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Attack on Pearl Harbour

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: World War II

   Attack on Pearl Harbour
   Part of the Pacific Theatre of World War II
   Ships burning in Pearl Harbour after the attack

   Date December 7, 1941
   Location Pearl Harbour, Hawaiʻi
   Result Decisive Japanese victory,
   United States declares war on the Empire of Japan and enters World War
   II on side of Allies,
   Nazi Germany declares war on the United States.
   Casus belli Oil and trade embargo by the United States.
   Combatants
   United States Empire of Japan
   Commanders
   Husband Kimmel ( USN),
   Walter Short ( USA) Chuichi Nagumo (IJN),
   Mitsuo Fuchida ( IJNAS)
   Strength
   8 battleships,
   8 cruisers,
   29 destroyers,
   9 submarines,
   ~50 other ships,
   ~390 planes 6 aircraft carriers,
   2 battleships,
   3 cruisers,
   9 destroyers,
   8 tankers,
   23 fleet submarines,
   5 midget submarines,
   441 planes
   Casualties
   2,335 military and 68 civilians killed,
   1,143 military and 35 civilians wounded,
   4 battleships sunk,
   4 battleships damaged,
   3 cruisers damaged,
   3 destroyers sunk,
   2 other ships sunk,
   188 planes destroyed,
   155 planes damaged 55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured,
   29 planes destroyed,
   5 midget submarines sunk
   Pacific campaigns 1941-42
   Pearl Harbour – Thailand – Malaya – Wake – Hong Kong – Philippines –
   Dutch East Indies – New Guinea – Singapore – Australia – Indian Ocean –
   Doolittle Raid – Solomons – Coral Sea – Midway
                              Pacific Ocean campaign
   Pearl Harbour – Wake Island – Doolittle Raid – Midway – Aleutian
   Islands – Guadalcanal – Solomon Islands – Gilbert and Marshall Islands
   – Marianas and Palau – Volcano and Ryūkyū Islands

   The Attack on Pearl Harbour was a surprise attack on Pearl Harbour,
   Oʻahu, Hawaiʻi, USA launched by 1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese
   Navy on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 ( Hawaiʻi time). It was
   aimed at the Pacific Fleet of the United States Navy and its defending
   Army Air Corps and Marine defensive squadrons as preemptive war
   intended to neutralize the American forces in the Pacific in an
   impending World War II. Pearl Harbour, was actually only one of a
   number of military and naval installations which were attacked,
   including those on the other side of island.

   The attack destroyed 8 American battleships, severely damaged 9 other
   warships, destroyed 188 aircraft, and killed 2,403 American servicemen
   and 68 civilians. However, the Pacific Fleet's three aircraft carriers
   were not in port and so were undamaged, as were the base's vital oil
   tank farms, Navy Yard and machine shops, submarine base, and power
   station, as well as the Headquarters Building (home to the intelligence
   unit HYPO). These provided the basis for the Pacific Fleet's campaign
   during the rest of the War.

Background

   After the Meiji Restoration, the Empire of Japan embarked on a period
   of rapid economic, political, and military expansion in an effort to
   achieve military, economic, and political parity with the European and
   North American powers. The expansion strategy included extending
   territorial and economic control to increase access to natural
   resources which were thought needed to sustain and accelerate growth.

   As a result, Japan embarked on a number of projects which caused
   confrontations with many other countries. These included the war with
   China in 1894 in which Japan took control of Taiwan, and the war with
   Russia in 1904 by which Japan gained territory in and around China and
   the Korean peninsula. After World War I, the League of Nations awarded
   Japan custody of most of Imperial Germany's possessions and colonies in
   the Far East and Pacific waters. In 1931, Japan forcibly imposed a
   "puppet" state in Manchuria which they called Manchukuo.

   From about 1910 through the 1930s Japan had been extensively
   militarized after considerable internal conflict (eg, assassinations of
   Opposition leaders) and built a large and modern Navy (third largest in
   the world at the time) and Army. In 1937, Imperial Army officers staged
   a provocation at the Marco Polo Bridge, beginning a large-scale
   invasion of mainland China, involving attacks from Manchuria and
   several points along China's Pacific coast.

   The League of Nations, the U.S., the UK, Australia, and the
   Netherlands, which had territorial interests in Southeast Asia and the
   Philippines, disapproved of the Japanese attacks on China, condemning
   them and applying diplomatic pressure. Japan resigned from the League
   of Nations in response. In July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911
   U.S./Japanese commerce treaty, which both showed official
   disapprobation and removed legal barriers to imposition of trade
   embargoes. Japan continued its military campaign in China and signed
   the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, formally ending World War I
   hostilities, and declaring common interests. In 1940, Japan signed the
   Tripartite Pact with Germany and Fascist Italy to form the Axis Powers.

   These Japanese actions led the U.S. to embargo scrap metal and
   gasoline, and to close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. The
   situation worsened, and in 1941 Japan moved into northern Indochina.
   The U.S. response was to freeze Japan's assets in the U.S. and to
   declare a complete oil embargo. Oil was Japan's most crucial resource;
   her own supplies were very limited, and 80% of Japan's imports came
   from the U.S. The Imperial Navy relied entirely on imported bunker oil
   stocks.

   There was considerable division in the Japanese high command. The Army
   wanted to "go south", intending to capture oil and mineral reserves in
   the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was certain this would bring the U.S.
   into the war. To forestall American interference, an attack on the
   Pacific Fleet was considered essential. (The certainty of American aid
   to Britain in the Pacific is far from clear, and was even at the time.)

   Diplomatic negotiations with the U.S. climaxed with the Hull note of
   November 26, 1941, which Prime Minister Hideki Tojo described to his
   cabinet as an ultimatum. Japanese leaders felt they had to choose
   between complying with U.S. and UK demands — backing down from its
   actions in China and surrounding areas — and continuing expansion.
   Concerned about losing status and prestige in the international
   community (" loss of face") if compelled to comply, and with the
   perceived threat to national survival posed by the Western Powers, the
   Japanese leadership (under Emperor Hirohito) decided to implement
   contingency plans, choosing war with the United States, United Kingdom,
   and the Netherlands as a direct response.

   On September 4, 1941, at the second of two Imperial Conferences
   attended by the Emperor considering an attack on Pearl Harbour, the
   Japanese Cabinet met to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial
   General Headquarters. It was decided that:

     Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defence and self-preservation,
     will complete preparations for war ... [and is] ... resolved to go
     to war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if
     necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic
     measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby
     endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no
     prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October
     through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will
     immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United
     States, Britain and the Netherlands.

Japanese preparations

   Ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense
   Force
   Enlarge
   Ensign of the Imperial Japanese Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense
   Force
   Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Imperial
   Japanese Navy and the implementer at the throne
   Enlarge
   Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the Imperial
   Japanese Navy and the implementer at the throne

   Several Navy officers had been impressed with Admiral Andrew
   Cunningham's Operation Judgement (the Battle of Taranto), where 20
   nearly-obsolete Fairey Swordfish, launched from an carrier far from the
   main British base at Alexandria, disabled half the Italian battle fleet
   and forced its withdrawal from Mediterranean combat. Admiral Isoroku
   Yamamoto dispatched a naval study delegation to Italy, which concluded
   a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could
   force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to bases in California, allowing time and
   space for Japan to achieve the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"
   — shorthand for control of the resources (especially oil reserves) of
   Southeast Asia (including the Dutch East Indies), with a defensible
   depth buffer around them. Most importantly, the delegation returned to
   Japan with information about the shallow running torpedoes Cunningham's
   "boffins" had devised.

   Additionally, some Japanese strategists may have been influenced by
   U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's approach in the 1932 joint Army-Navy
   exercises, which assumed an invasion of Hawaiʻi. Yarnell, as commander
   of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of Oʻahu in rough
   weather and launched "attack" planes on the morning of Sunday, February
   7, 1932. Umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious
   "damage" on the defenders, who were unable to locate his fleet for 24
   hours after the attack. Conventional U.S. Navy doctrine of the time
   (and other naval opinion as well) believed any attacking force would be
   destroyed by the battleship force (the "battle line") and dismissed
   Yarnell's strategy as impractical in the real world.
   Major General Minoru Genda
   Enlarge
   Major General Minoru Genda

   Yamamoto began considering such an attack early in 1941 as a
   pre-emptive attack, and assigned Minoru Genda of the IJN to plan it.
   Genda developed the attack plan which used, and stressed that surprise
   would be essential given the expected balance of forces; with surprise,
   he evaluated the attack as "hard, but not impossible." Yamamoto
   understood Japan was not in a position to fight the U.S and it probable
   allies. After some pressure on Naval Headquarters (including a threat
   to resign), he managed to get permission to begin formal planning and
   training for the proposed attack. The events of the summer (see above)
   led to preliminary approval of the attack plan at an Imperial
   Conference (including the Emperor), then approval of the attack in
   another Conference (also including the Emperor) early in November.
   Zuikaku
   Enlarge
   Zuikaku
   The Japanese fleet steamed towards Pearl Harbor undetected.
   Enlarge
   The Japanese fleet steamed towards Pearl Harbour undetected.

   The intent of the attack on Pearl Harbour was to neutralize American
   naval power in the Pacific, if only temporarily, as part of a
   theatre-wide, near-simultaneous coordinated attack against several
   different countries. Yamamoto himself expected even a successful attack
   would gain (at best) only a year or so of freedom of action before the
   U.S. recovered enough to check Japan's advances. Preliminary planning
   for a Pearl Harbor attack in support of military advance elsewhere
   began in January 1941, and, after some Imperial Navy factional
   infighting, the project was finally judged worthy. Training for the
   mission was under way by mid-year. The planned attack depended
   primarily on torpedoes, but torpedoes of the time required deep water
   to function when air-launched. This was a critical problem because
   Pearl Harbour is shallow, except in dredged channels. Over the summer
   of 1941, Japan secretly created and tested aircraft torpedo
   modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort
   resulted in the Type 95 torpedo which inflicted most of the damage to
   U.S. ships during the attack. Japanese weapons technicians also
   produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release
   shackles to 14 and 16 inch (356 and 406mm) naval shells. These were
   able to penetrate the armored decks of battleships and cruisers from
   10,000 feet (3000m).

   On November 26, 1941, a fleet including six aircraft carriers, two
   battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, eight tankers, 23 fleet
   submarines, five midget submarines, 441 planes commanded by Vice
   Admiral Chuichi Nagumo left Hitokappu Bay in the Kuril Islands bound
   for Hawaiʻi under strict radio silence.
   Aircraft carrier Hiryu
   Enlarge
   Aircraft carrier Hiryu

   The aircraft carriers were: Akagi, Hiryū, Kaga, Shōkaku, Sōryū, and
   Zuikaku. Two fast battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 9
   destroyers, and 3 fleet submarines provided escort for the task force.
   The carriers had a total of 423 planes, including Mitsubishi A6M (Type
   0) fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), Nakajima
   B5N (Type 97) torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and Aichi D3A
   (Type 99) dive bombers (Allied codename "Val"). Japan's task force, and
   its air group, were larger than any prior aircraft carrier-based strike
   force. Accompanying the force were eight oilers for refueling. In
   addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet submarines
   and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines which were to
   gather intelligence and sink any U.S. vessels that might try to flee
   Pearl Harbour during or after the attack.

United States preparedness

   Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
   Enlarge
   Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander-in-chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
   Battleship Row presented an attractive concentration of targets.
   Enlarge
   Battleship Row presented an attractive concentration of targets.

   U.S. civilian and military intelligence forces had, between them, good
   information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the
   summer and fall before the attack. None of it specifically indicated an
   attack against Pearl Harbor. Public press reports during summer and
   fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the
   growing tension and on developments in the Pacific. During November,
   all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were
   explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future,
   in the Philippines, Indochina, or Russia. The warnings were not
   specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was considered
   likely in the short term and that all commands should act accordingly.
   Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status, the attack
   would have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps might have
   caused less death and damage. Conversely, recall of men to the ships
   might have led to still more being casualties, and closing watertight
   doors might have left more trapped in capsized ships. When the attack
   arrived, Pearl Harbour was unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons were not
   manned, ammunition was locked down, anti-submarine measures were not
   implemented (e.g., no submarine nets), combat air patrols not flying,
   available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, aircraft
   parked wingtip to wingtip to lessen sabotage risks, and so on.

   U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence
   Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G unit, had
   intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval
   cipher traffic, though none of those decrypted carried significant
   tactical military information. Decryption and distribution of this
   intelligence was capricious and sporadic, and has been blamed on lack
   of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory,
   or insufficiently distributed. It was also incompletely understood by
   decision makers, and poorly unanalyzed. Nothing pointed directly to an
   attack at Pearl Harbor, and lack of awareness of the Imperial Navy's
   capabilities led to an underlying belief Pearl Harbour was safely out
   of harm's way. Only one Hawaiian message (6 December 1941), in a
   consular cipher, included mention of an attack on Pearl, and it was not
   decrypted until 8 December 1941. )
   Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post
   at Pearl Harbor.
   Enlarge
   Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commanding general of the Army post
   at Pearl Harbour.

   In 1924, General Billy Mitchell delivered a 324 page report to his
   superiors warning of a future war with Japan, possibly including an
   air-attack on Pearl Harbour; he was essentially ignored. Navy Secretary
   Knox had also appreciated the possibility in a written analysis shortly
   after taking office. American commanders had also been warned tests
   demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were possible, but
   no one in charge in Hawaiʻi fully appreciated that fact. Nevertheless,
   believing Pearl Harbour had natural defenses against torpedo attack
   (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy failed to deploy torpedo nets or
   baffles, which they judged an interference with ordinary operations,
   and so a low priority. Due to a shortage of long-range aircraft
   (including Army Air Corps bombers, by a prewar arrangement),
   reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often as required for
   adequate coverage. The Navy had only 16 operational PBYs long range
   aircraft. General Short was low on the priority list for additional
   B-17s in the Pacific, as General MacArthur in the Philippines was
   calling for as many as could be made. At the time of the attack, Army
   and Navy air defence were both on training status rather than on alert.
   There was confusion about the Army's alert status as Short had changed
   the designations without keeping higher commands informed. Most of the
   Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked
   down in separate armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, in
   keeping with Washington's admonitions not to alarm civil populations
   (eg, in the late November war warning messages from Navy and War
   Departments), officers did not keep guns dispersed around the navy base
   (i.e., on private property). As well, aircraft were parked on airfields
   to lessen against sabotage risks, not air attack.

Breaking off negotiations

   Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off
   negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began.
   Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, including the
   Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and special
   representative Saburo Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with
   the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move
   into Indochina in the summer (see above).

   In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the
   Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encoded with the PURPLE
   cryptographic machine), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of
   State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m. Washington time (In fact, Japan halted all
   further communication with the U.S. 30 minutes before the attack was
   scheduled to begin). The last part arrived not long before the attack
   but, because of decryption and typing delays, and because Tokyo had
   neglected to inform them of the crucial necessity to deliver it on
   time, Embassy personnel failed to deliver the message at the specified
   time. The last part, breaking off negotiations

     Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire
     with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts
     toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new
     order in East Asia ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese
     government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and
     promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the
     American Government has finally been lost

   was delivered to Secretary Hull several hours after the Pearl Harbour
   attack.

   The United States had decrypted the last part of the final message well
   before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before a fair typed
   copy of the decrypt was finished. It was decryption of the last part
   with its instruction for the time of delivery which prompted General
   George Marshall to send the famous warning message to Hawaii that
   morning. It was actually delivered, by a young Japanese-American cycle
   messenger, to Gen. Walter Short at Pearl Harbour several hours after
   the attack had ended. The delay was due to an inability to locate
   General Marshall after decryption and translation of the 14th part (he
   was out for a morning horseride), trouble with the Army's long distance
   communication system, a decision not to use Navy facilities to transmit
   it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable
   facilities. Somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced during its
   travels and it was delayed by several additional hours.

   Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings
   on the attack after the War, established that the Japanese government
   had not written any declaration of war until after they heard of the
   successful attack on Pearl Harbour. That two-line declaration of war
   was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours
   after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the United
   States where it was received late Monday afternoon.

The attack

Japanese tactics for attack

   The two attack sorties of Imperial Japanese Navy approached from
   different directions. The U.S. radar which detected them 136 miles (218
   km) away is at the top of this map.
   Enlarge
   The two attack sorties of Imperial Japanese Navy approached from
   different directions. The U.S. radar which detected them 136 miles (218
   km) away is at the top of this map.

   Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided to implement, and carried out, two
   waves of air attack. A third attack was suggested by air officers, but
   Nagumo declined. The first wave of attack consisted of 49 level
   bombers, 51 dive bombers, 40 torpedo bombers and 43 fighter planes (a
   total of 183 planes) started from north of Oahu, led by
   Lieutenant-Commander Mitsuo Fuchida. The second wave consisted of 54
   level bombers, 78 dive bombers and 35 fighter planes (a total of 167
   airplanes), launched from much the same location. There were also
   supporting submarines and midget submarines assigned to engage US ships
   leaving the harbour. The location of the attack force remained unknown
   to the US until after they had left to return to the Eastern Pacific;
   they were not located and several searches were made to the south of
   Oahu. The total planes involved in the aerial attack were 350, and rest
   of the 91 were engaged in protection of aircraft carriers and other
   ships during the attack.

   The first attack wave was divided into six formations with one directed
   to Wheeler Field; the second wave was divided into four formations with
   one formation tasked to Kāneʻohe Marine Corps Base away from Pearl
   Harbour proper and the rest sent against the main naval base. The
   separate sections of the attacking aircraft arrived at the attack point
   almost simultaneously, from several directions. The most vulnerable
   torpedo bombers made the first attack followed by the dive and level
   bombers and fighters.

The battle

   Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and commander of the 1st Air Fleet was the
   actual commander of the task force.
   Enlarge
   Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo and commander of the 1st Air Fleet was the
   actual commander of the task force.

   Even before Nagumo began launching, at 04.30 Hawaiian Time, minesweeper
   USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the Harbour entrance and
   alerted destroyer Ward. Ward carried out a fruitless search. The first
   shots fired and the first casualties in the attack on Pearl Harbour
   occurred when Ward attacked and sank a midget submarine at 06:37. Five
   Ko-hyoteki-class midgets had been assigned to torpedo U.S. ships after
   the bombing started. None of these made it back safely, and only four
   out of the five have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard the
   five submarines, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was
   captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war in World War II.
   Sakamaki's survival was considered traitorous by the Japanese, who
   referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods." United States
   Naval Institute photographic analysis conducted in 1999 indicates one
   entered the harbour and successfully fired a torpedo into the West
   Virginia, in what appears to have been the first shot by the attacking
   Japanese. The final disposition of this submarine is unknown. The 1st
   Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy attack was coordinated by
   Lieutenant-Commander Mitsuo Fuchida of the Imperial Japanese Navy Air
   Service. He flew and led the first strike formation.
   Lieutenant-Commander Mitsuo Fuchida
   Enlarge
   Lieutenant-Commander Mitsuo Fuchida
   Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service bombers prepare to take off.
   Enlarge
   Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service bombers prepare to take off.

   On the morning of the attack, the Army's Opana Point station (an
   SCR-270 radar, located near the northern tip of Oahu), which had not
   entered official service, having long been in training mode, detected
   the Japanese planes, but the warning was confused by an untrained new
   officer (Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler) at the new and only partially
   activated Intelligence Centre. Although the operators at Opana Point
   reported an aircraft sighting larger than anything they had ever seen,
   the watch officer assumed the pending, scheduled arrival of 6 B-17
   bombers was the cause due to the direction from which the aircraft were
   coming, and because the radar operators had only seen the first element
   of incoming attackers. In addition, some commercial US shipping may
   have reported "unusual" radio traffic in the preceding days.

   Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the air attack approached land;
   one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings were
   still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the air raid
   began. It is not clear that these forewarnings would have had much
   effect even if they had been interpreted perfectly and much more
   promptly. The results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were
   essentially the same as at Pearl Harbour, though there, MacArthur had
   nine hours of warning that the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and
   specific orders to commence operations).
   Bombers from the IJN's aircraft carrier Shokaku prepare to take off
   Enlarge
   Bombers from the IJN's aircraft carrier Shokaku prepare to take off

   .

   The attack on Pearl Harbour began at 7:53 a.m. December 7 Hawaiian
   Time; this was 3:23 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time. Japanese
   planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353 planes reached Oʻahu.
   Vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave of 183 planes, exploiting
   the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships (eg,
   aircraft carriers, battleships, etc), while dive bombers attacked U.S.
   air bases across Oʻahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and
   Wheeler Field, the principal fighter base. The 170 planes in the second
   wave attacked Bellows Field and Ford Island, a Marine and Naval air
   station in the middle of Pearl Harbour. The only significant air
   opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks that
   flew 25 sorties, and from naval anti-aircraft fire.
   Wreck of a midget submarine.
   Enlarge
   Wreck of a midget submarine.

   Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of bombs exploding and cries
   of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All hands on deck, we're being
   bombed." (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbour. This is not a
   drill." was issued by Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commanding Navy air
   patrol squadrons, from his headquarters on Ford Island.) Despite the
   lack of preparation, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft
   parked wing to wing against sabotage, and a lack of heightened alert
   status, there were many American military personnel who served with
   distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, and Captain
   Franklin Van Valkenburgh, commander of the Arizona, both rushed to the
   bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in
   the forward ammunition magazine, due to an armor piercing bomb hit next
   to one of the forward main turrets. Both were posthumously awarded the
   Medal of Honour. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, Nevada, under way
   from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers got
   underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more
   than a year's sea duty. That ship operated for four days at sea before
   its commanding officer caught up with it. Captain Mervyn Bennion,
   commanding West Virginia, led his men until he was cut down by
   fragments from a bomb hit in Tennessee, moored alongside. The earliest
   aircraft kill credit went to submarine Tautog, which claimed the first
   attacker downed. Probably the most famous single defender is Doris
   "Dorie" Miller, an African-American cook aboard West Virginia, who went
   beyond the call of duty when he took control of an unattended
   anti-aircraft gun, on which he had no training, and used it to fire on
   attacking planes, downing at least one, even while bombs were hitting
   his ship. He was awarded the Navy Cross. In all, 14 sailors and
   officers were awarded the Medal of Honour. A special military award,
   the Pearl Harbour Commemorative Medal, was later authorized to all
   military veterans of the attack.
   Torpedo exploding into USS West Virginia, as seen from Japanese plane.
   Enlarge
   Torpedo exploding into USS West Virginia, as seen from Japanese plane.

   Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,403 Americans
   died (68 were civilians, many killed by American anti-aircraft shrapnel
   and shells landing in civilian areas, including Honolulu), a further
   1,178 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.

   Nearly half of the American fatalities — 1,102 men — were caused by the
   explosion and sinking of Arizona. She was destroyed when a modified
   40 cm naval gun shell, dropped from a bomber, smashed through two
   armored decks and detonated in the forward main magazine. The hull of
   Arizona has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom
   remain within the ship. It continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil,
   nearly 70 years after the attack.

   Nevada attempted to exit the harbor, but was beached to avoid blocking
   the harbour entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward,
   Nevada was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway,
   sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as it beached.

   California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have
   kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were
   raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia
   drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it
   was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West
   Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away the
   ship's rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above
   her side armor belt which caused it to capsize. Maryland was hit by two
   of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

   Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels
   present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena
   was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the
   neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed
   when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire,
   flooding the dry dock with water made the oil and fire rise, and that
   burned out the ships. The light cruiser Raleigh was hit by a torpedo
   and holed. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in
   service. The destroyer Cassin capsized, and destroyer Downes was
   heavily damaged. The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona,
   was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also
   damaged.

   Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed and
   155 of those damaged were hit on the ground, where most had been parked
   wingtip to wingtip in central positions to minimize sabotage
   vulnerability. Attacks on barracks killed additional pilots and other
   personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes (including at
   least one inbound from Enterprise).

   Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the
   action. Of Japan's 441 available planes (350 took part in the attack),
   29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in
   the second), another 74 were damaged by antiaircraft and machine gun
   fire from the ground. Over 20 of the aircraft that safely landed on
   their carriers could not be salvaged.

Nagumo's decision to withdraw after two strikes

   The forward magazines of the USS Arizona exploded after it was hit by a
   bomb dropped by Tadashi Kusumi.
   Enlarge
   The forward magazines of the USS Arizona exploded after it was hit by a
   bomb dropped by Tadashi Kusumi.

   Some senior officers and flight leaders urged Nagumo to attack with a
   third strike to destroy the oil storage depots, machine shops, and dry
   docks at Pearl Harbour. The United States had considered the
   vulnerability of the fuel oil storage tanks before the war and secretly
   started construction of the bomb resistant Red Hill fuel tanks before
   Japan's attack. Destruction of these facilities would have greatly
   increased the U.S. Navy's difficulties, as the nearest immediately
   usable fleet facilities would have been several thousand miles east of
   Hawaiʻi on America's West Coast. Some military historians have
   suggested that the destruction of oil tanks and repair facilities would
   have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet more seriously than the loss of
   several battleships. Nagumo decided to forgo a third attack in favour
   of withdrawing for several reasons:
     * Anti-aircraft performance during the second strike was much
       improved over that during the first, and two-thirds of Japan's
       losses happened during the second wave, due in part to the
       Americans being alerted. A third strike could have been expected to
       suffer still worse losses.
     * The first two strikes had essentially used all the previously
       prepped aircraft available, so a third strike would have taken some
       time to prepare, perhaps allowing the Americans time to find and
       attack Nagumo's force. The location of the American carriers was
       and remained unknown to Nagumo.
     * The Japanese pilots had not practiced an attack against the Pearl
       Harbour shore facilities and organizing such an attack would have
       taken still more time, though several of the strike leaders urged a
       third strike anyway.

   Fuel farm at left, Submarine Base (right center). October 1941.
   Enlarge
   Fuel farm at left, Submarine Base (right centre). October 1941.
     * The bunker fuel situation did not permit remaining on station north
       of Pearl Harbour much longer. The Japanese force were acting at the
       limit of their logistical ability. To remain in those waters for
       much longer would have risked running unacceptably low on fuel.
     * The timing of a third strike would have been such that aircraft
       would probably have returned to their carriers after dark. Night
       operations from aircraft carriers were in their infancy in 1941,
       and neither Japan nor anyone else had developed reliable techniques
       and doctrine.
     * The second strike had essentially completed the entire mission:
       neutralization of the American Pacific Fleet.
     * There was the simple danger of remaining near one place for too
       long. Japan was very fortunate to have escaped detection during
       their voyage from the Inland Sea to Hawaiʻi. The longer they
       remained off Hawaiʻi, the more danger they were in from U.S.
       submarines and the absent American carriers.
     * The carriers were needed to support the main Japanese attack toward
       the "Southern Resources Area" (i.e., the Philippines, the Dutch
       East Indies, Malaya, and Burma) which was intended to capture
       control of oil and other resources. Japanese leaders (especially
       the Army) had been reluctant to allow the attack at all as it took
       air cover from the southern thrust, and Nagumo was under strict
       orders not to risk his command any more than necessary. As the war
       games during the planning of the attack had predicted that from two
       to four carriers might be lost in the attack, Nagumo must have been
       very happy to suffer no losses and very probably did not want to
       push his luck.

Additional U.S. losses on 7 December 1941

   The Japanese submarine I-26 sank the Cynthia Olson, a U.S. Army
   chartered schooner, off the coast of San Francisco with a loss of 35
   lives.

Subsequent attacks

   Later during the War several other, small-scale, attacks were also made
   on Pearl Harbour.

   In March, 1942, in Operation K-1, a preparation for the Midway
   invasion, two Japanese H8K flying-boats, based at Wotje in the Marshall
   Islands, were tasked with reconnaissance to see how repairs were
   progressing, and to bomb the important "Ten-ten" repair dock. The
   distance involved required refueling en route, and was done from
   submarines at French Frigate Shoals, 500 miles (800 km) north-west of
   Pearl Harbour. Poor visibility hampered the mission, and the bombs were
   dropped some miles from their target.

   Five Japanese submarines supported the operation: I-9 as a radio
   beacon; I-19, I-15 and I-26 to refuel the flying boats and I-23 to
   provide weather reports. However, I-23 was lost without trace.

   American ships were posted to the Shoals thereafter, which precluded
   another attempt using the same approach.

Rumors

   During the first days following the attack, rumors began to circulate.
   One of the most damaging was the claim that Japanese workers had cut
   arrows into the cane fields, thus pointing the way to Pearl Harbour for
   the Imperial pilots.

   There was no truth to the rumor, and in fact was considered ludicrous
   by military officers (especially pilots), who knew that any force which
   could fly hundreds of miles to find O'ahu would have no difficulty
   finding the largest harbour in the Central Pacific.

   However, this rumor was promoted by many who ignored the larger
   evidence of Japanese navigational skills, preferring to believe that
   the enemy was inept and would be easily defeated.

Japanese views of the attack

   Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to
   prepare the general Japanese civilian population for war with the U.S.
   via anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears that most Japanese were surprised,
   apprehensive, and dismayed by the news that they were now at war with
   the U.S., a country that many Japanese admired, and its Allies.
   Nevertheless, the Japanese people living in Japan and its territories
   thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack
   and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945,
   Yamamoto was angry at Nagumo for not launching a third attack and for
   not destroying the aircraft carriers and the oil supply soon after the
   attack.

   Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to believe that the
   war between the U.S. and Japan had been inevitable and
   Japanese-American relationship had already significantly deteriorated
   since the Japanese conquest of China, which the United States
   disapproved completely. In 1942, Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese
   ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he traced the
   "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia." He said
   that the war was a response to Washington's longstanding aggression
   toward Japan. According to Kurusu, the provocations began with the San
   Francisco School incident and the United States' racist policies on
   Japanese immigrants, and culminated in the "belligerent" scrap metal
   and oil boycott by the United States and Allied countries to contain or
   reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan whilst expanding its
   influence and interests throughout Asia. Of Pearl Harbour itself, he
   said that it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the
   U.S. government, the Hull note, and that the surprise attack was not
   treacherous because it should have been expected since
   Japanese-American relationship already had hit the lowest point and
   their interests contradicted greatly.

   Many Japanese today still feel that they were "pushed" or compelled to
   fight the U.S. due to threats to their national security and national
   interests from the U.S. and certain other European powers, and because
   of embargoes and uncooperation by certain Western powers against the
   Empire of Japan, particularly United States, United Kingdom and the
   Netherlands. This embargo was mostly about oil that fueled the whole
   Imperial Japanese Military operations in its missions. For example, the
   Japan Times, an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major
   news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran a number of columns in
   the early 2000s that echo Kurusu's comments in reference to Pearl
   Harbour. Putting Pearl Harbour into context, Japanese writers
   repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. servicemen killed in that
   attack with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians later
   killed by U.S. air attacks. not to mention the 1945 atomic bombings of
   Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States.

   However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war, many
   Japanese believe that the Pearl Harbour attack, although a tactical
   victory, was in reality part of a seriously flawed strategy for
   engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes the attack:

     The Pearl Harbour attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a
     strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as
     beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy
     United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat
     would follow.

   Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tojo
   Enlarge
   Prime Minister of Japan Hideki Tojo

   In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying that
   in 1941 Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the
   United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attacks
   at Pearl Harbour were scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged
   something which had been publicly known for years, that diplomatic
   communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack,
   and had filed delivery by the intended time.

   It appears that the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part
   message", which did not formally break off negotiations, let alone
   declare war, but which did in fact officially raise the issue. However,
   due to various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the
   declaration until well after the attack had begun. The Japanese
   government apologized for this delay. Imperial Japanese military
   leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Yamamoto
   was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of
   negotiations. He is rumored to have said, " I fear all we have done is
   awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve" . Even
   though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems to describe his
   feelings about the attack. He is on record as saying, in the previous
   year, that "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no
   expectation of success."

   The first Prime Minister of Japan during World War II Hideki Tojo later
   wrote that

     When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbour attack should
     have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven.

   Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had stated that, in the impending war
   with the United States,

     Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United
     States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor
     even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into
     Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our
     politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have
     confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary
     sacrifices?"

Longer-term effects

   Memorial Service for men killed during the Japanese attack on NAS
   Kaneohe.
   Enlarge
   Memorial Service for men killed during the Japanese attack on NAS
   Kaneohe.
   The attack inflamed U.S. sentiments against Japan.
   Enlarge
   The attack inflamed U.S. sentiments against Japan.

   A common view is that the Japan fell victim to victory disease due to
   the perceived ease of their first victories. Yet despite the perception
   of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were
   permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships Arizona,
   Oklahoma, and the old battleship Utah (then used as a target ship);
   nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including
   the two aft main turrets from Arizona. Heavy casualties resulted due to
   Arizona's magazine exploding and the Oklahoma capsizing. Four ships
   sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty,
   including the battleships California, West Virginia and Nevada.
   California and West Virginia had an effective torpedo-defense system
   which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to
   endure, enabling most of their crews to be saved. Many of the surviving
   battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their
   outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5" guns with a more useful
   battery of turreted DP guns, allowing them to better cope with Japan's
   threats. The destroyers Cassin and Downes were constructive total
   losses, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls,
   retaining their original names, while Shaw was raised and returned to
   service.

   Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one
   survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ship still afloat that was
   in Pearl Harbour during the attack is the Coast Guard Cutter Taney.

   In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbour was a strategic blunder
   for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who devised the Pearl Harbour
   attack, had predicted that even a successful attack on the U.S. Fleet
   could not win a war with the United States, because American productive
   capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was to
   destroy the three American aircraft carriers stationed in the Pacific,
   but they were not present: Enterprise was returning from Wake Island,
   Lexington was near Midway Island, and Saratoga was in San Diego
   following a refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Putting most of the
   U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both Navies and by
   most observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan.

   Though the attack was notable for large-scale destruction, the attack
   was not significant in terms of long-term loss. Had Japan destroyed the
   American carriers, the U.S. might have sustained significant damage to
   its Pacific Fleet for a year or so. As it was, the elimination of the
   battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to put its faith in
   aircraft carriers and submarines—and these were the tools with which
   the U.S. Navy would halt and eventually reverse the Japanese advance.
   One particular flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was that the
   ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides. As
   a result, Yamamoto hoarded his battleships for a decisive battle that
   would never happen.

   Ultimately, targets that never made the list, the Submarine Base and
   the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any of them. It
   was submarines that brought Japan's economy to a standstill and
   crippled its transportation of oil, immobilizing heavy ships. And in
   the basement of the old Headquarters Building was the cryptanalytic
   unit, Station Hypo.

Historical significance

   This battle has had history-altering consequences. It only had a small
   strategic military effect due to the failure of the Japanese Navy to
   sink U.S. aircraft carriers, but even if the air carriers had been
   sunk, it may not have helped Japan in the long term. The attack firmly
   drew the United States and its massive industrial and service economy
   into World War II, and the U.S. sent huge numbers of soldiers and a
   great amount of weapons and supplies to help the Allies fight Germany,
   Italy, and Japan, contributing to the utter defeat of the Axis powers
   by 1945. It also resulted in Germany declaring war on the United States
   four days later.
   Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam Air Force Base, still
   visible.
   Enlarge
   Damage to the headquarters building at Hickam Air Force Base, still
   visible.

   The United Kingdom's Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on hearing that
   the attack on Pearl Harbour had finally drawn the United States into
   the war, wrote: "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and
   sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and
   thankful." The Allied victory in this war and the subsequent U.S.
   emergence as a dominant world power have shaped international politics
   ever since.

   In terms of military history, the attack on Pearl Harbour marked the
   emergence of the aircraft carrier as the centre of naval power,
   replacing the battleship as the keystone of the fleet. However, it was
   not until later battles, notably the Coral Sea and Midway, that this
   breakthrough became apparent to the world's naval powers.

Mythical status

   Pearl Harbour is a major event in American history marking the first
   time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by
   another country. The event has assumed mythical status, and its
   prominence was vividly demonstrated sixty years later when the
   September 11, 2001 attacks took place: the World Trade Centre and
   Pentagon attacks were instantly compared to Pearl Harbour.

Cultural impact

   Anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. peaked during World War II. The
   government subsidized the production of propaganda posters using racial
   stereotypes. Shown here Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo of the Axis
   alliance
   Enlarge
   Anti-Japanese sentiment in the U.S. peaked during World War II. The
   government subsidized the production of propaganda posters using racial
   stereotypes. Shown here Adolf Hitler and Hideki Tojo of the Axis
   alliance

   The attack on Pearl Harbour and the ensuing war in the Pacific, fueled
   anti-Japanese sentiment. Japanese, Japanese-Americans and Asians having
   a similar physical appearance were regarded with suspicion, distrust
   and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an
   underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack".
   The fear of a Japanese-American Fifth column led to a massive
   detainment of this ethnic population since February 19, 1942 and its
   resulting Japanese American internment in both the United States and
   Canada.

   The attacks on Pearl Harbour were depicted in the joint
   American-Japanese film Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970), the American film
   Pearl Harbour (2001) and in several Japanese productions.

Recipients of the Medal of Honour

   * Awarded posthumously.
     * Mervyn S. Bennion *
     * John William Finn
     * Francis C. Flaherty *
     * Samuel G. Fuqua
     * Edwin J. Hill *
     * Herbert C. Jones *
     * Isaac C. Kidd *
     * Jackson C. Pharris
     * Thomas J. Reeves *
     * Donald K. Ross
     * Robert R. Scott *
     * Peter Tomich *
     * Franklin van Valkenburgh *
     * James R. Ward *
     * Cassin Young

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