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2005 Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal fire

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   Hemel Hempstead in the UK
   Hemel Hempstead in the UK

      In this satellite photo the pollution from the explosions, appearing
      black, is spreading in two main streams from the explosion site at the
      apex of the inverted 'v'. The orange dot is a marker not the actual
      fire.
      Enlarge
      In this satellite photo the pollution from the explosions, appearing
      black, is spreading in two main streams from the explosion site at the
      apex of the inverted 'v'.
      The orange dot is a marker not the actual fire.

      The fire seen from a vantage point between the Northgate and 3Com
      buildings.
      Enlarge
      The fire seen from a vantage point between the Northgate and 3Com
      buildings.

      Smoke from blasts, six hours after and twenty five miles away in
      Buckinghamshire.
      Enlarge
      Smoke from blasts, six hours after and twenty five miles away in
      Buckinghamshire.

      The smoke plume from Dunsmore, Bucks (about twenty miles away).
      Enlarge
      The smoke plume from Dunsmore, Bucks (about twenty miles away).

      Smoke is visible from the banks of the Thames in Fulham, West London
      (about twenty two miles away).
      Enlarge
      Smoke is visible from the banks of the Thames in Fulham, West London
      (about twenty two miles away).

   The 2005 Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal fire began after a series
   of explosions early on the morning of 11 December 2005. The terminal,
   generally known as the Buncefield Depot, is an oil storage facility
   located near the M1 motorway on the edge of Hemel Hempstead in
   Hertfordshire, England. These were some of the largest explosions ever
   to occur in the country, and the incident has been described as the
   biggest of its kind in peacetime Europe. The tank fires were
   extinguished by the afternoon of 13 December 2005. However, one storage
   tank re-ignited in the evening, and the firefighters left it to burn,
   rather than attempting to re-extinguish it.

The incident

Explosion and fire

   The first and largest explosion occurred at 06:03 UTC near container
   912. From all accounts, it seems to have been an unconfined vapour
   cloud explosion. An inversion layer permitted people to hear it from a
   hundred miles (160 km) away; there are reports it was heard as far away
   as France and the Netherlands. The British Geological Survey monitored
   the event, which measured 2.4 on the Richter scale. People were woken
   in their beds even in South London. Subsequent explosions occurred at
   06:27 and 06:28. Witnesses observed flames hundreds of feet high from
   many miles away, with the smoke cloud visible from space, and as far
   north as Lincolnshire.

   Damage from the blasts, ranging from broken windows and blown-in or
   warped front doors to an entire wall being removed from a warehouse,
   occurred more than half a mile (800 m) away. Buildings in neighbouring
   St Albans also suffered: for example, Townsend School had serious blast
   damage, and a window was blown out of St Albans Abbey (both c. 5 miles
   (8 km) from the site). Several nearby office blocks were hit so badly
   that almost every window, front and back, was blown in as the explosion
   ripped through them. Had this happened during the working day, these
   offices would have been full of people; there is no doubt that this
   would have caused dozens of deaths. Reports also indicated that cars in
   nearby streets caught fire. The roof of at least one house was blown
   off. Buildings in the vicinity were evacuated by police, not only
   because of the smoke and possibility of more explosions but because of
   the danger of structural damage making the buildings unstable.

   There were 43 reported injuries; two people were deemed to be seriously
   injured enough to be kept in hospital, one in Watford General Hospital,
   with breathing difficulties, and another in Hemel Hempstead Hospital;
   they were not in a life-threatening condition. Some early media reports
   spoke of eight fatalities, but these may have been persons missing. All
   members of staff from the terminal were accounted for.

   Hertfordshire police and fire services and the MP for the area, Mike
   Penning, have made clear that there were seven fuel tanks on the site
   which, as of 14:00 on 12 December, had not been affected; these tanks
   were at risk of exploding if the fire were to spread.

Tackling the blaze

   Around 150 firefighters began to tackle the blaze at 08:20 on the
   morning of 12 December, putting in containment measures before applying
   a large quantity of foam. Plans had been in place to start using foam
   at midnight on 11 December, but were delayed by last-minute concerns
   over possible pollution of local rivers and underlying water sources
   from contaminated water used to fight the fires. Six high volume pumps
   were used to extract 25,000 litres of water per minute from a reservoir
   2.4 kilometers from the fire, with six more high volume pumps deployed
   at various locations to serve as boosters. 32,000 litres of aerated
   foam per minute were directed against the fire for just over four
   hours, after which the pumping rate was reduced. Half the 20 individual
   fires were reported extinguished by midday. By 16:30 it was reported
   that a further two tank fires had been extinguished, but that one of
   the earlier extinguished tanks had ruptured and re-ignited, and was now
   threatening to cause the explosion of an adjacent tank. This led to the
   M1 motorway being closed again, the public exclusion area being widened
   and firefighters being temporarily withdrawn until the risk from the
   threatened tank could be determined.

   Firefighting operations were resumed at about 20:00 and it was still
   anticipated that all fires could be extinguished during the night.
   Further damage occurred to one of the storage tanks in the early hours
   of the morning, causing firefighters to be withdrawn once more, but
   operations resumed at 08:30. By midday on the 13 December, all but
   three fires had been extinguished, although the largest tank was still
   burning. The smoke plume had been considerably reduced and was more
   grey, indicating the amount of vapourised water now joining the smoke.
   Firefighters were confident that the remaining fires could be
   extinguished during the day. It was reported at 16:45 that all tank
   fires were now extinguished, although some smaller fires remained. 75%
   of firefighters for Hertfordshire were involved in fighting the fire,
   together with support from 16 other brigades.

   A further fire broke out during the early morning of 14 December.
   Firefighters were of the view that extinguishing it would leave the
   risk of petroleum vapour re-igniting or exploding, so it would be
   better to allow the fire, which was well contained, to burn itself out.

   Hertfordshire Fire Service's deputy chief Mark Yates stated that
   escaping petroleum vapour was the most likely cause of the original
   explosion and fire.

   Some chemical components of firefighting foams may present considerable
   risks to water resources and various ecosystems, particularly those in
   riverine environments.

Smoke cloud

   The black smoke cloud, which was clearly visible from satellite
   photographs, drifted at high altitude (around 9,000 feet, 2750 m)
   towards Reading and Swindon, and could be seen across much of South
   East England. The small particles in the smoke, which contained
   hydrocarbons, can be an irritant but had low toxicity and were not
   expected to cause any long-term harm. The Met Office issued warnings
   that the smoke in the atmosphere could come down in rainfall during the
   night of 11 December.

   For the first two days of the fire, the high thermal energy made the
   plume highly buoyant; this, together with settled weather conditions,
   allowed the plume to rise to a great height with little cross-mixing.
   When the fire was reduced in intensity it was reported to be possible
   that the plume would be less buoyant and that ground-level smoke
   concentrations could then rise significantly.

   By 12 December, it was reported that the smoke cloud had reached
   northern France; it was expected to arrive in northern Spain by the
   weekend.

   To investigate the smoke cloud the Facility for Airborne Atmospheric
   Measurements, a research aircraft operated jointly by NERC and the Met
   Office, made two flights on the 12th and 13 December. In the first
   flight the edge of the plume was followed along the south coast of
   England. Carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and ozone concentrations were
   found to be low with soot particles being the major component in the
   cloud. The second flight went into the centre of the plume to obtain
   data to help forecasting and emergency teams.

Reactions and responses

Evacuations and closures

   Around 2,000 people from the Hemel Hempstead area were evacuated from
   their homes, and emergency services asked residents of the
   smoke-affected areas to close their windows and doors and stay inside.
   Hertfordshire Constabulary advised people who had houses with smashed
   windows to seek refuge with friends or family nearby if possible. Some
   people whose homes were damaged by the blast were placed in hotels,
   while others stayed in a nearby shopping centre. Total, the operator of
   the Buncefield depot, set up a helpline for people whose properties had
   been badly damaged by the explosion, and called in local authorities
   and the Salvation Army to provide accommodation or other help for those
   affected by the explosion.

   About 227 schools across Hertfordshire and Buckinghamshire as well as
   libraries and other public buildings were closed on December 12 and
   December 13 for public safety. Police and local authorities advised
   residents to consult the "Hertfordshire Direct" website for up-to-date
   information. The University of Hertfordshire campus located further
   afield in Hatfield remained open. Meanwhile, 78 schools in Luton
   Borough were closed on 13 December and a limited number of schools in
   Bedfordshire. These were closed on the advice of Hertfordshire's Health
   Protection Agency that all schools should be closed in a 10-mile radius
   of the incident site due to concerns of the smoke plume and children's
   health. They reopened as normal on 14 December. (ref)

Transport disruption

   The incident occurred close to junction 8 of the M1 motorway. The
   motorway was shut between junctions 12 and 6a (about eighteen miles or
   29 km) shortly after the incident. Other roads in the vicinity,
   including the short M10 motorway, were also closed.

   Some local petrol stations reported long queues as people started panic
   buying. A spokesman for the Department for Trade and Industry gave
   assurances that no petrol shortage was likely to result from the
   incident.

   The Oil Terminal supplied 30% of Heathrow Airport's fuel, and because
   of the fire, the airport had to start rationing aircraft's fuel. Some
   long-haul flights to the Far-East and Australia had to "pit-stop" at
   Stansted Airport or other European airports to refuel, while short-haul
   operators were asked to fuel their planes for the round trip before
   flying to Heathrow. Fuel shortages continued for months after the
   explosion.

Business disruption

   A number of companies were affected by inability to reach premises used
   for distribution, even where the premises themselves were largely
   unaffected by the blast.

   The worst hit of the buildings were the Northgate Information Solutions
   headquarters and the Fujifilm building, both of which were totally
   devastated. Northgate is an IT company, one of the directors of which
   is Stephen Lander, former head of MI5. As of December 13 their building
   was completely unusable, and it may have to be demolished if it is
   found to be unsafe. The Fujifilm building was rendered unsafe, and
   demolition began soon afterwards. By June 2006 it had been completely
   removed from the site.

   The Northgate and Fujifilm buildings were closest to the blast,
   although the surrounding Catherine House (to the north), Keystone
   Distribution building (to the west), and 3Com Corporation and RO
   buildings (to the south), were also extensively damaged. As a result of
   the destruction of the equipment in the Northgate building several
   websites they host were briefly inaccessible — including that of the
   Labour Party. Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge was also affected
   with the IT system dealing with admissions and discharges needing to be
   replaced for several days by a manual system.

Local criticism

   Criticisms were expressed by local citizens and the local MP that
   originally the depot had been constructed away from other buildings,
   but that developmental pressures had led to both houses and commercial
   premises being built near to the depot.

Legal actions

   A total of 2,700 claims have been filed by residents, businesses and
   insurers. A group of 146 claimants is hoping to bring a class action
   against Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd. On 17 March 2006 a High Court
   official, Senior Master Turner, adjourned a hearing on whether to
   permit the class action until October 2006 at the earliest.

Groundwater pollution

   In May 2006 Three Valleys Water announced that it had detected the fire
   retardant perfluorooctane sulfonate ( PFOS), used in fire fighting
   foam, in a ground water bore hole close to the Buncefield site. It
   stated that no water from this well entered the public water supply and
   that a nearby well and pumping station had been closed since the fire
   as a precaution. The chemical is a known health risk and the UK
   government had been about to ban its use. However just prior to the
   announcement the Drinking Water Inspectorate announced that it was
   increasing the safe level of the chemical in drinking water. This
   prompted the Hemel Hempstead MP, Mike Penning to accuse the government
   of changing the rules to suit the situation in which PFOS levels in
   drinking water in the area may rise in the future. (ref)

Enquiry

   A government enquiry held jointly by the Health and Safety Executive
   (HSE) and the Environment Agency was started, but calls for a full
   public enquiry were declined . The Board included Lord Newton of
   Braintree, Prof Dougal Drysdale, an authority on fire safety and Dr
   Peter Baxter, a medical expert. Environment Agency and HSE staff were
   also on the board. The board's aim was to identify the immediate causes
   of the explosion, rather than consider who was to blame for any
   deficiencies, so as not to prejudice further legal proceedings. An
   initial progress report by the Major Incident Investigation Board on
   22nd February 2006 did not go into the causes of the explosion, but
   looked at the environmental impact.

   A further announcement was made on 9 May 2006 about the sequence of
   events which enabled the explosion to occur. Starting at 19:00 on the
   evening of 10 December Tank 912, towards the north west of the main
   depot, was filled with unleaded petrol. At midnight the terminal
   closed, and a check was made of the contents of tanks which found
   everything normal. From approximately 03:00 the level gauge for Tank
   912 began indicating an unchanging level reading, despite filling
   continuing at 550 cubic metres per hour. Calculations show that the
   tank would have begun to overflow at about 05:20. 40 minutes later, an
   estimated 300 tonnes of petrol would have spilled down the side of the
   tank onto the ground inside bund A, a semi-enclosed compound
   surrounding several tanks. There is evidence suggesting that a high
   level switch, which should have detected that the tank was full and
   shut off the supply, failed to operate. CCTV footage shows a cloud of
   vapour from 1-2 metres deep flowing away from the tank. By 06:01, when
   the first explosion occurred, the cloud had spread beyond the
   boundaries of the site.

   The extent of the damage meant it was not possible to determine the
   exact source of ignition, but possibilities include an emergency
   generator and the depot's fire pump system. The investigators did not
   believe that it was caused either by the driver of a fuel tanker, as
   had been speculated, or by anyone using a mobile phone.

   It was felt unlikely that the explosion had a widespread effect on air
   quality at ground level.

The terminal

   The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal (HOSL - Hertfordshire Oil
   Storage Ltd), generally known as the Buncefield complex, was the fifth
   largest oil-products storage depot in the UK, with a capacity of
   approximately 60 million Imperial gallons (273 million litres) of fuel,
   although it was not always filled. This was approximately 5% of UK oil
   storage capacity. It was a major hub on the UK's oil pipeline network
   (UKOP) with pipelines to Humberside and Merseyside and is an important
   fuel source to the British aviation industry, providing aircraft fuel
   for local airports including London Gatwick, London Heathrow and Luton
   airports. Approximately half of the complex is dedicated to the storage
   of aviation fuel. The remainder of the complex stores petrol and diesel
   fuel for petrol stations across much of the South-East of England. The
   terminal is owned by TOTAL UK Limited (60%) and Texaco 40%.

   The seat of the fire, and the worst damaged section, was "HOSL West",
   used by Total and Texaco to store a variety of fuels, and the
   neighbouring British Pipeline Agency area.

Initial speculation on causes

   The police issued a statement saying that they were treating the
   incident as an accident as opposed to a terrorist attack. Rumours of a
   deliberate attack, in the form of an aeroplane deliberately crashed
   into the site, spread in the initial aftermath of the explosion as a
   result of the distinctive noise the event made. They may have been
   given some credence because of the proximity of Luton airport to the
   site of the incident, and the fact that numerous flight paths
   crisscross the area.

   Italian television stations early on the morning of the fire described
   the event as a possible terrorist attack and went to the extent of
   showing features on the July 2005 terrorist bombings. Speculation about
   the possible terrorist nature of the blasts was prompted by the fact
   that a videotape allegedly released by al-Qaeda four days previously
   had called for attacks on fuel depots and refineries containing oil
   "stolen" from Muslim countries. However, the cause of the blasts will
   likely not be known until a full investigation is completed.

   An oil industry specialist speculated on BBC News that a vapour leak
   could have built up to explosive concentrations because of the ground
   frost in the area keeping vapour concentration at ground level. This
   would have resulted in a fuel-air explosion. It is industry practice
   for detection systems to be in place to reveal leakages. In order for
   this scenario to be fulfilled, there must have been a leakage that was
   not picked up by the leak detection system.

   A BBC News 24 interview with a petrol tanker driver, who was about to
   load his tanker at 06:00, reported a cloud of mist rolling in from the
   tank farm area behind the loading bay. All electric lights were turned
   off and they were ordered to leave the site on foot. As he was doing
   so, the blast blew him off his feet. In another interview, a security
   guard in a nearby office building reported an unusual smell of petrol
   inside his building before the explosion. Hertfordshire police reported
   speaking to a tanker driver concerned that switching the engine cut-off
   on his tanker might have triggered the explosion.

   Other safety experts spoke of a known "Weekend effect" in industry, in
   which weekend maintenance creates an unsafe condition.

   A retired military explosives safety officer submitted his published
   paper on this explosion to HSE's in-house Inquiry. The paper was
   designed to help those who lived close to petrol storage depots and who
   were worried about the risks they and their buildings faced. It held
   views different from those of other experts whose opinions had been
   voiced publicly. It was critical of HSE's general safety culture and
   showed that in the UK the severities and frequencies of explosions like
   that at Buncefield were unacceptably high.
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