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Alcibiades

2007 Schools Wikipedia Selection. Related subjects: Ancient History,
Classical History and Mythology; Historical figures

                   Alcibiades
   450 BC – 404 BC
   Alcibiades
   Place of birth Athens
   Place of death Phrygia
     Allegiance   Athens
                  ( 415 BC- 412 BC Sparta)
        Rank      general ( strategos)
    Battles/wars  Battle of Abydos ( 410 BC)
                  Battle of Cyzicus ( 410 BC)
                  Siege of Byzantium ( 408 BC)

   Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides ( Greek: Ἀλκιβιάδης Κλεινίου
   Σκαμβωνίδης, Eng. /ælsɪ'baɪədi:z/; c. 450 BC– 404 BC), also
   transliterated as Alkibiades, was a prominent Athenian statesman,
   orator, and general. The last famous member of an aristocratic family
   that fell from prominence after the Peloponnesian War, he played a
   major role in the second half of that conflict as a strategic advisor,
   military commander, and politician.

   During the course of the Peloponnesian War, Alcibiades changed his
   allegiance on several occasions. In his native Athens in the early 410s
   BC, he advocated for an aggressive foreign policy, and was a prominent
   proponent of the Sicilian Expedition, but fled to Sparta after his
   political enemies brought charges of sacrilege against him. In Sparta,
   he served as a strategic advisor, proposing or supervising several
   major campaigns against Athens. In Sparta too, however, Alcibiades soon
   made powerful enemies and was forced to defect to Persia. There, he
   served as an advisor to the satrap Tissaphernes until his political
   allies among the Athenians brought about his recall. He then served as
   an Athenian general ( strategos) for several more years, but his
   enemies eventually succeeded in exiling him a second time.

   The Sicilian expedition was Alcibiades' creation, and modern scholars
   have argued that, had that expedition been under Alcibiades' command
   instead of that of Nicias, the expedition might not have met its
   eventual disastrous fate. In the years that he served Sparta,
   Alcibiades played a crucial role in the city's undoing; the capture of
   Decelea and the revolts of several critical Athenian subjects occurred
   either at his suggestion or under his supervision. Once restored to his
   native city, however, he played a crucial role in a string of Athenian
   victories that eventually brought Sparta to seek a peace with Athens.
   He favored unconventional tactics, frequently winning cities over by
   treachery or negotiation rather than by siege. Alcibiades' military and
   political talents frequently proved valuable to whichever state
   currently held his allegiance, but his capacity for making powerful
   enemies ensured that he never remained in one place for long, and, by
   the end of the war that he had helped rekindle in the early 410s, his
   days of political relevance were a bygone memory.

Early years

   Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824-1904): Socrates seeking Alcibiades in the House
   of Aspasia, 1861
   Enlarge
   Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824-1904): Socrates seeking Alcibiades in the House
   of Aspasia, 1861

   Alcibiades was born in ancient Athens, the son of Cleinias and
   Deinomache, the latter of whom belonged to the powerful and
   controversial family of the Alcmaeonidae; Pericles and his brother
   Ariphon were Deinomache's cousins (her father and their mother were
   siblings). It is said that his family was traced back to Eurysaces. His
   grandfather, also named Alcibiades, was a friend of Cleisthenes, the
   famous constitutional reformer of the late 6th century BC. After the
   death of Cleinias at the Battle of Coronea in 447 BC, Pericles and
   Ariphron became his guardians. According to Plutarch, Alcibiades had a
   number of famous teachers, such as Socrates, and was well trained in
   the art of rhetoric. He was noted for his unruly behaviour, which is
   mentioned by the ancient Greek writers on various occasions.

   Alcibiades took part in the Battle of Potidaea in 432 BC, where
   Socrates saved his life, a service which he repaid at the Battle of
   Delium in 424 BC. Alcibiades had an intimate but (according to
   idealized ancient accounts) chaste relationship with Socrates, whom he
   admired and respected, and who in turn was drawn by his beauty but
   refused to succumb to the youth's attractions. According to Plutarch,
   Alcibiades "feared and reverenced Socrates alone, and despised the rest
   of his lovers".

   Alcibiades was married to Hipparete, the daughter of Hipponicus, a
   wealthy Athenian. According to Plutarch, Hipparete loved her husband,
   but she attempted to divorce him because he consorted with courtesans.
   She lived with him until her death and gave birth to probably two
   children, a daughter and a son, also named Alcibiades.

Political career until 412 BC

Rise to prominence

   Alcibiades first rose to prominence when he began advocating aggressive
   Athenian action after the signing of the Peace of Nicias. (That treaty,
   an uneasy truce between Sparta and Athens signed midway through the
   Peloponnesian War, came at the end of seven years of fighting in which
   neither side had gained a decisive advantage). Historians Arnold W.
   Gomme and Raphael Sealey believe that Alcibiades was offended that the
   Lacedaimonians had negotiated that treaty through Nicias and Laches,
   overlooking him on account of his youth.

   Disputes over the interpretation of the treaty led the Spartans to
   dispatch ambassadors to Athens with full powers to arrange all
   unsettled matters. The Athenians initially received these ambassadors
   well, but Alcibiades met with them in secret before they were to speak
   to the ecclesia (the Athenian Assembly) and told them that the Assembly
   was haughty and had great ambitions. He urged them to renounce their
   diplomatic authority to represent Sparta, and instead allow him to
   assist them through his influence in Athenian politics. The
   representatives agreed and, impressed with Alcibiades' foresight, they
   alienated themselves from Nicias, who sincerely wanted to reach an
   agreement with the Spartans. The next day during the Assembly
   Alcibiades asked them what powers Sparta had granted them to negotiate
   and they replied, as agreed, that they had not come with full and
   independent powers. This was in direct contradiction to what they had
   said the day before and Alcibiades seized on this opportunity to
   denounce their character, cast suspicion on their aims, and destroy
   their credibility. This ploy increased Alcibiades' standing while
   embarrassing Nicias, and Alcibiades was subsequently appointed general.
   He took advantage of his increasing power to orchestrate the creation
   of an alliance between Argos, Mantinea, Elis and other states in the
   Peloponnese, threatening Sparta's dominance in the region. According to
   Gomme, "it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian general at the head
   of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the Peloponnese cocking
   a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest". This
   alliance, however, would ultimately be defeated at the Battle of
   Mantinea.

   Somewhere in the years 416- 415 BC, a complex struggle took place
   between Hyperbolos on one side and Nicias and Alcibiades on the other.
   Hyperbolos tried to bring about the ostracism of one of this pair but
   Nicias and Alcibiades combined their influence to induce the people to
   expel Hyperbolos instead. This incident reveals that Nicias and
   Alcibiades each commanded a personal following, whose votes were
   determined by the wishes of the leaders.

   Alcibiades was not one of the generals involved in the capture of Melos
   in 416-415 BC, but Plutarch makes him a supporter of the decree by
   which the grown men of Melos were killed and the women and children
   enslaved. The orator Andocides alleges that Alcibiades had a child by
   one of these enslaved women.

Sicilian Expedition

   Map of Sicily designed by Marco Prins-Jona Lendering with all the
   Phoenician and Greek settlements.
   Enlarge
   Map of Sicily designed by Marco Prins-Jona Lendering with all the
   Phoenician and Greek settlements.

   In 415 BC, delegates from the Sicilian city of Segesta (Egesta in
   Greek) arrived at Athens to plead for the support of the Athenians in
   their war against Selinus. During the debates on the undertaking,
   Nicias was vehemently opposed to Athenian intervention, explaining that
   the campaign would be very costly and attacking the character and
   motives of Alcibiades, who had emerged as the supporter of the
   expedition. On the other hand, Alcibiades argued that a campaign in
   this new theatre would bring riches to the city and expand the empire,
   just as the Persian Wars had. In his speech Alcibiades predicted
   (over-optimistically, in the opinion of most historians) that the
   Athenians would be able to recruit allies in the region and impose
   their rule on Syracuse, the most powerful city of Sicily. In spite of
   Alcibiades' enthusiastic advocacy for the plan, it was Nicias, not he,
   who turned a modest undertaking into a massive campaign and made the
   conquest of Sicily seem possible and safe. It was at his suggestion
   that the size of the fleet was significantly increased from 60 ships to
   "140 galleys, 5,100 men at arms, and about 1300 archers, slingers, and
   light armed men". Philosopher Leo Strauss underscores that the Sicilian
   expedition surpassed everything undertaken by Pericles. Almost
   certainly Nicias' intention was to shock the assembly with his high
   estimate of the forces required, but, instead of dissuading his fellow
   citizens, his analysis made them all the more eager. Against his wishes
   Nicias was appointed general along with Alcibiades and Lamachus, all
   three of whom were given full powers to do whatever was in the best
   interests of Athens while in Sicily.

   One night during preparations for the expedition the hermai, heads of
   the god Hermes on a plinth with a phallus, were mutilated throughout
   Athens. This was a religious scandal and was seen as a bad omen for the
   mission. Plutarch explains that Androcles, a political leader, used
   false witnesses who accused Alcibiades and his friends of mutilating
   the statues, and of profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries. Later his
   opponents, chief among them being Androcles and Thessalus, Cimon's son,
   enlisted orators to argue that Alcibiades should set sail as planned
   and stand trial on his return from the campaign. Alcibiades was
   suspicious of their intentions, and asked to be allowed to stand trial
   immediately, under penalty of death, in order to clear his name. This
   request was denied and the fleet set sail soon after, with the charges
   unresolved.
   "Men do not rest content with parrying the attacks of a superior, but
   often strike the first blow to prevent the attack being made. And we
   cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop; we have
   reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but
   must scheme to extend it, for, if we cease to rule others, we are in
   danger of being ruled ourselves. Nor can you look at inaction from the
   same point of view as others, unless you are prepared to change your
   habits and make them like theirs."
   Alcibiades' Oration before the Sicilian expedition as recorded by
   Thucydides, (VI, 18]); Thucydides disclaims verbal accuracy.

   As Alcibiades had suspected, his absence emboldened his enemies, and
   they began to accuse him of other sacrilegious actions and comments and
   even alleged that these actions were connected with a plot against the
   democracy. According to Thucydides, the Athenians were always in fear
   and took everything suspiciously. When the fleet arrived in Catana, it
   found the state trireme Salaminia waiting to bring Alcibiades and the
   others indicted for mutilating the hermai or profaning the Eleusinian
   Mysteries back to Athens to stand trial. Alcibiades told the heralds
   that he would follow them back to Athens in his ship, but in Thurii he
   escaped with his crew; in Athens he was convicted in absentia and
   condemned to death. His property was confiscated and a reward of one
   talent was promised to whoever succeeded in killing any who had fled.
   Meanwhile the Athenian force in Sicily, after a few early victories,
   moved against Messina, where the generals expected their secret allies
   within the city to betray it to them. Alcibiades, however, foreseeing
   that he would be outlawed, gave information to the friends of the
   Syracusans in Messina, who succeeded in preventing the admission of the
   Athenians. With the death of Lamachus in battle some time later, the
   Sicilian Expedition fell into the hands of Nicias, who modern scholars
   have judged to be an inadequate military leader.

Defection to Sparta

   After his disappearance at Thurii, Alcibiades quickly contacted the
   Spartans, "promising to render them aid and service greater than all
   the harm he had previously done them as an enemy" if they would offer
   him sanctuary. The Spartans granted this request and received him among
   them. In the debate at Sparta over whether to send a force to relieve
   Syracuse, Alcibiades spoke and instilled fear of Athenian ambition into
   the Spartan ephors by informing them that the Athenians hoped to
   conquer Sicily, Italy, and even Carthage. Yale historian Donald Kagan
   believes that Alcibiades knowingly exaggerated the plans of the
   Athenians to convince the Spartans of the benefit they stood to gain
   from his help. Kagan asserts that Alcibiades had not yet acquired his
   "legendary" reputation, and the Spartans saw him as "a defeated and
   hunted man" whose policies "produced strategic failures" and brought
   "no decisive result". If accurate, this assessment underscores one of
   Alcibiades greatest talents, his highly persuasive oratory. After
   making the threat seem imminent, Alcibiades advised the Spartans to
   send troops and most importantly, a Spartan commander to discipline and
   aid the Syracusans.
   "Our party was that of the whole people, our creed being to do our part
   in preserving the form of government under which the city enjoyed the
   utmost greatness and freedom, and which we had found existing. As for
   democracy, the men of sense among us knew what it was, and I perhaps as
   well as any, as I have the more cause to complain of it; but there is
   nothing new to be said of a patent absurdity - meanwhile we did not
   think it safe to alter it under the pressure of your hostility."
   Alcibiades' Speech to the Spartans as recorded by Thucydides, (VI,
   89]); Thucydides disclaims verbal accuracy.

   Alcibiades served as a military advisor to Sparta and helped the
   Spartans secure several crucial successes. He advised them to build a
   permanent fort at Decelea, just over ten miles from Athens and within
   sight of the city. By doing this, the Spartans cut the Athenians off
   entirely from their homes and crops and the silver mines of Sunium.
   This was part of Alcibiades's plan to renew the war with Athens in
   Attica. The move was devastating to Athens and forced the citizens to
   live within the long walls of the city year round, fostering the Plague
   of Athens and making them entirely dependent on their seaborne trade
   for food. Seeing Athens thus beleaguered on a second front, members of
   the Delian League began to contemplate revolt. In the wake of Athens'
   disastrous defeat in Sicily, Alcibiades sailed to Ionia with a Spartan
   fleet and succeeded in persuading several critical cities to revolt. In
   spite of these valuable contributions to the Spartan cause, Alcibiades
   fell out of favour with the Spartan government at around this time when
   it was discovered that he was having an affair with the wife of the
   Spartan king, Agis II. Leotychides, the son born by Agis' wife Timaia
   shortly after this, was believed by many to be Alcibiades' son.
   Alcibiades's influence was further reduced after the retirement of
   Endius, the ephor who was most friendly to him. It is alleged that
   Astiochus, a Spartan admiral, was sent orders to kill him, but
   Alcibiades received warning of this order and defected to the Persian
   satrap Tissaphernes, who had been supporting the Peloponnesian forces
   financially in 412 BC.

In Asia Minor

   Jean-Baptiste Régnault (1754-1829): Socrates dragging Alcibiades from
   the Embrace of Sensual Pleasure, 1785
   Enlarge
   Jean-Baptiste Régnault (1754-1829): Socrates dragging Alcibiades from
   the Embrace of Sensual Pleasure, 1785

   On his arrival in the Persian court, Alcibiades won the trust of the
   powerful satrap and made several policy suggestions which were well
   received. According to Thucydides, Alcibiades immediately began to do
   all he could with Tissaphernes to injure the Peloponnesian cause. At
   his urging, the satrap reduced the payments he was making to the
   Peloponnesian fleet and began delivering them irregularly. Alcibiades
   next advised Tissaphernes to bribe the generals of the cities to gain
   valuable intelligence on their activities. Lastly, and most
   importantly, he told the satrap to be in no hurry to bring the Persian
   fleet into the conflict, as the longer the war dragged out the more
   exhausted the combatants would become. This would allow the Persians to
   more easily conquer the region in the aftermath of the fighting.
   Alcibiades tried to convince the satrap that it was in Persia's
   interest to wear both Athens and Sparta out at first, "and after
   docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the
   country of the Peloponnesians". Although Alcibiades' advice benefitted
   the Persians, it was merely a means to an end;Thucydides tells us that
   his real motive was to use his alleged influence with the Persians to
   effect his restoration to Athens.

Recall to Athens

Negotiations with the Athenian oligarchs

   Alcibiades seemed to assume that the "radical democracy" would never
   agree to his recall to Athens. Therefore, he exchanged messages with
   the Athenian leaders at Samos and suggested that if they could install
   an oligarchy friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with
   him Persian money and possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes.
   Alcibiades set about winning over the most influential military
   officers and achieved his goal by offering them a threefold plan: the
   Athenian constitution was to be changed, the recall of Alcibiades was
   to be voted, and Alcibiades was to win over Tissaphernes and the King
   of Persia to the Athenian side. Most of the officers in the Athenian
   fleet accepted the plan and welcomed the prospect of a narrower
   constitution, which would allow them a greater share in determining
   policy. According to Thucydides, only one of the Athenian generals at
   Samos, Phrynichus, opposed the plan and argued that Alcibiades cared no
   more for the proposed oligarchy than for the traditional democracy. The
   involvement in the plot of another general, Thrasybulus, remains
   unclear.

   These officers of the Athenian fleet formed a group of conspirators,
   but were met with opposition from the majority of the soldiers and
   sailors; these were eventually calmed down "by the advantageous
   prospect of the pay from the king". The members of the group assembled
   and prepared to send Pisander, one of their number, on an embassy to
   Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of
   the democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of
   the Athenians.

   Phrynichus, fearing that Alcibiades if restored would revenge himself
   upon him for his opposition, sent a secret letter to the Spartan
   admiral, Astyochus, to tell him that Alcibiades was ruining their cause
   by making Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, and containing an
   express revelation of the rest of the intrigue. Astyochus went up to
   Alcibiades and Tissaphernes at Magnesia and communicated to them
   Phrynichus's letter. Alcibiades responded in kind, sending to the
   authorities at Samos a letter against Phrynichus, stating what he had
   done, and requiring that he should be put to death. Phrynichus in
   desperation wrote again to Astyochus, offering him a chance to destroy
   the Athenian fleet at Samos. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades
   who informed the officers at Samos that they had been betrayed by
   Phrynichus. Alcibiades however gained no credit, because Phrynichus had
   anticipated Alcibiades's letter and, before the accusations could
   arrive, he told the army that he had received information of an enemy
   plan to attack the camp and that they should fortify Samos as quickly
   as possible.

   Despite these events, Pisander and the other envoys of the conspirators
   arrived at Athens, and made a speech before the people. Pisander won
   the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the centre. The
   ecclesia deposed Phrynichus and elected Pisander and ten other envoys
   to negotiate with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades.

   At this point, Alcibiades's scheme encountered a great obstacle.
   Tissaphernes would not make an agreement on any terms, wanting to
   follow his policy of neutrality. As Kagan points out, Tissaphernes was
   a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing each side
   out without direct Persian involvement. Alcibiades realized this and,
   by presenting the Athenians with stiffer and stiffer demands on
   Tissaphernes' behalf, attempted to convince them that he had persuaded
   Tissaphernes to support them, but that they had not conceded enough to
   him. Although the envoys were angered at the audacity of the Persian
   demands, they nevertheless departed with the impression that Alcibiades
   could have brought about an agreement among the powers if he had chosen
   to do so. This fiasco at the court of Tissaphernes, however, put an end
   to the negotiations between the conspirators and Alcibiades. The group
   was convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side of the bargain
   without demanding exorbitantly high concessions of them and they
   accordingly abandoned their plans to restore him to Athens.

Reinstatement as an Athenian General

   In spite of the failure of the negotiations, the conspirators succeeded
   in overthrowing the democracy and imposing the oligarchic government of
   the Four Hundred, among the leaders of which were Phrynichus and
   Pisander. At Samos, however, a similar coup instigated by the
   conspirators did not go forward so smoothly. Samian democrats learned
   of the conspiracy and notified four prominent Athenians, the generals
   Leon and Diomedon, the trierarch Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus, at that
   time a hoplite in the ranks. With the support of these men and the
   Athenian soldiers in general, the Samian democrats were able to defeat
   the 300 Samian oligarchs who attempted to seize power there. Further,
   the Athenian troops at Samos formed themselves into a political
   assembly, deposed their generals, and elected new ones, including
   Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The army, stating that they had not
   revolted from the city but that the city had revolted from them,
   resolved to stand by the democracy while continuing to prosecute the
   war against Sparta.

   After a time, Thrasybulus persuaded the assembled troops to vote
   Alcibiades' recall, a policy that he had supported since before the
   coup. Then he sailed to retrieve Alcibiades and returned with him to
   Samos. The aim of this policy was to win away Persian support from the
   Spartans, as it was still believed that Alcibiades had great influence
   with Tissaphernes. Plutarch claims that the army sent for Alcibiades so
   as to use his help in putting down the tyrants in Athens. Kagan argues
   that this reinstatement was a disappointment to Alcibiades, who had
   hoped for a glorious return to Athens itself but found himself only
   restored to the rebellious fleet, where the immunity from prosecution
   he had been granted "protected him for the time being but not from a
   reckoning in the future"; furthermore, the recall, which Alcibiades had
   hoped to bring about through his own prestige and perceived influence,
   was achieved through the patronage of Thrasybulus.

   At his first speech to the assembled troops, Alcibiades complained
   bitterly about the circumstances of his exile, but the greatest part of
   the speech consisted of boasting about his influence with Tissaphernes.
   The primary motives of his speech were to make the oligarchs at Athens
   afraid of him and to increase his credit with the army at Samos. Upon
   hearing his speech the troops immediately elected him general alongside
   Thrasybulus and the others. In fact, he roused them so much that they
   proposed to sail at once for Piraeus and attack the oligarchs in
   Athens. It was primarily Alcibiades, along with Thrasybulus, who calmed
   the people and showed them the folly of this proposal, which would have
   sparked civil war and led to the immediate defeat of Athens. Shortly
   after Alcibiades' reinstatement as an Athenian general, the government
   of the Four Hundred was overthrown and replaced by a broader oligarchy,
   which would eventually give way to democracy.

   Presently Alcibiades sailed to Tissaphernes with a detachment of ships.
   According to Plutarch, the supposed purpose of this mission was to stop
   the Persian fleet from coming to the aid of the Peloponnesians.
   Thucydides is in agreement with Plutarch that the Persian fleet was at
   Aspendus and that Alcibiades told the troops he would bring the fleet
   to their side or prevent it from coming at all, but Thucydides further
   speculates that the real reason was to flaunt his new position to
   Tissaphernes and try to gain some real influence over him. According to
   the historian, Alcibiades had long known that Tissaphernes never meant
   to bring the fleet at all, and wished to compromise him as much as
   possible in the eyes of the Spartans through his friendship for himself
   and the Athenians, and thus to oblige him to join their side.

Battles of Abydos and Cyzicus

   Alcibiades was recalled by the "intermidiate regime" of the Five
   Thousand, the government which succeeded the Four Hundred in 411, but
   it is most likely that he waited until 407 BC to actually return to the
   city. Plutarch tells us that, although his recall had already been
   passed on motion of Critias, a political ally of his, Alcibiades was
   resolved to come back with glory. While this was certainly his goal, it
   was again means to an end, that end being avoiding prosecution upon his
   return to Athens.

   The next significant part he would play in the war would occur at the
   Battle of Abydos. Alcibiades had remained behind at Samos with small
   force while Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus led the greater part of the
   fleet to the Hellespont. During this period, Alcibiades succeded in
   raising money from Caria and the neighboring area, with which he was
   able to pay the rowers and gain their favour. After the Athenian
   victory at Cynossema, both fleets summoned all their ships from around
   the Aegean to join them for what might be a decisive next engagement.
   While Alcibiades was still en route, the two fleets clashed Abydos,
   where the Peloponnesians had set up their main naval base. The battle
   was evenly matched and raged for a long time, but the balance tipped
   towards the Athenians when Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont with
   eighteen triremes. The Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who had replaced
   Tissaphernes as the sponsor of the Peloponnesian fleet, moved his land
   army to the shore to defend the ships and sailors who had beached their
   ships. Only the support of the Persian land army and the coming of
   night saved the Peloponnesian fleet from complete destruction.

   Shortly after the battle, Tissaphernes had arrived in the Hellespont
   and Alcibiades left the fleet at Sestos to meet him, bringing gifts and
   hoping to once again try to win over the Persian governor. Evidently
   Alcibiades had gravely misjudged his standing with the satrap, and he
   was arrested on arrival. Within a month he would escape and resume
   command. It was now obvious, however, that he had no influence with the
   Persians; from now on his authority would depend on what he actually
   could accomplish rather than on what he promised to do.

   After an interlude of several months in which the Peloponnesians
   constructed new ships and the Athenians besieged cities and raised
   money throughout the Aegean, the next major sea battle took place the
   spring of 410 BC at Cyzicus. Alcibiades had been forced to flee from
   Sestos to Cardia to protect his small fleet from the rebuilt
   Peloponnesian navy, but as soon as the Athenian fleet was reunited
   there its commanders led it to Cyzicus, where the Athenians had
   intelligence indicating that Pharnabazus and Mindarus, the
   Peloponnesian fleet commander, were together plotting their next move.
   Concealed by storm and darkness the combined Athenian force reached the
   vicinity without being spotted by the Peloponnesians. Here the
   Athenians devised a plot to draw the enemy into battle. According to
   Diodorus Siculus, Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to
   draw the Spartans out to battle, and, after he successfully deceived
   Mindarus with this ploy, the squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes
   came to join him, cutting off the Spartan's retreat.

   The Spartan fleet suffered losses in the flight, and reached the shore
   with the Athenians hot on their heels. Alcibiades's troops, leading the
   Athenian pursuit, landed and attempted to pull the Spartan ships back
   out to sea. The Peloponnesians fought to prevent their ships from being
   towed away, and Pharnabazus's troops came up to support them.
   Thrasybulus landed his own force to temporarily relieve pressure on
   Alcibiades, and meanwhile ordered Theramenes to join up with Athenian
   land forces nearby and bring them to reinforce the sailors and marines
   on the beach. The Spartans and Persians, overwhelmed by the arrival of
   multiple forces from several directions, were defeated and driven off,
   and the Athenians captured all the Spartan ships which were not
   destroyed. A letter dispatched to Sparta by Hippocrates, vice-admiral
   under Mindarus, was intercepted and taken to Athens; it ran as follows:
   "The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know
   not what to do". A short time later Sparta petitioned for peace, but
   their appeals were ultimately rejected by the Athenians.

Further military successes

   Satellite image of the Thracian Chersonese (now known as the Gallipoli
   Peninsula) and surrounding area. Alcibiades traveled to the Chersonese
   in 408 BC and attacked the city of Selymbria on the north shore of the
   Propontis.
   Enlarge
   Satellite image of the Thracian Chersonese (now known as the Gallipoli
   Peninsula) and surrounding area. Alcibiades traveled to the Chersonese
   in 408 BC and attacked the city of Selymbria on the north shore of the
   Propontis.

   After their victory, Alcibiades and Thrasyllus began the siege of
   Chalcedon in 409 BC with about 190 ships. Although unable to attain a
   decisive victory or induce the city to surrender, Alcibiades was able
   to win a small tactical land battle outside of the city gates and
   Theramenes concluded an agreement with the Chalcedonians. Afterwards
   they concluded a temporary alliance with Pharnabazus which secured some
   much needed immediate cash for the army, but despite this Alcibiades
   was still forced to depart in search for more booty to pay the soldiers
   and oarsmen of the fleet.

   In pursuit of these funds he traveled to the Thracian Chersonese and
   attacked Selymbria. He plotted with a pro-Athenian party within the
   city and offered the Selymbrians reasonable terms and imposed strict
   discipline to see that they were observed. He did their city no injury
   whatever, but merely took a sum of money from it, set a garrison in it
   and left. Epigraphical evidence indicates the Selymbrians surrendered
   hostages until the treaty was ratified in Athens. His performance is
   judged as skillful by historians, since it saved time, resources, and
   lives and still fully achieved his goal.

   From here Alcibiades joined in the siege of Byzantium along with
   Theramenes and Thrasyllus. A portion of the citizens of the city,
   demoralized and hungry, decided to surrender the city to Alcibiades for
   similar terms as the Selymbrians had received. On the agreed upon night
   the defenders left their posts and the Athenians attacked the
   Peloponnesian garrison in the city and their boats in the harbour. The
   portion of the citizenry that remained loyal to Peloponnesians fought
   so savagely that Alcibiades issued a statement in the midst of the
   fighting which guaranteed their safety and this persuaded the remaining
   citizens to turn against the Peloponnesian garrison, which was nearly
   totally destroyed.

Return to Athens, dismissal and death

Return to Athens

   It was in the aftermath of these successes that Alcibiades resolved to
   finally return to Athens in the spring of 407 BC. Even in the wake of
   his recent victories, Alcibiades was exceedingly careful in his return,
   mindful of the changes in government, the charges still technically
   hanging over him, and the great injury he had done to Athens. Thus
   Alcibiades, instead of going straight home, he first went to Samos to
   pick up 20 ships and proceeded with them to the Ceramic Gulf where he
   collected 100 talents. He finally sailed to Gytheion to make inquiries,
   partly about the reported preparations of the Spartans there, and
   partly about the feelings in Athens about his return. His inquiries
   secured him that the city was kindly disposed towards him and that his
   closest friends urged him to return.

   Therefore he finally sailed into Piraeus where the crowd had gathered,
   desiring to see the famous Alcibiades. He entered the harbour full of
   fear till he saw his cousin and others of his friends and acquaintance,
   who invited him to land. Upon arriving on shore he was greeted with a
   hero's welcome. Nevertheless, some saw an evil omen in the fact that he
   had returned to Athens on the very day when the ceremony of the
   Plynteria (the feast where the old statue of Athena would get cleansed)
   were being celebrated. This was regarded as the unluckiest day of the
   year to undertake anything of importance. His enemies took note of this
   and kept it in mind for a future occasion.

   All the criminal proceedings against him were cancelled and the charges
   of blasphemy were officially withdrawn. Alcibiades was able to assert
   his piety and to raise Athenian morale by leading the solemn procession
   to Eleusis (for the celebration of the Eleusinian Mysteries) by land
   for the first time since the Spartans had occupied Decelea. The
   procession had been replaced by a journey by sea, but this year
   Alcibiades used a detachment of soldiers to escort the traditional
   procession. His property was restored and the ecclesia elected him
   general (strategos) with sole powers by land and sea.

Defeat at Notium

   In 406 BC Alcibiades set out from Athens with 1,500 hoplites and a
   hundred ships. He failed to take Andros and then he went on to Samos.
   Later he moved to Notium, closer to the enemy at Ephesus. In the
   meanwhile Tissaphernes had been replaced by Cyrus (a relative of Darius
   II of Persia) who decided to financially support the Peloponnesians.
   This new revenue started to attract deserters to the Spartan navy from
   the Athenians. Additionally the Spartans had replaced Mindarus with
   Lysander, a very capable admiral. These factors caused the rapid growth
   of the Peloponnesian fleet at the expense of the Athenian. In search of
   funds and needing to force another decisive battle, Alcibiades left
   Notium and sailed to help Thrasybulus in the siege of Phocaea.
   Alcibiades was aware the Spartan fleet was nearby, so he left nearly
   eighty ships to watch them under the command of his personal helmsman
   Antiochus, who was given express orders not to attack. Antiochus
   disobeyed these orders and endeavored to draw Lysander into a fight by
   imitating the tactics used at Cyzicus. The situation at Notium,
   however, was radically different than that at Cyzicus; the Athenians
   possessed no element of surprise, and Lysander had been well informed
   about their fleet by deserters. In practice, Antiochus's ship was sunk,
   and he was killed, by a sudden Spartan attack; the remaining ships of
   the decoy force were then chased headlong back toward Notium, where the
   main Athenian force was caught unprepared by the sudden arrival of the
   whole Spartan fleet. In the ensuing fighting, Lysander gained an entire
   victory. Alcibiades soon returned and desperately tried to undo the
   defeat at Notium by scoring another victory, but Lysander could not be
   compelled to attack the fleet again.

   Ultimately responsibility for the defeat fell on Alcibiades and his
   enemies used the opportunity to attack him and have him removed from
   command, although some modern scholars believe that Alcibiades was
   unfairly blamed for Antiochus' mistake. Diodorus reports that, in
   addition to his mistake at Notium, Alcibiades was discharged on account
   of false accusations brought against him by his enemies. According to
   Anthony Andrewes, professor of ancient history, the extravagant hopes
   that his successes of the previous summer had created were a decisive
   element in his downfall. Consequently Alcibiades condemned himself to
   exile. Never again returning to Athens, he sailed north to the castles
   in the Thracian Chersonese, which he had secured during his time in the
   Hellespont. The implications of the defeat were severe for Athens.
   Although the defeat had been minor, it occasioned the removal of not
   only Alcibiades but also his allies like Thrasybulus, Theramenes and
   Critias. These were likely the most capable commanders Athens had at
   the time and their removal would help lead to the Athenian surrender
   only two years later after their complete defeat at Aegospotami.

Death

   Michele de Napoli (1808-1892): Morte di Alcibiade (1839 circa). Naples
   National Archaeological Museum.
   Enlarge
   Michele de Napoli (1808-1892): Morte di Alcibiade (1839 circa). Naples
   National Archaeological Museum.

   With one exception, Alcibiades' role in the war ended with his command.
   Prior to the Battle of Aegospotami, in the last attested fact of his
   career, Alcibiades recognized that the Athenians were anchored in a
   strategically disadvantageous spot and advised them to move to Sestus
   where they could benefit from a harbour and a city. Diodorus, however,
   does not mention this advice, arguing instead that Alcibiades offered
   the generals Thracian aid in exchange for a share in the command. In
   any case, the generals of the Athenians, "considering that in case of
   defeat the blame would attach to them and that in case of success all
   men would attribute it to Alcibiades", asked him to leave and not come
   near the camp ever again. Days later the fleet would be annihilated by
   Lysander.

   After the Battle of Aegospotami, Alcibiades crossed the Hellespont and
   took refuge in Phrygia, with the object of securing the aid of
   Artaxerxes against Sparta. But the Spartans induced Pharnabazus to put
   him out of the way. According to Plutarch, Lysander sent an envoy to
   Pharnabazus who then dispatched his brother to Phrygia where Alcibiades
   was living with his mistress, Timandra. In 404 BC, as he was about to
   set out for the Persian court, his residence was surrounded and set on
   fire. Seeing no chance of escape he rushed out on his assassins, dagger
   in hand, and was killed by a shower of arrows.

Assessments

Political career

   In ancient Greece Alcibiades was a polarizing figure. Thucydides
   reprehends the Athenian statesman for his political conduct and
   motives. According to the historian, Alcibiades, being "exceedingly
   ambitious", proposed the expedition in Sicily in order "to gain in
   wealth and reputation by means of his successes". Alcibiades is held
   responsible by Thucydides for the destruction of Athens, since "his
   habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to
   other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city". Plutarch regards
   him as "the least scrupulous and most entirely careless of human
   beings". On the other hand, Diodorus argues that he was "in spirit
   brilliant and intent upon great enterprises". Sharon Press of Brown
   University points out that Xenophon emphasizes Alcibiades' service to
   the state, rather than the harm he was charged with causing it.
   Demosthenes defends Alcibiades's achievements, saying that he had taken
   arms in the cause of democracy, displaying his patriotism, not by gifts
   of money or by speeches, but by personal service. For Demosthenes and
   other orators Alcibiades epitomized the figure of the great man during
   the glorious days of the Athenian democracy and became a rhetorical
   symbol. One of Isocrates' speeches, delivered by the son of Alcibiades,
   argues that the statesman deserved the Athenians' gratitude for the
   service he had given them. Lysias, on the other hand, argued in one of
   his orations that the Athenians should regard Alcibiades as an enemy
   because of the general tenor of his life, as "he repays with injury the
   open assistance of any of his friends". In the Constitution of the
   Athenians Aristotle does not include Alcibiades in the list of the best
   Athenian politicians, but in Posterior Analytics he argues that traits
   of a proud man like Alcibiades are "equanimity amid the vicissitudes of
   life and impatience of dishonor". Alcibiades excited in his
   contemporaries a fear for the safety of the political order. Therefore,
   Andocides said of him that "instead of holding that he ought himself to
   conform with the laws of the state, he expects you to conform with his
   own way of life". Central to the depiction of the Athenian statesman is
   Cornelius Nepos' famous phrase that Alcibiades "surpassed all the
   Athenians in grandeur and magnificence of living".

   Even today Alcibiades divides scholars. For Malcolm F. McGregor, former
   head of the Department of Classics in the University of British
   Columbia, Alcibiades was rather a shrewd gambler than a mere
   opportunist. Evangelos P. Fotiadis, a prominent Greek philologist,
   asserts that Alcibiades was "a first class diplomat" and had "huge
   skills". Nevertheless his spiritual powers were not counter-balanced
   with his magnificent mind and he had the hard luck to lead a people
   susceptible to demagoguery. K. Paparrigopoulos, a major modern Greek
   historian, underlines his "spiritual virtues" and compares him with
   Themistocles, but he then asserts that all these gifts created a
   "traitor, an audacious and impious man". Walter Ellis believes that his
   actions were outrageous, but they were performed with panache. For his
   part, David Gribble argues that Alcibiades's actions against his city
   were misunderstood and believes that "the tension which led to
   Alcibiades' split with the city was between purely personal and civic
   values". Russell Meiggs, a British ancient historian, asserts that the
   Athenian statesman was absolutely unscrupulous despite his great charm
   and brilliant abilities. According to Meiggs his actions were dictated
   by selfish motives and his feud with Cleon and his successors
   undermined Athens. The same scholar underscores the fact that "his
   example of restless and undisciplined ambition strengthened the charge
   brought against Socrates". Even more critically, Athanasios G. Platias
   and Constantinos Koliopoulos, professors of strategic studies and
   international politics, state that Alcibiades' own arguments "should be
   sufficient to do away with the notion that Alcibiades was a great
   statesman, as some people still believe".

Military achievements

   Pietro Testa (1611-1650): The Drunken Alcibiades Interrupting the
   Symposium (1648)
   Enlarge
   Pietro Testa (1611-1650): The Drunken Alcibiades Interrupting the
   Symposium (1648)

   Despite his critical comments, Thucydides admits in a short digression
   that "publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired".
   Diodorus and Demosthenes regard him as a great general. According to
   Fotiadis, Alcibiades was an invincible general and, wherever he went,
   victory followed him. Fotiadis believes that, had he led the army in
   Sicily, the Athenians would have avoided disaster and, had his
   countrymen followed his advice at Aegospotami, Lysander would have lost
   and Athens would have ruled Greece. On the other hand, Paparrigopoulos
   believes that the Sicilian Expedition, prompted by Alcibiades, was a
   strategical mistake. In agreement with Paparrigopoulos, Platias and
   Koliopoulos underscore the fact that the Sicilian expedition was a
   strategic blunder of the first magnitude, resulting from a "frivolous
   attitude and an unbelievable underestimation of the enemy". For his
   part, Angelos Vlachos, a Greek Academician, underlines the constant
   interest of Athens for Sicily from the beginning of the war. According
   to Vlachos the expedition had nothing of the extravagant or adventurous
   and constituted a rational strategic decision based on traditional
   Athenian aspirations. Vlachos asserts that Alcibiades had already
   conceived a broader plan: the conquest of the whole West. He intended
   to conquer Carthage and Libya, then to attack Italy and, after winning
   these, to seize Italy and Peloponnesus. The initial decision of the
   ecclesia provided however for a reasonable military force, which later
   became unreasonably large and costly because of Nicias' demands. Kagan
   criticizes Alcibiades for failing to recognize that the large size of
   the Athenian expedition undermined the diplomatic scheme on which his
   strategy rested.

   Kagan believes that while Alcibiades was a commander of considerable
   ability, he was no military genius, and his confidence and ambitions
   went far beyond his skills. He thus was capable of important errors and
   serious miscalculations. Kagan argues that at Notium Alcibiades
   committed a serious error in leaving the fleet in the hands of an
   inexperienced officer, and that most of the credit for the brilliant
   victory at Cyzicus must be assigned to Thrasybulus. In this judgement,
   Kagan agrees with Cornelius Nepos, who said that the Athenians'
   extravagant opinion of Alcibiades's abilities and valor was his chief
   misfortune.
   Félix Auvray (1830-1833): Alcibiade with the Courtesans (1833), Museum
   of Fine Arts of Valenciennes
   Enlarge
   Félix Auvray (1830-1833): Alcibiade with the Courtesans (1833), Museum
   of Fine Arts of Valenciennes

   Press argues that "though Alcibiades can be considered a good general
   on the basis of his performance in the Hellespont, he would not be
   considered so on the basis of his performance in Sicily", but "the
   strengths of Alcibiades' performance as a general outweigh his faults".
   Professors David McCann and Barry Strauss attempt a comparison between
   Alcibiades and Douglas MacArthur, pointing out that "both men stood out
   as military leaders to whom a mystique attached itself".

Oratorical skill

   Plutarch asserts that "Alcibiades was a most able speaker in addition
   to his other gifts", while Theophrastus argues that Alcibiades was the
   most capable of discovering and understanding what was required in a
   given case. Nevertheless, he would often stumble in the midst of his
   speech, but then he would resume and proceed with all the caution in
   the world. Even the lisp he had, which was noticed by Aristophanes,
   made his talk persuasive and full of charm. Eupolis says that he was
   "prince of talkers, but in speaking most incapable"; which is to say,
   more eloquent in his private discourses than when orating before the
   ecclesia. For his part, Demosthenes underscores the fact that
   Alcibiades was regarded as "the ablest speaker of the day".
   Paparrigopoulos does not accept Demosthenes's opinion, but acknowledges
   that the Athenian statesman could sufficiently support his case. Kagan
   acknowledges his rhetorical power, whilst Thomas Habinek, professor of
   Classics at the University of Southern California, believes that the
   orator Alcibiades seemed to be whatever his audience needed on any
   given occasion. According to Habinek, in the field of oratory, the
   people responded to Alcibiades' affection with affection of their own.
   Therefore, the orator was "the institution of the city talking to - and
   loving - itself". According to Aristophanes Athens "yearns for him, and
   hates him too, but wants him back".

Citations

    1. ^ ^a ^b A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 59 etc.
    2. ^ ^a ^b ^c P.B. Kern, Ancient Siege Warfare, 151
    3. ^ C.A. Cox, Houshold Interests, 144
    4. ^ Plato, Alcibiades 1, 121a
    5. ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedic Dictionary The Helios.
       (1952).
    6. ^ N. Denyer, Commentary of Plato's Alcibiades, 88-89
    7. ^ Plato, Symposium, 220e
    8. ^ I. Sykoutris, Introduction to Symposium, 159-180
    9. ^ Plato, Symposium, 215a-222b
   10. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 6
   11. ^ ^a ^b ^c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 8
   12. ^ A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 339
   13. ^ ^a ^b R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 353
   14. ^ ^a ^b ^c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 14
   15. ^ Thucydides, V, 45
   16. ^ A.W. Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 70
   17. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 15
   18. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 13
   19. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, XVI
   20. ^ Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 22
   21. ^ ^a ^b Platias-Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 237-246
   22. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 322
   23. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 20
   24. ^ ^a ^b L. Strauss, The City and Man, 104
   25. ^ Thucydides, VI, 26
   26. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 19
   27. ^ Thucydides, VI, 29
   28. ^ Thucydides, VI, 61
   29. ^ ^a ^b Thucydides, VI, 53
   30. ^ D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 273
   31. ^ Thucydides, VI, 74
   32. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 23
   33. ^ ^a ^b Thucydides, VI, 89-90
   34. ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d D. Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 282-283
   35. ^ Thucydides, VII, 18
   36. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 24 and Thucydides, VIII, 26
   37. ^ ^a ^b ^c "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2002).
   38. ^ Plutarch, Lysander, 22 and Agesilaus, III
   39. ^ P.J. Rhodes, A History of the Classical Greek World, 144
   40. ^ ^a ^b Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8. 45
   41. ^ ^a ^b Thucydides, VIII, 46
   42. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 47
   43. ^ T. Buckley, Aspects of Greek History, 411
   44. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 25
   45. ^ R. Sealey, A History of the Greek City States, 359
   46. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 48
   47. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 49
   48. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 50
   49. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 51
   50. ^ Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8. 53
   51. ^ ^a ^b D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 136-138
   52. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 366
   53. ^ ^a ^b ^c Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 8. 56
   54. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 73
   55. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 76
   56. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 81
   57. ^ ^a ^b ^c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 26
   58. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 389
   59. ^ ^a ^b ^c Thucydides, VIII, 82
   60. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 97
   61. ^ Thucydides, VIII, 88
   62. ^ Cartwright-Warner, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 301
   63. ^ ^a ^b ^c Plutarch, Alcibiades, 27
   64. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 406
   65. ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1. 5
   66. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 408
   67. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 28
   68. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410
   69. ^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Diodorus, XIII, 50-51
   70. ^ ^a ^b Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.1. 17-23
   71. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410-413
   72. ^ Diodorus, Library, 52-53
   73. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 429
   74. ^ ^a ^b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 66. 3
   75. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 30
   76. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 410
   77. ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1, 4, 8-12
   78. ^ B. Due, The Return of Alcibiades, 39
   79. ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1, 4, 13
   80. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 32
   81. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 34
   82. ^ D Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 290
   83. ^ S. Price, Religions of the Ancient Greeks, 54
   84. ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1, 4, 18
   85. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 33
   86. ^ ^a ^b A. Andrewes, The Spartan Resurgence, 490
   87. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 443
   88. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 444
   89. ^ For the accepted account of the battle see Plutarch, Alcibiades,
       35 or the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, 4.
   90. ^ G. Cawkell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War, 143
   91. ^ Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 447
   92. ^ ^a ^b B. Perrin, The Death of Alcibiades , 25-37
   93. ^ ^a ^b Xenophon, Hellenica, 2.1. 25
   94. ^ ^a ^b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 105
   95. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 39
   96. ^ ^a ^b ^c Thucydides, VI, 15
   97. ^ Plutarch, The Comparison of Alcibiades with Coriolanus, 6
   98. ^ ^a ^b Diodorus, Library, xiii, 68. 5
   99. ^ ^a ^b S. Press, Was Alcibiades a Good General?
   100. ^ Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.4. 18
   101. ^ ^a ^b ^c Demosthenes, Against Meidias, 144-145
   102. ^ ^a ^b D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 32-33
   103. ^ Isocrates, Concerning the Team of Horses, 15
   104. ^ Lysias, Against Alcibiades 1, 1
   105. ^ Lysias, Against Alcibiades 2, 10
   106. ^ Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians, 28
   107. ^ Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, ii, 13
   108. ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 41
   109. ^ ^a ^b Andocides, Against Alcibiades, 19
   110. ^ Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades, XI
   111. ^ M.F. McGregor, The Genius of Alkibiades, 27-50
   112. ^ ^a ^b ^c Κ. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Αβ,
       264-268
   113. ^ W. Ellis, Alcibiades, 18
   114. ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 55 etc.
   115. ^ A.G. Platias and C. Koliopoulos, Thucydides on Strategy, 240
   116. ^ Κ. Paparrigopoulos, History of the Greek Nation, Αβ, 272
   117. ^ A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 206
   118. ^ ^a ^b A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 202-203
   119. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 17
   120. ^ ^a ^b ^c D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 419-420
   121. ^ Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades, VII
   122. ^ D. McCann - B. Strauss, War and Democracy, xxv
   123. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 10
   124. ^ Aristophanes, Wasps, 44
   125. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 1
   126. ^ D. Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire, 178
   127. ^ ^a ^b T. Habinek, Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory, 23-24
   128. ^ Aristophanes, Frogs, 1425
   129. ^ E. Corrigan, Plato's Dialectic at Play, 169
   130. ^ G.A. Scott, Plato's Socrates as Educator, 19
   131. ^ Plato, Apology, 33a
   132. ^ N. Endres, Alcibiades
   133. ^ T.T.B. Ryder, Alcibiades, 32
   134. ^ J. Richards, The Gods Abandon Alcibiades
   135. ^ Isocrates, Busiris, 5
   136. ^ ^a ^b Plutarch, Alcibiades, 7
   137. ^ Y. Lee Too, The Rhetoric of Identity in Isocrates, 216
   138. ^ D. Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens, 30
   139. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 12
   140. ^ Plato, Symposium, 221a
   141. ^ I. Sykoutris, Symposium of Plato (Comments), 225
   142. ^ Thucydides, I, 22
   143. ^ Donald Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, 385
   144. ^ R.J. Buck, Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy, 27-28
   145. ^ ^a ^b R.J. Littman, The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus, 271
   146. ^ J. Hatzfeld, Alcibiade, 271
   147. ^ Plutarch, Alcibiades, 36 and Comparison with Coriolanus, 2
   148. ^ A. Wolpert, Remembering Defeat, 5
   149. ^ H.T. Peck, Harpers Dictionary of Classical Antiquities and W.
       Smith, New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, 39
   150. ^ Isocrates, Concerning the Team of Horses, 40
   151. ^ A. Vlachos, Thucydides' Bias, 204

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