the extraordinary disclaimer,
   "Their Lordships find that some of the principles advocated in the
   book, especially the tendency to minimise the importance of seeking
   battle and forcing it to a conclusion, are directly in conflict with
   their views.")

   Whatever one thinks of the result, it is true that the stakes were very
   high, the pressure on Jellicoe was immense, and his caution is
   certainly understandable - his judgment might have been that even 90%
   odds in favour were not good enough on which to bet the British Empire.
   The former First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, said of the
   battle that Jellicoe "was the only man on either side who could have
   lost the war in an afternoon." The criticism of Jellicoe also fails to
   give enough credit to Scheer, who was determined to preserve his fleet
   by avoiding a decisive engagement, and showed great skill in effecting
   his escape.

Beatty's actions

   Another school of thought condemns the actions of Admiral Beatty for
   the failure of a complete British victory. Although Beatty was
   undeniably a brave man, his encounter with the High Seas Fleet almost
   cost the British the battle. Most of the British losses in tonnage
   occurred in Beatty's squadron. The three capital ships the British lost
   that day were all under the command of Beatty.

   Beatty's lack of control over the battlecruiser action is often
   criticised. He failed to provide Jellicoe with precise information on
   the whereabouts of the High Seas Fleet. Beatty did not apparently
   appreciate the finer points of command and control over a naval
   engagement, or the potential weaknesses of his own ships. Beatty,
   aboard the battlecruiser Lion, repeatedly overlooked the four fast
   battleships of the 5th Battle Squadron under his command, engaging with
   six ships when better control could have given him 10 against Hipper’s
   five. Despite Beatty's 12" guns having greater range than Hipper's 11"
   guns, Beatty closed the gap between the opposing squadrons until the
   Germans' superior gunnery took its toll.

   Even his famous remark "There's something wrong with our bloody ships
   today" could be construed as Beatty seeking to deflect blame away from
   himself. Despite his poor control of his battlecruisers, his neglect of
   the 5th Battle Squadron and inadequate battle preparedness, Beatty was
   fully prepared to lambast Admiral Jellicoe for not being aggressive
   enough; even though during the course of the battle Beatty, and Admiral
   Arbuthnot, had shown the folly of charging in for the attack. Jellicoe
   clearly understood the capabilities of his ships and the risks he
   faced; it is not clear that Beatty did.

Losses

British

     * Battlecruisers Indefatigable, Queen Mary, Invincible
     * Armoured cruisers Black Prince, Warrior, Defence
     * Flotilla Leaders Tipperary
     * Destroyers Shark, Sparrowhawk, Turbulent, Ardent, Fortune, Nomad,
       Nestor

German

     * Battlecruiser Lützow
     * Pre-Dreadnought Pommern
     * Light cruisers Frauenlob, Elbing, Rostock, Wiesbaden
     * (Heavy Torpedo Boats) Destroyers V48, S35, V27, V4, V29

Honours Won at Jutland

Victoria Cross

     * The Hon. Edward Barry Stewart Bingham ( HMS Nestor)
     * John Travers Cornwell ( HMS Chester)
     * Francis John William Harvey ( HMS Lion)
     * Loftus William Jones ( HMS Shark)

Protection of the British wrecks

   On the 90th anniversary of the battle, in 2006, the Ministry of Defence
   announced that the 14 British vessels lost in the battle were being
   designated as protected places under the Protection of Military Remains
   Act.

Quotations

     * "Two short siren blasts rang out over the water as the main battle
       fleet, steaming in four groups, turned to port to form themselves
       in a single line of battle--the last line head battle formation in
       the history of the British navy. Not wooden walls this time, but
       walls of steel, with streamlined gray hulls instead of gilded stern
       galleries and figureheads, and funnels belching black smoke instead
       of sails close-hauled. But it was a formation Blake or Rooke or
       Rodney would have recognized, and approved. King George V and Ajax
       were first, followed by Orion, Royal Oak, Iron Duke, Superb,
       Thunderer, Benbow, Bellerophon, Temeraire, Collingwood, Colossus,
       Marlborough, St. Vincent -- twenty-seven in all, names redolent
       with the navy's past [...], names of admirals and generals, Greek
       heroes and Roman virtues. And all slowly bringing their guns to
       bear as they steamed into harm's way--just as their predecessors
       had for so many centuries in exactly the same sea. [...] Scheer's
       position was dangerous but hardly hopeless. [...] Scheer might have
       looked to his heavier armor to protect his ships from British
       shells (many of which were defective and failed to explode), while
       overpowering theirs with his own faster and more accurate fire.
       Certainly this was the moment of decisive battle he and Tirpitz had
       been yearning for. But as Scheer gazed out at the flashing fire
       along the horizon, he saw something else. He saw before him the
       entire history of the British navy, a fighting force with an
       unequalled reputation for invincibility in battle and bravery under
       fire. "The English fleet," he wrote later, "had the advantage of
       looking back on a hundred years of proud tradition which must have
       given every man a sense of superiority based on the great deeds of
       the past." His own navy's fighting tradition was less than two
       years old. At that fateful moment, Scheer was confronting not John
       Jellicoe but the ghosts of Nelson, Howe, Rodney, Drake, and the
       rest; and he backed down. Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the
       British Navy Shaped the Modern World, 2004

     * “The High Seas Fleet [of Imperial Germany], developed in only
       sixteen years, had proved itself able to face the full might and
       tradition of British seapower and survive. [A variety of grave
       shortcomings] point to the underlying reason for the shock which
       Jutland administered to British pride. Already the balance of
       energy and vigour had begun to shift. Already the leadership in
       competitive endeavour had crossed the North Sea and was crossing
       the North Atlantic. In a sector crucial to national survival, the
       onset of British decline, hidden for a generation behind the
       splendors of the old order, was revealed. Few recognised the deeper
       perspectives at the time; most were concerned to argue and explain
       the foreground event. [. . .] Because it seemed so indecisive,
       Jutland was sometimes called ‘the battle that was never fought.’ It
       was in fact one of the more decisive battles of modern history. For
       it was one of the first clear indications to Britain that the
       creator had become the curator.” Stuart Legg. Jutland. 1966

Veterans

     * Henry Allingham, a British RAF (originally RNAS) airman, is the
       last living veteran of the Battle of Jutland. He is still alive as
       of September 6, 2006, aged 110.

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