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Battle of Britain

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: British History Post 1900

   Battle of Britain
   Part of World War II
   Heinkel He 111 over London, 7 September 1940

     Date   July, 1940 – May, 1941
   Location United Kingdom airspace, mostly over southern England
    Result  British victory
   Combatants

                               United Kingdom

                                   Germany

   Commanders
   Hugh Dowding Hermann Göring
   Albert Kesselring
   Strength
   700+ Grew to nearly 1000 during end of the Battle. 1,260 bombers, 316
   dive-bombers, 1,089 fighters
   Casualties
   1,547 aircraft, 27,450 civilian dead, 32,138 wounded 2,698 aircraft
                      Western Front (World War II)
   France - The Netherlands - Dunkirk - Britain - Dieppe -
   Villefranche-de-Rouergue - Normandy - Dragoon - Arnhem - Scheldt -
   Hurtgen Forest - Aachen - Bulge - Plunder - Varsity - Aintree

   One of the major campaigns of the early part of World War II, the
   Battle of Britain is the name commonly given to the attempt by the
   German Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force
   (RAF), before a planned sea and airborne invasion of Britain (
   Operation Sealion). Neither Hitler nor the German Wehrmacht believed it
   possible to carry out a successful amphibious assault on the British
   Isles until the Royal Air Force had been neutralised. Secondary
   objectives were to destroy aircraft production and ground
   infrastructure, as well as terrorising the British people with the
   intent of intimidating them into seeking an armistice or surrender and
   attacking areas of political interest.

   British historians regard the battle as running from 9 July to 31
   October 1940, which represented the most intense period of daylight air
   raiding. German historians begin the battle in mid-August 1940 and end
   it in May 1941, on the withdrawal of the bomber units in preparation
   for the attack on the USSR. The failure of Nazi Germany to destroy
   Britain's air forces to allow for an invasion or to break the spirit of
   either the British government or people is widely considered the Third
   Reich's first major defeat.

   Some historians have argued that no invasion could have succeeded given
   the massive superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kriegsmarine;
   Sealion would have been a disaster. They argue that the Luftwaffe would
   have been unable to prevent decisive intervention by RN cruisers and
   destroyers, even with air superiority.

   An Italian expeditionary force called Corpo Aereo Italiano also took
   part in the latter stages of battle on the German side. The Battle of
   Britain was the first major battle to be fought entirely in the air. It
   was the largest and most sustained bombing campaign yet attempted and
   the first real test of the strategic bombing theories that had emerged
   since the previous World War.

Background

   Following the British evacuation from Dunkirk and the French surrender
   in June 1940, the Germans were uncertain what to do next on the
   military front. Hitler believed the war was practically over and that
   the British, defeated on the continent and without European allies,
   would quickly be forced to come to terms with Germany. Although there
   was a strand of British public and political sentiment that favoured a
   negotiated peace with a clearly ascendant Germany, the
   recently-installed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill nonetheless
   refused to consider an armistice with the Nazis. Churchill's skilful
   use of rhetoric hardened public opinion against a peaceful resolution
   and prepared the British for a long war. Simultaneously coining the
   general term for the ensuing battle, Churchill stated in a speech to
   the House of Commons on 18 June 1940, that:

     What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over. I expect
     that the Battle of Britain is about to begin. Upon this battle
     depends the survival of Christian civilization. Upon it depends our
     own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and
     our Empire. The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be
     turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this
     Island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be
     free and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit
     uplands. But if we fail, then the whole world, including the United
     States, including all that we have known and cared for, will sink
     into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps
     more protracted, by the lights of perverted science. Let us
     therefore brace ourselves to our duties, and so bear ourselves that,
     if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand
     years, men will still say, " This was their finest hour."

   The British rejection of German terms was therefore emphatic.
   Recognising this - and in an effort to finish the war in the West -
   Hitler subsequently ordered the rapid preparation of an invasion plan
   against Britain on 16 July. Hitler hoped perhaps to frighten Britain
   into peace before an actual invasion was launched, and used the
   invasion preparations as a means to apply pressure. The plan was
   prepared by the OKW (Armed Forces High Command). The operation,
   code-named Seelöwe (Sea Lion), was planned for mid-September 1940 and
   called for landings on the south coast of Great Britain, backed by an
   airborne assault. All preparations were to be made by mid-August.

   The Kriegsmarine was reluctant to launch an invasion, and on 11 July,
   Admiral Raeder told Hitler that invasion could only be contemplated as
   a last resort, and only then with full air superiority. The
   Kriegsmarine had a limited number of ships, while the Royal Navy had
   over 50 destroyers and dozens of cruisers and battleships in home
   waters. Nevertheless, Hitler was determined that the invasion plan
   would go ahead, and ordered all services to make preparations for an
   amphibious assault once air superiority had been achieved. With control
   of the air, the Luftwaffe would have at least a chance of preventing
   Royal Navy interference.

   Therefore, the first task was to win air superiority. A plan was
   hatched to attack RAF airfields and aircraft production centres. The
   Luftwaffe commander, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring called his plan
   Adlerangriff (Eagle Attack), which would begin on 11 August, or
   Adlertag (Eagle Day), with an all-out attack. The attack had been
   scheduled to begin 9 days earlier, on the 2nd, but bad weather meant
   that it had to be postponed.

   Before the start of Adlertag, the Luftwaffe spent a month attacking
   convoys in the English Channel. This period of fighting was called
   Kanalkampf (Channel Battle) by the Germans and was used to test the
   RAF's defences and to lure their fighter aircraft up for a battle of
   attrition. The RAF thus dates the beginning of the battle from the
   first convoy attacks on 10 July 1940.

Luftwaffe strategy

   The German strategy was influenced by pre-war theories of strategic
   bombing that stressed the weakness of air defence and the effects of
   terror bombing on public morale. After the Spanish Civil War, the
   emphasis of German air operations had shifted toward a more tactical
   force. In Poland and France, the Luftwaffe had operated jointly with
   the Wehrmacht in its Blitzkrieg or "lightning war". In the Battle of
   Britain, however, the Luftwaffe had to operate alone, not as support
   for an advancing army but as a decisive weapon in its own right. There
   remained a strong belief in the power of strategic bombing and the
   battle was seen by Göring as an opportunity to prove what his air force
   could do.

   At the same time, the Luftwaffe was facing an opponent the likes of
   which it had not met before: a sizable, highly-coordinated,
   well-supplied air force, fielding aircraft every bit the match for the
   German Bf-109 and Bf-110. The majority of the RAF's fighting would rest
   upon the workhorse Hurricane Mk I. More shocking to the German pilots
   was the newer Spitfire Mk I, which was quickly recognised as a nimble,
   world-class fighter. The fighters they had encountered thus far in the
   war did not, despite strong showings by their pilots, measure up to the
   performance of the German Bf-109. Only the Spitfire was in a similar
   class.

   The Luftwaffe regrouped after the Battle of France into three
   Luftflotten (Air Fleets) on the UK's southern and northern flanks.
   Luftflotte 2, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, was
   responsible for the bombing of southeast England and the London area.
   Luftflotte 3, under Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle, targeted the
   West Country, Midlands, and northwest England. Luftflotte 5, led by
   Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff from his headquarters in Norway, was
   unleashed against the north of England and Scotland. As the battle
   progressed, command responsibility shifted, with Luftflotte 3 taking
   more responsibility for the night Blitz while the main attack fell upon
   Luftflotte 2's shoulders. Late in the battle, an Italian expeditionary
   force, the Corpo Aereo Italiano, briefly joined the fighting.

   Initial Luftwaffe estimates allotted four days to defeat the RAF's
   Fighter Command in southern England, followed by four weeks for the
   bombers and long-range fighters to mop up the rest of the country and
   destroy the UK's aircraft industry. The plan was to begin with attacks
   on airfields near the coast, gradually moving inland toward London and
   the ring of Sector airfields defending it.

   The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had
   differences of opinion on strategy. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Hugo
   Sperrle, wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing.
   His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Albert Kesselring, championed
   attacking London directly—either to bombard the British government into
   submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göring did
   nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders, obsessed
   as he was with maintaining his own power base in the Luftwaffe and
   indulging his outdated beliefs on air fighting, which were later to
   lead to tactical and strategic errors.

   The Luftwaffe was ill-served by its lack of intelligence on the British
   defences. The German intelligence services were fractured, driven by
   rivalries and their overall performance was amateurish. By 1940, there
   were few if any German agents operating in the UK and a handful of
   bungled attempts to insert spies into the country were foiled. This
   meant that the Luftwaffe had almost no recent knowledge of the workings
   of the RAF's air defences, in particular of the crucial command and
   control system that had been built before the war. Even when good
   information existed, such as 5th Abteilung's November 1939 assessment
   of Fighter Command strengths and capabilities, it was ignored if it did
   not match conventional preconceptions.

   Throughout the battle, the Luftwaffe was plagued by poor intelligence;
   as a result, the Luftwaffe had to launch numerous reconnaissance
   sorties. The Dornier 17s proved easy prey for British fighters, even
   though for the better part of the battle, they were escorted by a whole
   squadron of Messerschmitt Me 109s. As a result, for much of the battle,
   the Luftwaffe operated 'blind', unaware of their enemy's true
   strengths, capabilities and deployments. Many times the leadership
   believed that the Fighter Command's strength had collapsed, while raids
   against supposed fighter airfields fell instead on bomber or coastal
   defence installations. The results of bombing and air fighting were
   exaggerated, resulting in the Luftwaffe leadership becoming
   increasingly disconnected from reality. This lack of leadership and
   solid intelligence meant that the Germans did not adopt any consistent
   strategy, even when the RAF had its back to the wall.

The Dowding System

   The Battle of Britain campaign made the eight-gun monoplane fighters of
   the RAF—the Spitfire and Hurricane—into legends. The keystone of the
   British defence, however, was the complex infrastructure of detection,
   command, and control that ran the battle. This was known as the
   'Dowding System' after its chief architect, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh
   Dowding, the leader of RAF Fighter Command.

Groups

   The UK's airspace was divided up into four Groups.
     * 10 Group defended Wales and the West Country and was commanded by
       Air Vice-Marshal Sir Christopher Quintin-Brand.
     * 11 Group covered the southeast of England and the critical
       approaches to London and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Keith
       Park.
     * 12 Group defended the Midlands and East Anglia and was led by Air
       Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory.
     * 13 Group covered the north of England, Scotland and Northern
       Ireland and was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal Richard Saul.

   At the HQ of each Group (e.g. for 11 Group RAF Uxbridge) information
   from Fighter Command headquarters would be noted on plotting tables,
   large maps on which counters marking the incoming raids would be moved,
   and RAF officers known as Fighter Controllers could then order a
   response.

Sectors

   The Group areas were subdivided into Sectors; each commanding officer
   was assigned between two and four squadrons. Sector stations,
   comprising an aerodrome with a command post, were the heart of this
   organisation, though they also had satellite airfields to disperse
   squadrons to. When ordered by their Group HQ, the sector stations would
   'scramble' their squadrons into the air. Once airborne, the squadrons
   would be commanded by radio-telephone (R/T) from their sector station.
   Squadrons could be ordered to patrol airfields or vital targets, or be
   'vectored' to intercept incoming raids.

Limitations

   Though it was the most sophisticated air defence system in the world at
   that time, the Dowding System had many limitations, including, but not
   often stressed, its emphatic need for qualified ground maintenance
   personnel, many of whom had received their training under the Aircraft
   Apprentice scheme instituted by Hugh Trenchard. The RDF radar was
   subject to significant errors and the Observer Corps had difficulties
   tracking raids at night and in bad weather. R/T communications with
   airborne fighters were restricted because of the RAF's use of
   High-Frequency (HF) radio sets. HF radio was limited in range and even
   with a network of relay stations, the squadrons could not roam more
   than one or two sectors from their airfields. It was also restricted to
   a single frequency per squadron, making inter-squadron communication
   impossible. Finally, the system for tracking RAF fighters, known as
   HF/DF or " Huff-Duff", restricted sectors to a maximum of four
   squadrons in the air.

Efficiency

   In spite of this, RAF Fighter Command was able to achieve high levels
   of efficiency, at times achieving interception rates greater than 80%.
   The R/T problems were solved late in the battle with the adoption of
   Very High-Frequency (VHF) radio sets, which gave clearer voice
   communications, had longer range, and provided multiple channels. For
   all of its faults, the RAF's system of ground control directed its
   fighters to be where they were needed. The Luftwaffe, with no such
   system, was always at a disadvantage.

Effect of signals intelligence

   It is unclear how much the British intercepts of the Enigma cipher,
   used for high-security German radio communications, affected the
   battle. Ultra, the information obtained from Enigma intercepts, gave
   the highest echelons of the UK's command a view of German intentions
   but it seems that little of this material filtered down to Hugh
   Dowding's desk. However, the 'Y' radio listening service, monitoring
   the patterns of Luftwaffe radio traffic, contributed considerably to
   the early warning of raids.

Battle of the beams

          See Battle of the beams

   While the British were using radar more effectively than the Germans
   realised for air defence, the Luftwaffe had their own electronic means
   to increase their air attacks' effectiveness. One of the systems was
   called Knickebein ("crooked leg"), a system where carefully positioned
   radio transmitters in friendly territory broadcast specially targeted
   navigational beams that intersected over specific bombing targets in
   enemy territory. Bombers equipped with technology to detect these beams
   could be guided towards a target and receive a signal to drop their
   bombs when they were (roughly) overhead. This allowed for somewhat more
   accurate bombing at night when British air defence was at its weakest.

   Although British intelligence had heard of proposals for this system
   they were not taken seriously until a British science advisor to MI6,
   Reginald Victor Jones, gathered evidence of its existence and its
   threat. He then convinced the high command of the menace and confirmed
   it with special reconnaissance flights. Jones was put in charge of
   developing countermeasures which often involved interfering with the
   beams to make attacking aircraft go widely off course. Although the
   Germans resorted to other navigational systems, Jones and the
   Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) were able to neutralise
   each in turn. The result was markedly reduced precision bombing
   effectiveness for the Germans. With the beams no longer accurate,
   however, many civilian areas that would not normally have been targeted
   were bombed.

Luftwaffe tactics

   Bf 109E
   Enlarge
   Bf 109E

   The Luftwaffe varied its tactics considerably to try to find a way
   through the RAF defences. It launched many free-roving fighter sweeps,
   known as Freie Jagd or "Free Hunts" to try to draw up RAF fighters. RAF
   fighter controllers, however, were often able to detect the free hunts
   and manoeuvre squadrons around them to avoid a direct encounter. The
   Luftwaffe also tried using small formations of bombers as bait,
   covering them with large numbers of escorts. This was more successful,
   but escort duty tied the fighters to the bombers' slow speed and made
   them more vulnerable. Casualties were greatest among the escort units.

   Standard tactics for raids soon became an amalgam of techniques. A free
   hunt would precede a raid to try to sweep any defenders out of the
   raid's path. The bombers would then fly in at altitudes between 10,000
   and 16,000 feet, sometimes closely escorted by fighters. A 'detached'
   escort, or 'top cover' would fly above the bombers and maintain a
   distant watch.

   Luftwaffe tactics were influenced by their fighters, which were divided
   into single-engined Me 109s and twin-engine Me 110s. The Me 110
   Zerstörer (Destroyer fighters) proved to be too vulnerable to the
   nimble single-engined RAF fighters. Soon, they had to be given escorts
   of their own and were eventually restricted in their employment. This
   meant that the bulk of fighter duties fell on the Me 109. Fighter
   tactics were then complicated by the Luftwaffe bomber crews who
   demanded closer protection against the RAF. Because they had his ear
   after the hard-fought battles of 15 August and 18 August, Göring was
   only too pleased to order an increase in close escort duties. This
   shackled many Me 109s to the bombers and, though they were more
   successful at protecting the bombing forces, casualties amongst the
   fighters mounted.

RAF tactics

   An RAF Spitfire shortly before World War II.
   Enlarge
   An RAF Spitfire shortly before World War II.

   The weight of the battle fell upon the RAF's 11 Group. Keith Park's
   tactics were to dispatch individual squadrons to intercept raids. The
   intention was to subject attackers to continual attacks by relatively
   small numbers of aircraft and try to break up the tight formations of
   bombers. Once formations had fallen apart straggling bombers could be
   picked off one by one. Where multiple squadrons reached a raid the
   procedure was for the slower Hurricanes to tackle the bombers while the
   more agile Spitfires held up the fighter escort. This ideal was not
   always achieved, however, and sometimes the Spitfires and Hurricanes
   reversed roles.

   In the early phases of the battle the RAF was hamstrung by its reliance
   on obsolete fighting drills. These restricted their squadrons to tight
   12 aircraft formations composed of three-aircraft "sections" in tight
   "V's" nicknamed 'vics'. With four sections flying together in tight
   formation only the squadron leader at the front was free to actually
   watch for the enemy, the other pilots had to concentrate on him and
   each other. RAF fighter training also emphasised by-the-book attacks by
   sections breaking away in sequence. The German pilots dubbed the RAF
   formations "Idiotenreihen" ("rows of idiots") because they left
   squadrons vulnerable to attack. They employed the looser and more
   flexible four-ship 'Schwarme' developed in the Spanish Civil War, using
   two pairs each consisting of leader and wingman. The frontline RAF
   pilots were acutely aware of the inherent deficiencies of their own
   tactics. However, they could not radically change them as arriving
   replacement pilots, often with only minimal actual flying time, could
   not be readily retrained in the midst of battle. A compromise was
   adopted whereby squadron formations used much looser formations with
   one or two aircraft flying independently above and behind ( dubbed
   'weavers') to provide increased observation and rear protection. After
   the battle RAF pilots adopted a variant on the German formations with
   some success.

   The fact that 'sweeps' by German fighters not escorting bombers were
   often ignored by fighter command seems to reinforce the idea that
   Dowding sought always to preserve his fighter force to fight another
   day.

   During the battle, some commanders, notably Trafford Leigh-Mallory of
   12 Group, proposed that squadrons should be formed into Big Wings,
   consisting of at least three squadrons, to attack the enemy en masse, a
   method pioneered by the legless pilot Douglas Bader. Proponents of this
   tactic claimed that interceptions in large numbers caused greater enemy
   losses while reducing their own casualties. Opponents pointed out that
   the big wings would take too long to form up, and that the strategy ran
   a greater risk of fighters being caught on the ground refuelling. The
   big wing idea also caused pilots to over-claim their kills, due to the
   confusion of a more intense battle-zone. This led to the media belief
   that the big wings were far more effective than they actually were.
   A Hawker Hurricane at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and
   Space Museum.
   Enlarge
   A Hawker Hurricane at the Smithsonian Institution's National Air and
   Space Museum.

   The issue caused intense friction between Park and Leigh-Mallory, as
   Leigh-Mallory's 12 Group were tasked with protecting 11 Group's
   airfields whilst Park's squadrons intercepted incoming raids. However,
   the delay in forming up Big Wings meant that this air cover often did
   not arrive until after German bombers had hit 11 Group's airfields.
   Post-war analysis agrees that Dowding and Park's approach was best for
   11 Group. However, the controversy affected Park's career after the
   battle and contributed to Dowding's dismissal from Fighter Command.

Phases of the Battle

   The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:
     * 10 July – 11 August: Kanalkampf, the Channel battles.
     * 12 August – 23 August: Adlerangriff, the early assault against the
       coastal airfields.
     * 24 August – 6 September: the Luftwaffe targets the airfields. The
       critical phase of the battle.
     * 7 September onwards: the day attacks switch to British towns and
       cities.

Kanalkampf

   A pair of 264 Squadron Defiants. (PS-V was shot down on 28 August 1940
   over Kent by Bf 109s.)
   Enlarge
   A pair of 264 Squadron Defiants. (PS-V was shot down on 28 August 1940
   over Kent by Bf 109s.)

   The Kanalkampf comprised a series of running fights above convoys of
   freighter vessels running through the English Channel. In general,
   these battles off the coast tended to favour the Germans whose bomber
   escorts massively outnumbered the convoy patrols. Eventually the number
   of ship-sinkings became so great that the British Admiralty cancelled
   all further convoys through the Channel. However, these early fights
   provided both sides with experience. They also gave the first
   indications that some of the aircraft, such as the RAF's Defiant
   turret-fighter and the Luftwaffe's Me 110, were not up to the intense
   dog-fighting that would characterise the battle.

Adlerangriff

   The weather, which was to prove an important feature of the campaign,
   delayed Adlertag, or Eagle Day until 13 August. But on the 12th the
   first attempt was made to blind the Dowding system when aircraft from
   the specialist fighter-bomber unit Erprobungsgruppe 210 attacked four
   radar stations. Three stations were briefly taken off the air but were
   back working within six hours. The raids appeared to show that the
   British radars were difficult to knock out for any length of time. The
   Luftwaffe's failure to mount repeated attacks on them allowed the RAF
   to get the radar stations back on the air.

   Adlertag opened with a series of attacks on coastal airfields, used as
   forward landing grounds for the RAF fighters. As the week drew on, the
   airfield attacks moved further inland and repeated raids were made on
   the radar chain. 15 August saw "The Greatest Day" when the Luftwaffe
   mounted the largest number of sorties of the campaign. This day saw the
   one major intervention by Luftflotte 5 in the battle with an attack on
   the north of England. Believing the strength of Fighter Command to be
   concentrated away in the south, raiding forces from Denmark and Norway
   ran into strong resistance. Inadequately escorted by long-ranged Me 110
   Zerstörers, the bombers were shot down in large numbers. As a result of
   the casualties Luftflotte 5 would not appear in strength again in the
   campaign.
   Junkers Ju 87 Dive-Bombers
   Enlarge
   Junkers Ju 87 Dive-Bombers

   18 August, which saw the greatest number of casualties to both sides,
   has been dubbed "The Hardest Day". Following the grinding battles of
   the 18th, exhaustion and the weather reduced operations for most of a
   week, allowing the Luftwaffe to review their performance. "The Hardest
   Day" had sounded the end for the Ju 87 Stuka dive-bomber in the
   campaign. This veteran of the Blitzkrieg was simply too vulnerable to
   fighter attack over Britain and to preserve the Stuka force Göring
   withdrew it from the fighting. This removed the Luftwaffe's main
   precision-bombing weapon and shifted the burden of pin-point attacks on
   the already-stretched Erprobungsgruppe 210. But Göring was not
   finished: the Me 110 Zerstörer had proven itself too fragile for
   dog-fighting with single-engined fighters and its participation would
   also be scaled back. It would only be used when range required it or
   when sufficient single-engined escort could be provided.

   Göring made yet another fateful decision: to order more bomber escorts
   at the expense of free-hunting sweeps. To achieve this the weight of
   the attack now fell on Luftflotte 2 and most of the Me 109 forces in
   Luftflotte 3 were transferred to Kesselring's command, reinforcing the
   fighter bases in the Pas de Calais. Stripped of its fighters,
   Luftflotte 3 would concentrate on the night bombing campaign.

   Finally, Göring ordered the attacks on the radar chain stopped. The
   attacks were seen as unsuccessful and neither the technically inept
   Reichsmarschall nor his subordinates realised how vital the Chain Home
   stations were to the defence. It was known that radar provided some
   early warning of raids, but the belief amongst fighter pilots was that
   anything that brought up the ' Tommies' to fight was to be encouraged.

Luftwaffe targets RAF airfields

   From 24 August onwards, the battle was essentially a slugging match
   between Kesselring's Luftflotte 2 and Keith Park's 11 Group. The
   Luftwaffe concentrated all their strength on knocking out Fighter
   Command and made repeated attacks on the airfields. Of the 33 heavy
   attacks in the next two weeks, 24 were against airfields. The key
   sector stations were hit repeatedly: Biggin Hill and Hornchurch four
   times each, Debden and North Weald twice each. Croydon, Gravesend,
   Rochford, Hawkinge and Manston were also attacked in strength. No fewer
   than seven attempts were made against Eastchurch, which was not a
   Fighter Command aerodrome but was believed to be by the
   intelligence-starved Germans. At times these raids knocked out the
   sector stations, threatening the integrity of the Dowding system.
   Emergency measures had to be taken to keep the sectors operating.

   These were desperate times for the RAF, which was also taking many
   casualties in the air. Aircraft production could replace aircraft but
   replacement pilots were barely keeping place with losses, and novice
   flyers were being shot down in droves. Most replacements had as little
   as nine hours flying time and no combat training. At this point the
   multinational nature of the RAF came to the fore. With many pilots from
   the Dominions already serving in Fighter Command — Australians, South
   Africans, New Zealanders and Canadians — they were bolstered by the
   arrival of fresh Czechoslovak and Polish squadrons. These squadrons had
   been held back by Dowding, who mistakenly thought the non-English
   speaking aircrew would have trouble working within his control system.
   In addition there were other nationals, including Free French, Belgian
   and even a Palestinian Jewish pilot serving amongst the squadrons.

   The RAF at least had the advantage of fighting over home territory.
   Pilots who bailed out of their shot-down aircraft could be back at
   their airfields within hours. For Luftwaffe aircrews, a bail out over
   England meant capture, while parachuting into the English Channel often
   meant drowning or death from exposure. Morale began to suffer and
   Kanalkrankheit or 'Channel Sickness' — a form of combat fatigue — began
   to appear amongst the German pilots. Their replacement problem was even
   worse than the British. Though the Luftwaffe always maintained its
   numerical superiority, the slow appearance of replacement aircraft and
   pilots put increasing strain on the resources of the remaining
   attackers.

   And yet, the Luftwaffe was winning this battle of the airfields.
   Another fortnight of this pounding and the RAF might have been forced
   to withdraw their squadrons from the south of England. This was not
   clear to the Luftwaffe command, which had watched its bomber force
   start to waste away and had grown desperate to deliver on the original
   timetable. They could not understand why the RAF hadn't yet collapsed,
   or how they were always able to get fighters to the place they were
   needed, no matter how many raids were sent. Something needed to be done
   to force the RAF into a decisive battle.

   On 4 September, Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe to bomb London, following
   RAF raids on Berlin on the night of 25– 26 August, itself a reprisal
   after London and its suburbs had been damaged by bombs on several
   occasions in late August. The Berlin raid had hurt Göring's pride, as
   he had previously claimed the British would never be allowed to bomb
   the city. Kesselring seized his chance and proposed a strategy change.
   In the face of Sperrle's arguments that attacks on the airfields should
   continue, Kesselring persuaded the Reichsmarschall to attack London.
   The raids would either panic the British population into submission, or
   force the "last fifty Spitfires" into the sky where they could be
   annihilated. This attack was no longer seen as a prerequisite for
   Seelöwe, but was meant to be decisive in itself.

Raids on British Cities

   For several months prior to 7 September, when the first major London
   raid was launched, the Luftwaffe had bombed a series of British cities,
   killing more than 1,250 civilians in July and August. The 7 September
   raid targeted docks in the East End of the city, and over the coming
   days massive raids were launched again and again: some targeting the
   docks but others bombing indiscriminately. The RAF did come up but in
   greater numbers than the Luftwaffe expected. The 12 Group Big Wing was
   deployed for the first time, giving the German pilots a fright. Over
   the coming days the attacks on London continued. The break from bombing
   the airfields gave the RAF critical breathing space. It was the turning
   point.

   Without a doubt, the most damaging aspect of the switch to London was
   the longer range. The Me 109 escorts had a limited fuel capacity, and
   by the time they arrived over the city, they had only ten minutes of
   flying time before they had to turn for home. This left many raids
   completely undefended by fighter escorts. The Battle of Britain
   culminated on September 15, 1940 with two massive waves of German
   attacks that were decisively repulsed by the RAF. The total casualties
   on this critical day was 60 German aircraft shot down versus only 26
   for the RAF or a ratio of roughly 2:1 in favour of the RAF. The German
   defeat caused Hitler to order, two days later, the postponement of
   preparations for the invasion of Britain. Henceforth, in the face of
   mounting losses in men, aircraft and the lack of adequate replacements,
   the Luftwaffe switched from daylight bombing raids to night-time
   attacks instead. The threat of invasion was essentially over although
   the German night blitz on London and other British cities continued
   into 1941.

Aftermath

   Overall, the Battle of Britain was a stalemate for both the Germans and
   the British, but it dramatically raised the morale of the Allied
   forces. The Battle of Britain marked the first time that the Nazis were
   stopped and that air superiority became clearly seen as the key to the
   war. Though the battle was small in the number of combatants and
   casualties, had the Germans triumphed the war would have taken a very
   different path. The British victory marked the first failure of
   Hitler's war machine. It also signaled a shift in U.S. opinion at a
   time when many people from the U.S. believed that the UK could not
   survive, a view promoted by Joseph Kennedy, the U.S. ambassador in
   London and father of John F. Kennedy, the future President of the
   United States.

   Both sides in the battle made exaggerated claims of numbers of enemy
   aircraft shot down. In general, claims were two to three times the
   actual numbers, due to confusion in the whirling air battles. However,
   post-war analysis of records has shown that between July and September
   the RAF claimed over 2,698 kills for 1,023 fighter aircraft lost to all
   causes, while the Luftwaffe fighters claimed 3,198 RAF aircraft downed
   for losses of 1,887, of which 873 were fighters. The 147 Polish pilots
   scored 201 out of that number. To the RAF figure should be added an
   additional 376 Bomber Command and 148 Coastal Command aircraft that
   conducted vital bombing, mining and reconnaissance operations in
   defence of the country.

   Modern military historians have suggested the battle was unwinnable for
   the Luftwaffe. Their numerical majority was not sufficient to achieve
   superiority. Dowding's and Park's strategy of choosing when to engage
   the enemy whilst maintaining a coherent force was totally vindicated.

   The theories of strategic bombing, which hinged on the collapse of
   public morale, were undone by British defiance in the face of the day
   and night Blitzes. The switch to a terror bombing strategy allowed the
   RAF to recuperate and to defend against the attacks. Even if the
   attacks on the 11 Group airfields had continued, the British could have
   withdrawn to the Midlands, out of German fighter range, and continued
   the battle from there. Post-war records show that British aircraft were
   being replaced faster than those of the Germans; the RAF maintained its
   strength even as the Luftwaffe's declined. In losses of aircraft and
   experienced aircrew the battle was a blow from which the Luftwaffe
   never fully recovered.

   The terror strategy in itself could not force the British to surrender.
   Even though the Germans launched some spectacular attacks against
   important British industries, they could not destroy the British
   industrial potential. But hindsight does not disguise the fact that the
   threat to the RAF was very real and for the participants, it seemed as
   if there was a "Narrow Margin" between victory and defeat. The victory
   was as much psychological as physical. It turned a tide of defeats and
   heartened the enemies of Nazism.

   The British triumph in the Battle of Britain was not without heavy
   cost. Total British civilian losses from July to December 1940 were
   23,002 dead and 32,138 wounded, with one of the largest single raids
   occurring on December 29, 1940, in which almost 3,000 civilians died.

   Winston Churchill summed up the effect of the battle and the
   contribution of the RAF in the immortal words: "Never in the field of
   human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few". Pilots who
   fought in the battle have been known as The Few ever since.

   September 15 is celebrated in the United Kingdom as "Battle of Britain
   Day", marking the climactic battles witnessed above London in daylight.

   In British military tradition, the Battle of Britain is remembered with
   at least as much pride as the Battle of Trafalgar or the Battle of
   Waterloo. In addition, the battle has entered popular legend around the
   world as an inspiring story of how a small island, standing alone
   against Nazi tyranny, managed to defeat a powerful enemy.

   Most important, the end of the Battle of Britain allowed the UK to
   rebuild its military forces and establish itself as an Allied
   stronghold. Britain later served as a base from which Operation
   Overlord, aka the Battle of Normandy, was launched against Nazi forces
   in Europe.

Foreign contribution

   The RAF roll of honour for the Battle of Britain recognises 510
   overseas pilots as flying at least one authorised operational sortie
   with an eligible unit of the Royal Air Force or Fleet Air Arm between
   10 July and 31 October 1940. This included pilots from Poland, New
   Zealand, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Belguim, Australia, South Africa,
   France, Ireland, United States of America, Jamaica, Palestine and
   Southern Rhodesia.
   Retrieved from " http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain"
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   with only minor checks and changes (see www.wikipedia.org for details
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